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Introduction to the Portfolio
This portfolio is comprised of two volumes that has been produced in fulfilment of the 
criteria for the Psych.D in Clinical Psychology and presents the academic work that 
was completed over three years. The portfolio is organised chronologically to 
demonstrate the acquisition and development of academic, clinical and research skills 
throughout training.
Volume one is divided into three sections: academic, clinical and research. The 
academic section contains four essays which examine subject areas associated with 
the four core placements: Adult Mental Health; Learning Disabilities; Child and 
Family and finally. Older people. The clinical section contains summaries of the four 
core clinical placements, one specialist clinical case report and summaries of each of 
the clinical placements. The research section contains the Service Related Research 
Project from year one, the Qualitative Research Projects completed in year two, the 
Major Research Project completed in year three, and a research log which details 
research skills, knowledge and experience gained throughout the three years of 
training.
Volume two of the portfolio comprises the confidential dossier, which details the 
experience gained on the clinical placements. It contains: the placement contracts; 
clinical placement evaluation forms; logbooks of clinical activity for the four core 
clinical placements and the two specialist clinical placements; the five case reports for 
the four core clinical placements and one specialist placement. Due to the confidential 
nature of volume two, it is retained by the Department of Clinical Psychology at the 
University of Surrey.
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Introduction
This essay will seek to evaluate two interventions for Major Recurrent Depressive 
Disorder (MRDD). The theory and process of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) 
and psychoanalysis is outlined within their historical and clinical perspectives and 
outcome evidence for their application and efficacy is reviewed accordingly. The 
diverse nature of these two approaches is discussed and the philosophical and 
theoretical difficulties encountered in developing and applying effective treatments 
within publicly funded health services are considered.
Definition of Major Recurrent Depressive Disorder (MRDD)
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) the essential feature of MRDD is that it is cyclical 
in nature ie. the individual should experience recurrent Major Depressive Episodes 
(see definition below) that are at least two months apart. During that two month period 
there should be either full or partial remission of symptoms such that they no longer 
meet the criteria for diagnosis of a Major Depressive Episode (MDE).
Given the above, the occurrence of each MDE^ is characterised by social withdrawal 
and depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure (anhedonia) in almost all of the 
person’s activities that were previously considered enjoyable. The person may 
describe themselves as feeling sad, discouraged and hopeless (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). It 
is distinct from the extreme sadness one may feel when bereaved. In each MDE there 
are disturbances in appetite (which if severe are evidenced by either a significant loss 
or gain in weight) and sleeping pattern. The person may wake either in the middle of 
the night or early morning and have difficulty returning to sleep. There may be a 
decrease in sexual desire and activity. The person may experience extreme lethargy, 
feelings of worthlessness and guilt often through focussing on very negative 
evaluations of the self based on a mis-interpretation of neutral and adverse events. 
Huge effort may be needed to approach minor tasks, taking much longer than usual to
 ^ Throughout this essay the term ‘Major Depressive Episode’ is always referred to within the context o f 
its occurrence in MRDD.
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accomplish. Psychomotor agitation in the form of hand-wringing, pacing or scratching 
and pulling of the skin may be present. The person may show a slowness and poverty 
in their speech and movement. Impairment in thinking, concentrating and memory 
capacity is common, with associated difficulties in reasoning and making decisions. 
There may be a preoccupation with death evidenced by attempting or planning 
suicide, with the belief that others would be better off without them. The individual’s 
presentation and facial expressions may reflect their depressed mood. Alternatively, 
they may demonstrate a heightened awareness of somatic complaints and appear 
irritable and frustrated over minor problems, often blaming others and not able to 
acknowledge feelings of sadness. DSM-IV-TR (2000) states that at least 5 of 9 
specific depressive symptoms (which must include depressed mood or loss of interest 
or pleasure) must be present nearly every day, and persist for most of the day for at 
least 2 weeks to make a diagnosis of an MDE and that symptoms should cause 
significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning, 
such as feeding, clothing and washing oneself. Further classification denotes severity 
i.e. Mild, Moderate, Severe with Psychotic Features or Severe without Psychotic 
Features (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). MRDD is a potentially life-threatening condition.
Course of MRDD
MRDD can begin at any age and runs a variable course. Some individuals may 
experience isolated Major Depressive Episodes with long periods (sometimes years) 
of remission in between. Others may suffer multiple episodes that occur in quick 
succession before enjoying a long period of remission, or from an increasing 
frequency of episodes as they get older. The risk of recurrent episodes increases 
significantly after a second episode with 70% going on to experience a third episode, 
and of those, 90% go on to suffer a fourth episode.
Beck’s cognitive model of depression (1967,1976)
Until Beck developed a cognitive model of depression in the late 1960’s the cognitive
18
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deficits seen in depression were viewed very much as secondary to disturbances in 
mood and unsuitable as a target for therapeutic intervention. Since that time. Beck’s 
model has become widely adopted by clinicians and has been the subject of much 
evaluation through research. The essence of the model is that assumptions or schemata 
about the self, the world and others are formed in response to early experience and 
constitute a person’s core beliefs by which all future interactions and events are 
filtered and evaluated (Beck 1967, 1976).
It is of course a normal process to form schemata so that the individual is able to refer 
new incoming information to past experience and so infer the likely outcome of 
current and future interactions and events. However, according to the nature of early 
experience, dysfunctional schemata or assumptions may form that result in patterns of 
behaviour that are unhelpful to the individual. For example, if a child has learnt that 
its parent only shows love and affection when he or she is undemanding i.e. affection 
from the parent is conditional upon the child displaying certain behaviours, then this 
could result in all future significant relationships being judged and evaluated in the 
same way. The child may develop as one who is unable to assert or express 
themselves in any real or valid sense, through fear of rejection or the loss of an 
intimate relationship. This may result in a lifetime of unsatisfactory and unrewarding 
relationships whereby that person’s emotional needs are never fulfilled or met. In 
itself, at some point during the lifecourse this pattern of interaction may lead to 
repeated episodes of depression (if one believes that to be happy one needs to be 
loved). But also, when loss or rejection does occur in later experience this may act as 
a trigger for negative thinking about the self. Negative thinking may be triggered 
whenever a critical incident occurs such as arguments with partners or colleagues and 
is directly informed by the dysfunctional assumptions formed through early 
experience, to which the individual yields (Fennell, 1989).
The cognitive model of depression suggests that negative automatic thoughts are a 
potent force in that they constitute an information processing bias. The situational 
trigger effectively selects for those negative thoughts, thus ensuring that any deliberate 
reasoning process which could disprove dysfunctional assumptions or lead to a 
rational evaluation of a given situation is effectively obscured. Additionally, 
unpleasant emotions such as sadness and isolation are evoked that are associated both
19
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with the triggering event and past similar events and also with predictions about future 
events (Fennell, 1989). For example, the depressed individual may have experienced 
earlier losses to which an element of self-blame may be attached. That sense of blame 
may be recreated in situations such as losing their job e.g. “it’s all my fault. I’m 
useless, I always make a mess of things I value, nothing will ever go right for me” and 
is accompanied by feelings of sadness and rejection. Thus, the person over-generalises 
and selects for the negative aspects of the situation. This produces a cascade of 
behavioural, emotional, cognitive and physical depressive symptoms. The person 
may find it impossible to initiate action and withdraws feeling overwhelmed by 
anxiety or guilt unable to concentrate or make decisions, feeling hopeless and in 
despair. These symptoms understandably promote more negative thinking and account 
for the way in which an episode of MRDD can develop in intensity over a period of 
weeks or months (Beck, 1967).
Not all people who engage in negative thinking become depressed. For some 
individuals who have experienced adverse circumstances throughout their lives, a 
negative view of the world is a rational view; it fits with their reality and is a fair 
evaluation of the evidence. Depression is more likely to arise in response to trauma in 
individuals who on the basis of past experience have maintained an ‘optimistic bias’ 
rather than in those who are realistically negative (Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph 1996). 
There may be other pre-disposing variables for developing MRRD: biological, 
intellectual and social factors may play a part as well as innate temperament (Fennell, 
1989). Also, some individuals may defend against acknowledging their emotional 
needs to such an extent that cognitive processes are not informed by them. This may 
be the case where extreme deprivation has occurred in early childhood where 
unconscious emotional processing (an adaptive response) is unable to inform 
cognitions and subsequent actions and may result in a severe underlying pathology 
and personality disturbance from an early age (Bowlby, 1969). The emotions 
associated with the adverse event are effectively detached and stored where they 
cannot threaten the child’s conscious but unrealistic representations of relationships. 
In this regard, it is reasonable to assert that depression is a painful but healthy 
response to stored experience.
Beck’s cognitive model of depression identifies the symbiotic relationship between
20
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negative automatic thoughts and depressive symptoms and their role in maintaining 
and strengthening an MDE. This aspect of the model is focused upon in a cognitive 
behavioural intervention rather than the early experience implicit to the formation of 
dysfunctional assumptions. The client and therapist collaborate to solve problems 
through a process of guided discovery effected by Socratic questioning (Young & 
Beck, 1982). It is essential therefore that the client assumes an equal role with the 
therapist and does not seek to be persuaded by the therapist. This is a fundamental 
requirement of therapy without which it may be impossible to encourage the client to 
develop the skills needed for questioning negative thoughts as they arise. Cognitive 
behaviour therapy (CBT) is brief, usually around 8-10 sessions. For an MDE 
however this may be extended considerably (Fennell, 1989). Techniques focus on 
reducing depressive symptoms, countering hopelessness and helping the client to 
develop independent thinking and self-help skills. Additionally, sharing the cognitive 
model with the client and defining goals is implicit to CBT.
Cognitive behavioural strategies focus on identifying, questioning and testing negative 
automatic thoughts (NAT’s). Beck (1967) identified NAT’s as a ‘cognitive triad’ of 
distorted thinking about the self, the current situtation and the future and described 
them as pervasive, habitual, automatic, involuntary and made plausible through strong 
accompanying emotions (Beck, 1970).
Cognitive therapy recognises that strong emotions have lasting impact and are recalled 
more easily than thoughts, so clients are taught to think carefully about the last time 
they felt unpleasant emotions and to identify what they were doing at the time and the 
thoughts that accompanied or preceded the experience together with the intensity of 
their belief in those thoughts. Once negative thinking has been identified through 
sensitive and skilled questioning by the therapist the task ahead is one of verbally 
challenging them and setting up behavioural experiments in order to test out their 
validity.
There is some debate as to whether endogenous or melancholic depression responds to 
CBT. Rush & Shaw (1983) suggest that CBT is unlikely to be successful for these 
conditions whereas Kovacs, Rush, Beck & Hollon (1981) found no clear evidence to 
preclude CBT where endogenous symptoms may be present. It is of course highly
21
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contentious to attribute depressive symptoms entirely to internal (except in cases of 
organic deterioration) or external factors and no doubt this area remains a theoretical 
and diagnostic stumbling block.
The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) conducted a major research 
programme in 1989 comparing the efficacy of CBT, Interpersonal psychotherapy and 
imipramine in the treatment of depression. Two hundred and thirty nine patients who 
were either moderately or severely depressed took part. Roth, Fonagy, Parry and 
Target (1996) report that a reanalysis of the data showed no difference in effect (with 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck, 1961) and Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Depression (HRSD, Luborsky et al, 1975) as outcome measures) between treatment 
conditions for less depressed patients but did indicate that medication was 
significantly more effective than CBT in patients who were severely depressed. 
However, at follow-up 18 months later 24% of the CBT patients remained well 
compared to 23% and 16% of the IPT and imipramine samples respectively. Recovery 
without relapse was defined by the absence of any two-week period of symptoms 
meeting the criteria for a MDE during the follow-up phase. Hollon, DeRubeis, Evans 
and Wiemer (1992) used a similar design to that of the NIMH study in comparing 
imipramine alone to CBT alone, or to CBT with imipramine. Equal efficacy was 
demonstrated for all 3 conditions but at 2 year follow-up relapse rates were 
significantly lower for the CBT group (18% either alone or with imipramine) than 
those in the imipramine alone condition (50%). Furthermore, the medication only 
group showed a mean relapse time of 3.3 months after treatment compared to 17.3 
months for the cognitive therapy groups. However, as only 44 patients of the original 
64 were available for analysis at follow-up, results should be interpreted with caution.
In an interesting small scale study Scott, Tacchi, Jones & Scott (1997) utilised 
schema-based therapy as part of a brief cognitive therapy (BCT) (Scott, T995) 
intervention that was employed as an adjunct to treatment as usual (TAU) for patients 
suffering from major depressive disorder. Schema Therapy (ST) (Young, 1990/1999) 
developed out of Beck’s cognitive therapy for depression (Beck et al, 1979) and 
attempts to address some of the limitations that earlier CBT models may demonstrate 
in treating chronic and recurrent depression. ST focuses on maladaptive schemas that 
may have developed in childhood or adolescence and the activation of those schemas
22
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in response to life events. A full discussion of ST is beyond the scope of this essay, 
but essentially, ST uses the therapeutic relationship as a treatment tool for activating 
and confronting schemas (Young, 1990/1999) and promotes the client’s affective 
arousal in relation to maladaptive schemas in order to bring about modification of 
those schemas. Accordingly, Safran & Segal (1990) suggest that cognition is much 
more amenable to change when accompanied by strong emotions. All patients in the 
study above continued with TAU whilst in addition, the intervention group received 7 
once a week half hour sessions of BCT. Results at follow-up (58 weeks from 
beginning of intervention) showed a significant difference between the groups in 
depressive symptoms as measured on the BDI and HRSD with more subjects in the 
BCT group meeting recovery criteria than in the TAU group (n=8). Critically, only 
one patient in the BCT group relapsed during the follow up period compared to four 
in the TAU group. Also, a significant difference in group attrition rates at the end of 
the study may signal improved treatment compliance for the intervention group. 
However, as the authors point out, considerable skill on the part of the therapist is 
needed to provide meaningful therapy in such a short space of time (7 once-weekly 
half hour sessions) and they do not advocate its use by ‘novice’ therapists.
Freud’s theory of Psychoanalysis (1893 -  1960f
According to Freud, psychoanalysis is a theory of psychic energy and the differing 
amounts by which it is distributed throughout the psychic apparatus namely the id, the 
ego and the super-ego. In life it is the ego’s task to mediate between the instinctual 
(biological) demands of the id and the authoritative (parental, societal and cultural) 
demands of the super-ego, whilst taking into account the limitations of external 
reality. The ego behaves therefore as a kind of central executive whereby perceptual 
and cognitive processes are utilised in order to ensure an adaptive response both to 
internal demands and external events. In Freud’s view the resulting tri-partite 
structure of mental life has two possible outcomes. In the first scenario there is an 
integration of past and present i.e. the id and the super-ego (essentially heredity and 
the past experience of others) operate upon the ego (the individual’s own current
 ^ The period in which Freud produced his complete psychological works. The reference section details 
material referred to for this essay.
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experience) as conflicting and dynamic forces whereby the ego selects that which will 
be permitted or prohibited whilst remaining coherent and strong. In the alternative 
scenario should the ego not succeed in satisfying the demands of the id and the super­
ego and reconciling them with external reality then conflict ensues in which the ego 
may become weakened and altered. In psychoanalytic theory the nature of the 
conflict and subsequent weakening of the ego is determined through the state of the 
internal and external relationships that the person holds. An external and much loved 
object (eg. the mother) has libidinal (sexual) energy invested into it by the ego which 
it (the ego) then withdraws back into itself. Depending on the amount of energy 
invested, the ego may be completely subsumed by the object. In essence, internal 
object relations are the individual’s internal mental representations of external objects 
i.e. the result of the external object being invested with libidinal energy. In depressive 
illness, Freud postulates that the individual is responding to loss of an object that was 
both loved and hated and through an unconscious internal identification with the 
object has internalised hate as well as love which is ultimately destructive because it 
weakens and alters the ego thereby inviting self-hatred.
The basis on which a psychoanalytic intervention proceeds is rooted in the alliance of 
analyst and client. It is primarily an emotional exercise in which the client is 
encouraged to collaborate. In Freud’s own words “the analytic physician and the 
client’s weakened ego....band themselves together into a party against the enemies, 
the instinctual demands of the id and the conscientious demands of the super-ego”. 
The client should tell the analyst all that he knows and conceals from others. This, 
hopefully, reveals a wealth of material which has felt the effects of the unconscious 
exerted upon it and thus signals the dominant themes therein. The aim of analysis is 
ultimately the evocation of affect and to make the unconscious conscious in order to 
extend self-knowledge so that the ego may be strengthened. The analyst’s 
interpretation of the client’s experience is aided and abetted through the processes of 
transference, free association, parapraxes (minor slip-ups in speech, writing and 
memory) and dreaming. Whilst the latter three processes have been taken up and 
adopted for use in common language, transference refers to the phenomena by which 
the client projects onto the analyst feelings and attitudes which he/she may hold with 
regard to parents, siblings, partners or authority figures. The client may see the 
analyst as a reincarnation of some important figure from the past. A major task for the
24
© Vanessa Bryant 2005
analyst is to help the client fully experience transference processes and to bring his 
attention to them as they arise. In this way the client is under no illusion and is able to 
acknowledge that transference processes (feelings of love, passion, hate and envy) are 
a reflection of and motivated by past experience and not the result of a “new, real life” 
(Freud, 1940a) and at the same time the analyst is able to keep his neutrality. Freud 
observed that that which was taken for real within the framework of transference is 
almost never unlearned. Freud’s observations are supported by recent information 
processing theories of cognition and emotion. Stimulus features that evoke intense 
affect for the client are likely to be subject to rapid processing and storage through 
multiple, parallel levels of input (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) whilst cognitive 
processing may be slower, serial, conscious and limited by capacity. The qualitatively 
different and anatomically separate nature of cognitive and emotional processing may 
go some way towards explaining the relative imperviousness that emotional memories 
have both to retrieval and re-evaluation but paradoxically also to their impermeability 
to memory loss (Brewin, 2001). The degree to which afferent and efferent connections 
between the neo-cortex (conscious processing) paralimbic and limbic system 
(emotional processing) effect inhibition or excitation within these structures is as yet 
not fully understood but indicate the possible neuro-correlates to evidence Freud’s 
abstract concepts of mental structure and provide insight with regard to the psycho­
analytical process itself and the mechanisms by which free association and dream 
interpretation (Freud’s ‘royal road to the unconscious’) may reactivate emotional 
memories for the client. In an MDE painful emotions associated with past loss or 
trauma that have been defended against are reactivated in response to cues of later 
rejection or losses that may bear similar features to the original stimulus, but their 
significance for the client may not be clear. In summary, a psychoanalytic intervention 
constitutes an interpretation of the evolving process (which signals important events 
for the client) between therapist and client as informed by psychoanalytic theory and 
strives to bring the contents of the unconscious into conscious awareness.
John Bowlby (1907-1990) was a major contributor to the expansion of psychoanalytic 
theory. In three papers Bowlby (1958, 1959 & 1960) outlined his formulation of 
Attachment Theory in which he departed from Freud’s interpretation of the 
mother/child relationship as one that is driven by reward or feeding (gratification of 
the id) but that there is instead a “primary attachment bond” between mother and child
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from birth that is driven by the need for love and affection. This view recognised the 
importance of the environment for the developing child and signals an “inter-personal, 
rather that a intra-personal process” (Holmes, 1995, p. 25). Winnicott also had similar 
ideas of an “environmental mother” as well as “object mother”. Winnicott (1965) 
states “there is no such thing as an individual but a society of parent and child whose 
interactions are gradually internalised to form the intrapsychic structures that 
psychoanalysis has delineated”. Mary Ainsworth, a contemporary of Bowlby’s 
developed a procedure known as the Strange Situation (Ainsworth & Wittig, 1969) in 
which the security of the child’s attachment to its mother was explored. The 
implications of this work are that secure attachments in infancy may act to provide the 
basis on which the child develops a sense of both intimacy and autonomy that persists 
into adulthood. Specifically, the development of depressive illness may signal “long 
buried yearnings for intimacy” (Holmes, 1997) resulting from insecure or 
unsatisfactory early attachment relationships.
Assessing the outcome in psychoanalysis for MRDD is problematic, not least because 
of the dearth of research so far as major controlled studies is concerned, but also 
because research tends to focus on outcome per se rather than diagnostic group. One 
such study is a follow-up report of 84 clients from the Tavistock clinic in London 3-9 
years after the end of therapy (Clememtel-Jones, Malan & Trauer, 1990). Clients 
were given a global outcome score based on the difference between ratings on the 
Menninger’s Health-Sickness scale (Luborsky, Auerbach, Chandler & Cohen, 1975) 
at intake and follow-up. Scores ranged from -2  (worse) to +4 (fully recovered) with 
an average outcome score of 1.19. Sixty patients had improved, whilst 24 were either 
worse or had not improved. Improvers had on average received twice as many 
sessions as non-improvers perhaps signalling their motivation to stay in therapy and 
get well. Additionally, good outcome correlated positively with capacity to relate, 
problem solving, and good initial adjustment. However, it is impossible to draw 
definitive conclusions as client conditions were not identified except to say that “21 
had some form of depressive disorder”. Furthermore, the study did not include a 
control group. Nevertheless, in a separate paper (Clememtel-Jones & Malan, 1988) 
some of these clients have been reported as single case studies. Four of those cases 
are relevant to this discussion in terms of outcome. In the first two cases (both male), 
one is suffering from a sense of loss and anger (in classical psychoanalysis depression
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is conceived of as unresolved anger with the other which is then turned against the 
self) and in the second case, loneliness, isolation and depression. These two clients 
are notable in that they did not respond to therapy, most probably due to their 
persecutory characteristics and schizoid tendencies. Freud (1940) suggested the 
necessity of ego ‘coherence’ in the application of psychoanalysis, the absence of 
which is a feature of psychosis. In contrast, successful outcome is reported for two 
clients suffering from depression. In the first of these, sadness and anger over lack of 
expressed affection in childhood from a mother who was “efficient but emotionally 
distant and apparently unloving” is the central issue. Therapy was directed at helping 
her to “get in touch with her feelings of sadness” and to “mourn future 
disappointments “ appropriately. In the second case, frequent depressions and anger 
with a mother were also the focal difficulties, seemingly motivated by a chaotic 
childhood full of conflict and guilt, rather than a lack of emotional expression as in the 
above case. In her initial assessment she states “I am frequently depressed and very 
frightened of being so, which tends to make me more depressed. Often I and life feel 
very empty” (p. 3 8) The formulation here identifies depression as a result of basic 
needs going unfulfilled through fear of “being abandoned... being 
possessed... .becoming angry” (p.3 8) and necessitated a total of 960 sessions over a 
five year period to reach a successful resolution. These clients presented with good 
insight as to the aetiology and development of their difficulties. Kantrowitz (1995) 
suggests that the patient-analyst match will also have considerable impact on outcome 
which may explain why “some seemingly suitable patients have unsuccessful 
outcomes and some.... unsuitable patients have favourable outcomes”. The 
importance of correctly interpreting transference and countertransference is 
demonstrated by a further client from the Tavistock study presenting with severe 
depression who felt angry with the analyst for being unresponsive and distant, 
culminating in her terminating treatment and making a suicide attempt. The analyst 
recorded that her outburst was a way of her finding out if he could cope with her 
angry feelings. Subsequent history taking revealed that the client had in fact been 
coping simultaneously with the death of her fiancé, and a male colleague. The client’s 
depression finally lifted when she moved to another therapist.
A long term study of the efficacy of psychoanalysis for depression is currently 
underway in Hamburg (Brockmann, Schluter & Eckert (in preparation)). Follow up
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at 3.5 years shows a higher rate of improvement for the psychoanalysis group 
compared to a group receiving behaviour therapy, both in depressive symptoms and 
interpersonal problems as measured by the Symptom Check List (SCL 90-R) 
(Derogatis, 1977) and the Inventbiy of Interpersonal Problems (HP) (Horowitz, 
Rosenberg, Baer, Ureno & Villasenor, 1988) respectively. This is one of the few 
studies to evaluate a psychoanalytical intervention by diagnostic group. However, the 
severity and duration of depression found in the sample is not clearly delineated by the 
authors, making the results somewhat inconclusive. This is a problem that needs to be 
thoroughly addressed in future studies.
Discussion and conclusion
Whilst CBT promotes the control of negative affect through rationality and intellect 
and effects change by modifying dysfunctional thoughts and assumptions, 
psychoanalysis focuses on the evocation of affect and its meaning in relation to past 
experience and current difficulties using the patient-analyst relationship to inform the 
process. However, an interesting study by Jones & Pulos (1993) that compared the 
process in CBT and psychodynamic therapies informed by psychoanalytical theory 
found that when CBT did contain process factors that were designated as 
psychodynamic technique e.g. ‘therapist identifies a recurrent theme in patient’s 
experience or conduct’ and ‘therapist emphasises patient’s feelings to help him/her 
experience them more deeply’ this was associated with a more favourable outcome 
that when these factors were absent. Cognitive behavioural therapies that contain 
elements of the psychodynamic technique have been termed “developmental” in 
approach (Guidano, 1987). The important point here perhaps is in identifying the 
factor(s) which may be the “common core of the therapeutic process” (Jones & Pulos, 
1993).
Although long, costly and demanding, a psychoanalytic intervention clearly targets 
emotional experience, its meaning and re-evaluation. It is not clear whether therapies 
that don’t explore the meaning and significance of affect such as CBT will have a 
long-standing impact upon deep-seated depression. In MRDD the development and 
longevity of dysfunctional thoughts and their accompanying emotions combine as a 
powerful force. Can the new therapy induced rational responses of a brief CBT
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intervention ever attain the potency of the old ones? The addition of schema therapy to 
CBT interventions can perhaps address these concerns to some extent. In contrast the 
Tavistock clinic studies of psychoanalytical interventions (although suffering from 
small sample size) document successful outcomes for severe depressive illness up to 
between 3 and nine years after therapy has ended. They afford insight into the nature 
and depth of the developmental events that may lead to severe and recurrent 
depression in adulthood.
Psychoanalysis and CBT are two conceptually distinct psychological therapies that 
may be utilised in the treatment of MRDD. One is long, exploratory and dynamic 
whilst the other is brief, focal and directed. The theoretical underpinnings of each are 
evidenced by their respective processes so that whilst psychoanalysis attempts a whole 
re-structuring of the personality, CBT is directed at reducing and managing 
symptoms. There is no doubt from major research that CBT is successful in this 
regard either alone or in combination with pharmacological treatments, at least in the 
short term. Outcome studies of psychoanalytic intervention suffer from small sample 
size and are therefore difficult to extrapolate from in any meaningful way. 
Additionally, it is rare to find studies of psychoanalysis that differentiate MRDD from 
other conditions. Comparing their efficacy is problematic due to fundamental 
differences in what they set out to achieve, their application and outcome measures. 
An assessment of ego strength is undoubtedly more subjective than scores on the BDI. 
This is an area fraught with philosophical and methodological argument and is 
perhaps irresolvable. It is also important to regard individuals as individuals and 
recognise that the nomethetic approach to mental health services may not be the best 
way forward. Although it would be impractical to suggest that everyone suffering 
from MRDD should be able to access long-term analysis within government funded 
services it would be interesting to develop treatments which combine the effective 
components of each therapy within a clear and theoretically sound framework that can 
be applied within primary care and acute settings.
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People with Learning disabilities essay
Parenting skills can be 
assessed and taught 
to people with 
learning difficulties. 
Discuss.
Word count: 4563
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Introduction
Over the past two decades people with intellectual disabilities have moved 
increasingly towards normalisation in many areas of their lives. A recent government 
White Paper, Valuing People: A New Strategy for Learning Disability for the 21st 
Century (Department of Health, 2001), underlined the need for society and services to 
recognise, acknowledge and respond accordingly to the rights, independence, 
inclusion and choice of people with intellectual disabilities. Fundamental to the 
expression of these key principles is the right to enter into an intimate and reciprocal 
relationship and raise children. Inevitably, as more people with intellectual disabilities 
opt to become parents, issues of parental competence arise. As well as becoming 
parents such individuals are almost always dealing with the additional stresses of poor 
support networks both social and familial, poverty, isolation and stigma, all of which 
may reinforce and compound an already impoverished repertoire of parenting skills 
(Booth & Booth, 1995). It is vital therefore that parenting interventions targeted at 
this group are properly researched and evaluated in order to assess their likely efficacy 
and impact.
This essay begins by detailing the possible physical, social, cognitive and emotional 
risk to children of parents with intellectual disabilities. Parenting assessment methods 
and parent intervention programmes are then introduced with particular emphasis on 
the work of Feldman (1998), a prolific researcher in this field. The discussion section 
focuses on the difficulties that parents may face in generalising new skills and the 
qualitative differences between skills learned in response to concrete tasks and affect­
laden interactions. Problems with design and methodology of interventions are 
discussed and the obligations of researchers in this field are raised. Finally, 
suggestions for future research are given.
Throughout this essay the term learning disability refers to an individual with an IQ of 
less than 70 with onset before 18 years of age (American Psychiatric Association, 
DSM-IV, 1994) and adaptive behaviour difficulties.
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Risk to children of parents with intellectual disabilities
Children of parents with intellectual disabilities suffer a greater risk of abuse and 
neglect and are more likely to be targeted by child protection agencies than children of 
parents without intellectual disabilities (Levy, Perhats, Nash-Johnson & Welter, 
1992). Evidence suggests that these children are at risk for maltreatment, poor 
psychosocial development and behaviour disorders (Feldman, Case, Towns & Betel, 
1985; Taylor et a l, 1991). Parents with intellectual disabilities routinely have their 
children taken away, more often due to neglect (errors of omission) rather than 
outright abuse (Taylor et a l, 1991). Lutzker (1990) suggests that neglect is as likely 
to cause as much harm (or even death) to the child as is physical abuse. Greenspan 
and Budd (1986) found that both child abuse and behaviour disorders tended to 
increase in families where the parents had intellectual disabilities but the child was not 
cognitively impaired. Children may also suffer malnourishment and a failure to thrive 
due to the parent’s poor nutritional and feeding skills (Feldman, Garrick & Case, 
1997). However, parents with intellectual disabilities are often perceived to be 
incompetent even without actual evidence of child maltreatment and as a result suffer 
an increased incidence of termination of their parental rights (Booth & Booth, 1997; 
Hayman, 1990).
In addition to the above, children of parents with intellectual disabilities have been 
shown to be at risk from developmental delay. When interacting with their children, 
mothers with low IQ tend to be less sensitive, responsive and reinforcing compared to 
mothers in the same socio-economic group without intellectual disabilities (Feldman 
et a l, 1986; Tymchuk & Andron, 1992). Reed and Reed (1965) found the occurrence 
of developmental delay in such children to be 40%, 15% and 1% where there were 2, 
1 or no parents respectively with a learning disability. In a study of two year old 
children of parents with intellectual disabilities Feldman et al (1985) found scores 
significantly below the mean for language development on the Bayley Scales of Infant 
Development (BSID) (Bayley, 1969). This study also found a high correlation 
between the child’s mental development (particularly language) and the quality of the 
home environment and the number of mother-child interactions. For children without 
cognitive impairments, they may also reproduce the delayed language of their 
intellectually disabled parent(s) (Denfield, 1998).
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A more recent study of school-age children (Feldman & Walton-Allen, 1997) found 
that the children of mothers with intellectual disabilities had significantly lower IQs 
(mean =80.5) than a group of children of mothers without intellectual disabilities 
(mean = 102.9) who had been matched on age and economic status. The study also 
showed more problem behaviours for the low IQ children compared to the control 
group children as measured by the Child Behaviour Checklist (Offord et al., 1987) 
with boys being affected more than girls. Academic achievement was also lower in 
children of mothers with intellectual disabilities; again, boys were more affected than 
girls. Interestingly, Feldman et al (1997) found that the quality of the home 
environment had more resonance for the children of intellectually disabled mothers 
than for those children of mothers without intellectual disabilities: the Caldwell 
HOME Inventory (Caldwell & Bradley, 1984) demonstrated a significant negative 
correlation with hyperactivity (r=- .39, p < .05) and conduct disorders (r = -.43, p< 
.05) for the children of mothers with intellectual disabilities but not for the control 
group. Reasons for this are not clear, but it may be that the efficacy of the home 
environment is more extreme for children of mothers with intellectual disabilities due 
to a paucity of external supportive and social networks that would otherwise provide 
diversity and alternative role models for the child to observe and engage. Research 
suggests that parents with intellectual disabilities are socially excluded both through 
their own lack of social awareness and social skills and also through the perceptions of 
others, making opportunities to promote and maintain friendships very few (McGaw, 
Ball & Clark, 2002).
Further to the physical, intellectual, behavioural and social problems for children of 
parents with intellectual disabilities there may be an increased risk of developing poor 
attachment relationships, low levels of self-esteem and a perception of the parent(s) as 
stigmatising. Bowlby (1969) established that the quality and strength of a child’s 
attachment to its caregiver (usually the mother) is dependant upon the ability of the 
mother to be warm, nurturing and sensitive and responsive to the child’s needs. 
Accordingly, Perkins et al (2002) found that children who perceived their mothers as 
warm care-givers were securely attached and perceived the mother’s intellectual 
disability as less stigmatising than in those children whose attachments were 
ambivalent or avoidant. Furthermore, avoidant and anxious/ambivalent attachments
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to the mother tended to be correlated with low self-esteem in the child. Ronai’s (1977) 
personal account of being a child of a mother with intellectual disabilities describes 
how the ambiguity of her mother’s behaviour towards her threatened the mother-child 
relationship: T must face the reality that I am unable to love her again in the intense,
unbridled way I did as a child she often conspired to save me from Frank (her
father), but she also beat me and delivered me to Frank for sexual abuse..’ (p.430). 
The dynamics between all of the factors described above and their relative 
contribution to the child’s development warrant further investigation. However, from 
these results it is reasonable to suggest that warm care-giving in mothers with 
intellectual disabilities may protect against low self-esteem in their children and that 
in turn high self-esteem is incongruent with stigma. It would, after all, be difficult 
(although not impossible) to conceive of an individual who is truly happy and 
confident in their sense of who and what they are and at the same time feel ashamed 
or embarrassed of the person who was key in helping them to develop that identity. 
However, Nichols (1989) found significant levels of anxiety, depression and rejection 
in children of parents with intellectual disabilities even though those children scored 
within the normal range on measures of self-esteem. This would seem to suggest that 
self-esteem, particularly for these children, is one of many factors that may contribute 
to healthy emotional development.
Parenting assessment and intervention programmes
The majority of education programmes for parents with intellectual disabilities seek to 
provide intensive intervention with the parents and children in their own homes, due 
in part to cost, but also because of concerns about parents being able to generalise 
learned parenting skills from one location/situation to another and their ability to 
operationalise knowledge into skill. (Tymchuk et al., 1992; Bakken, Miltenberger & 
Schauss, 1993). Specialised day care interventions tend to be directed at increasing 
and maintaining IQ level in the child rather than addressing the potential for physical 
and psychological neglect of the child at home by its parents. Feldman (1998) 
describes a comprehensive parenting assessment and intervention model that he 
developed with colleagues over a 15-year period. This was primarily an early 
intervention programme targeting parents with intellectual disabilities for the first
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three years of their child’s life. Initially, a wide-ranging evaluation of risk factors 
was made in order to establish the likely success or failure of the programme and also 
to calculate the level of support parents would require. This evaluation covered 
parental, child and environmental Variables such as stress, social support, marital 
satisfaction, general physical and mental health (past and current), reading skills and 
history of physical/sexual abuse. Information was gathered on the child’s history with 
regard to health, temperament, behaviour, abuse and interactions with siblings and 
peers. All children underwent assessment on the BSID (Bayley, 1969). This model of 
assessment corresponds with Belsky’s (1984) Interactional Model of Parenting and 
The Parental Skills Model (McGaw & Sturmey, 1994) and reflects the epigenetic view 
of development such that ‘parenting skills are the result of the transaction between the 
biology of the individual and the environment in which that individual lives’ 
(McGaha, 2002, p. 86). This view implies that development is an active system rather 
than a linear process, and suggests that health care professionals should be directed 
towards calculating probability of outcome rather than prediction of outcome with 
regard to the care parents with intellectual disabilities provide for their children. 
However, calculating probabilities infers the future dynamics of specific variables, 
which in effect makes them unknown variables. This must inevitably present 
difficulties for child-protection services who have to make decisions about the safety 
of the child at all stages of their development, based on concrete evidence of the 
parent’s skills or lack of skills at any one time. Whilst it is true to say that integration 
of services for intellectually disabled parents is moving in a positive direction, current 
levels of support may be unsympathetic to the epigenetic view.
On entering the programme described by Feldman (1998), baseline fimctioning was 
established by observing and assessing the parent on a number of child-care tasks that 
had been agreed upon by child health care professionals as being essential parenting 
skills. Each of these skills had initially been subjected to a task analysis to aid 
therapists in their observation and assessment of a parent’s skill level. For example, 
‘feeding solids’ to the child was broken down into twelve steps starting with ‘serves 
food at room temperature or slightly warmer’ (step 1); ‘Presents different foods 
separately on the dish’ (step 2) moving through to step 12 ‘Wipes the child’s face after 
the meal’. The parent was observed performing the task during a home visit and 
checked off against the Task Analyses for that skill. However, the normative data for
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this process revealed that the average parent does not always perform a given task to 
the optimum level e.g. washing hands after every nappy change or making sure there 
are no toys placed in the cot. This presents difficulties with regard to assessment 
issues i.e. what level of skill should professionals reasonably expect from parents with 
intellectual disabilities given that in the ‘real’ world children can and do survive less 
than perfect parenting and the competing demands made for their parent’s attention? 
However, Booth (2001) comments that parents with intellectual disabilities come 
under such intense and unrealistic scrutiny from child-health and social service 
agencies such that they need to become super parents in order to satisfy the 
professionals that they can be effective parents. Similarly, Goodinge (2000) found 
that Social Services make critical decisions about removing children from learning 
disabled parents using inappropriate and inadequate information. Perhaps in an 
attempt to obviate any possibility of failure, most parents in the Feldman (1998) study 
opted to learn the ideal set of target skills.
After establishing baselines Feldman’s (1998) programme focussed on any immediate 
and critical aspects of child health and safety that had been identified as needing 
training input, such as prevention of malnutrition due to poor feeding skills, and 
gastro-intestinal problems associated with poor food preparation and poor hygiene 
(failure to sterilize baby bottles and feeding utensils). The programme also focussed 
on developing skills to treat nappy rash effectively and to keep the child safe from 
physical dangers such as placing the baby on a changing mat on the floor rather than a 
table and not filling the bath with water that was too hot. Therapists taught parents 
how to give medications correctly and to keep dangerous objects away from the child. 
Once these issues had been addressed, the programme moved on to teach the parents 
how to foster a more stimulating home environment in which to nurture the child’s 
social, physical, cognitive and language development. A major consideration of the 
programme was to encourage a positive parent-child relationship and to tackle child 
problem behaviours. Feldman (1998) used skill-teaching techniques that had been 
validated in other studies most noticeably for teaching parents without intellectual 
disabilities (Hudson, 1982) such as simple instruction, modelling, positive 
reinforcement, role play and pictorial prompts. Observational probes were conducted 
during and just after training sessions to assess learning, and also weekly (in order to 
assess the parent’s level of retention of specific skills from one week to the next). As
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far as possible assessment was arranged to fit in with the families’ normal schedule, 
but if a particular skill had not been observed by the end of the visit then the parent 
was asked to demonstrate the skill. Feedback by the therapist to the parent would 
emphasise positive reinforcement for all skills performed correctly, and modelling and 
exaggeration of skills (by the therapist) that were missed or needed further training. 
The parent would then be asked to perform these latter skills again with the therapist 
observing and giving praise and encouragement alongside. For example ‘He’s 
climbing on your lap -  now’s a good time to give him a hug and a kiss’ (Feldman, 
1998 p. 411). Performance was measured by dividing the number of correct 
unprompted steps by the total number of steps. Training coupons that could be 
exchanged for goods or travel were also distributed to parents, initially dependant on 
performance but then gradually thinned to a Variable Ratio (VR) reinforcement 
schedule i.e. it was highly unpredictable when reinforcement would occur. Ferster and 
Skinner (1957) showed a VR reinforcement schedule to be the most powerful of all 
reinforcement schedules in making target behaviours highly resistant to extinction.
As an adjunct to training, parents were also urged both to broaden the scope of their 
own learning and experience (by enrolling for various courses) and that of their 
children by placing them in day care.
Outcome studies
There have been several outcome studies of the intervention programme described 
above. One such study (Feldman, Case & Sparks, 1992) evaluating the training of 
basic child care skills such as nutrition, preparing formula, treating nappy rash and 
toilet training,) found significant differences in skill levels between training and 
control groups post-training. The training group (n=ll) had increased their child-care 
skills to levels observed in a comparison group of parents without intellectual 
disabilities. Increases in child-care skills were maintained over the follow-up period 
(2-76 weeks) with the control group (n=ll) replicating these results once they 
themselves received training. The utility of an increased skill level was evidenced 
through increases in rate of weight gain for four previously malnourished children, 
elimination of nappy rash in six children and successful toilet training for one child. 
Unfortunately the authors do not detail the total number of children suffering these
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conditions in the first place, making it difficult to assess the overall impact and 
efficacy of the intervention. However, rate of child removal dropped dramatically 
after the intervention with only 19% of parents losing parenting rights. Prior to the 
intervention, 82% of parents with a pirevious child had had their child removed. Again 
though, the authors do not define exactly how many parents had a previous child, 
making actual comparisons difficult.
Feldman, Sparks and Case (1993) assessed whether the part of the intervention 
programme that trained mothers to increase specific interactional skills had improved 
language development in their children. Using a between groups design to control for 
maturational effects, training focussed on teaching mothers to praise the child, imitate 
and expand the child’s verbal and non-verbal vocalisations, to talk and make eye- 
contact and display physical affection with the child when interacting (e.g. feeding or 
changing the child). The control group received training in home safety skills. At the 
beginning of the study the children’s ages ranged from 4-28 months. Both groups 
received training for a mean of 45 weeks. After training, the interaction-training 
group demonstrated a significantly greater incidence of each interaction skill and total 
interactions than the control group. The training group parents showed more affection 
and reinforcing of their child’s language. Total parental interactions for the control 
group (but not the training group) were significantly below that of a comparison group 
of mothers without intellectual disabilities. Importantly, there was a significant 
increase in child vocalizations for the interaction group compared to the control group 
during training and a significant increase in reciprocal play and affection in the 
interaction group compared to the control group post-training. The training group 
scored significantly higher on the BSID (Bayley, 1969) with regard to language and 
social items and began talking sooner than the control group. Children in the 
interaction group showed a level of vocalisation that placed them in the same range as 
their peers who had mothers without intellectual disabilities. However, results from a 
similar study (Tymchuk & Andron 1992) using Feldman’s (1998) interactional 
training model were less impressive with only limited improvements to positive child 
behaviours. The authors attribute these results to an increased incidence of physical 
and mental illness and abuse in the parent’s history. Nevertheless, the same risk 
factors were not seen to correlate with outcomes in the Feldman (1998) studies.
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Feldman’s intervention programme was used in another study (Feldman, Garrick & 
Case, 1997) where feeding and nutrition skills were successfully taught to two 
mothers with intellectual disabilities who had children aged 7 months and 10.5 months 
respectively. Before training both children had been diagnosed as non-organic-failure- 
to-thrive with weights that fell below the third percentile. Post-training, weight had 
increased to reach the 15^ and 25* percentiles respectively. Rate of weight gain in 
both children was maintained at 28 month and 59 month follow-ups. Using a model of 
intervention similar to that of Feldman (1998) Greene et al (1995) demonstrated 
improvements in child care skills for a single mother with an IQ of 71, specifically 
with regard to the serving of nutritious food. However, although weight gain in the 
child was associated with foods the mother served, the child remained in foster care 
throughout the study and training was limited to being carried out during supervised 
visits. It is difficult therefore to attribute these gains solely to the intervention itself.
Discussion
From the literature it is clear that children of intellectually disabled parents are at risk 
from an array of environmental, social, biological and genetic factors. Conversely, the 
outcome literature on teaching parenting skills tends to be generally positive 
(Feldman, 1994). Although this could reflect a tendency to publish only ‘good’ results 
it may also be an indication of the way in which design, observation and measurement 
of parenting skills is carried out. Research has tended to concentrate on designing 
parent intervention programmes for use with pre-school children focusing on tasks 
primarily concerned with physical health and safety. The essence of learning a 
concrete skill is that it can usually be taught to occur in response to an environmental 
trigger and can be demonstrated through modelling or teaching the required response 
to those specific triggers, which then allows for quantitative measurement. For 
example, a dirty nappy may or may not initiate a sequence of steps that result in the 
nappy being changed. However, observation by therapists of learned skills is usually 
time sampled and planned, the results of which are presented as evidence for an 
increase in those skills, at least in research studies. It is difficult to assess whether an 
observation of a particular skill infers its use when the therapist is not there. It is 
possible that the parent may have been responding to the therapist as an additional 
trigger to demonstrate a particular skill. In this sense success rates may in part be
43
© Vanessa Biyant 2005
related to the methodology of intervention programmes. The challenge for researchers 
is to establish rigorous methods of assessment so that child-protection agencies can be 
confident in their utility for determining risk. Rigour is especially important in this 
field as the growing body of research may contribute to social trends and inform 
government legislation. Feldman (1994) suggests that parents could live temporarily 
in group homes with their children where the effects of training could be more closely 
monitored and for a longer period of time. The effectiveness of training programmes 
may also be increased by placing families with foster parents who can teach child-care 
skills on a more natural, ongoing and integrated basis (Feldman, 1994). These 
innovative ideas may offer more ecologically valid and methodologically sound 
interventions, and also reduce reliance on highly questionable methods of 
reinforcement such as tokens.
A specific and fimdamental difficulfy that parents with intellectual disabilities have is 
in interpreting and responding to emotionally laden expression, language and 
behaviours. This in turn may have profound implications for the emotional, social and 
cognitive development of the child given the durability of intergenerational 
transmissions of behaviour (Steele & Steele, 1994) and also the quality of the child’s 
attachment to its parent (usually the mother). The richness and diversity of the 
minutiae of routine interaction between mothers and babies is complex. When a 
situation arises that requires an interaction or response which is affect laden, the 
response needs to be intrinsically generated by the parent from a store of previously 
learned responses. The potential for the response not to resolve the situation is far 
greater in an affective interaction than in a concrete task as the parent must first 
interpret the trigger accurately. The ambiguity of the need of a crying baby presents 
the parent with having to make choices from multiple possible responses. Learning 
affective interaction skills within intervention programmes is essentially a linear 
cognitive process and may not in itself promote the flexibility required to demonstrate 
a reliable affective response when needed. On the one hand, training seeks to break 
tasks down into small chunks but, paradoxically, in the case of an affective interaction 
is dealing with a stimulus that depends on its dynamic complexity for meaning. 
However, the reinforcement provided by the child’s subsequent response may help to 
consolidate learned responses in emotional memory and promote emotional ‘growth’ 
within the parent.
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Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1989) showed that people with intellectual disabilities were 
more able in recognising and naming concrete objects than they were in recognising 
and naming emotions. These findings are in line with the emotion specificity 
hypothesis (Luckasson et al, 1992) that suggests there may be specific deficits in 
decoding emotional stimuli for people with learning disabilities rather than a ‘general 
task demand deficit’ (Rydin-Orwin, Drake & Bratt, 1999, p. 254). However, Rydin- 
Orwin et al (1999) suggest that these deficits may be due to failures in development 
with regard to the parent’s childhood experiences such that they received biased socio- 
emotional feedback. For example, their own parents may have felt that negative 
emotional experience would be unacceptably traumatic for their intellectually disabled 
child and sought to protect them accordingly. In so doing, the child may have been 
subject to situations which were incongruent with the perceived surrounding emotion. 
Similarly, high levels of childhood neglect and/or abuse in this population may result 
in maladaptive emotional development (Feldman, 1998). However, there is some 
evidence to suggest that emotion recognition skills are open to mediation through 
education. Rydin-Orwin et al (1999) found that training with appropriate cues and 
group discussion did significantly increase emotion recognition for facial expressions 
in individuals with intellectual disabilities in comparison with a no training control 
group. This type of training could be used in conjunction with strategies that teach 
parental warmth and sensitivity as in the interaction skills training described by 
Feldman (1998) above in order to optimise and facilitate generalisation of skills. To 
assess their impact, more studies are needed that evaluate the quality of the child’s 
attachment to its mother and other interpersonal aspects of the mother-child 
relationship.
One other way of assessing the impact of interventions with regard to affective 
interaction is to ask the children themselves about their childhood experiences when 
they reach adulthood. Currently, there are hardly any accounts of the view of the adult 
child and their experience of growing up in families where one or both parents have 
intellectual disabilities. The present generation of children being raised in such 
families should yield a rich source of information in ten years or so. This kind of 
research may demonstrate more clearly how families fare on a day-to-day basis.
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Conclusion
Given that more individuals with intellectual disabilities will opt to become parents in 
the coming decades it is vital that services should respond with a level of support that 
can meet this group’s diverse and complex needs in order to ensure that another 
generation of children and parents are not subjected to a maladaptive existence. From 
the above it is clear that some parents with intellectual disabilities will in all 
probability need varying levels of ongoing support throughout their children’s pre­
school and school years. If interventions are to be offered as a possible alternative to 
removal of the child from its parents then levels of support should be timely, 
integrated and thoroughly evaluated as to their effectiveness. Specifically, 
intervention programmes should attempt ecological validity and be formulated in such 
a way that they can confidently predict if learned skills observed in parents with 
intellectual difficulties are being maintained, generalised and used consistently. 
However, the literature is encouraging and demonstrates that effective parent-skill 
programmes are gradually evolving. Together with research on which parent training 
interventions are the most effective more research is needed on other variables that 
may impact upon parental competency such as social isolation, support networks, 
marital satisfaction, availability of other family members and number of children in 
family to name but a few.
The cognitive and emotional development and quality of life of children is informed 
by their internal world which is a constantly evolving process effected through 
interaction with the environment in which parents are by far the major contributors, at 
least during the pre-school years. The cost-value benefits of parenting interventions 
needs to be continually assessed against this fundamental consideration.
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Child and family essay
What developmental and 
psychological theories could explain 
Asperger’s Syndome and 
what implications do these have for 
assessment and intervention?
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Introduction
It is only fairly recently that Asperger Syndrome (AS) also known as Asperger’s 
disorder has begun to emerge as a diagnostic category in the scientific literature, being 
used to describe those individuals who display autistic-like behaviours but who, 
nevertheless, differ qualitatively fi*om those persons with more severe impairments in 
communicative and social functioning. As Frith (1991) points out this is due both to 
the fact that Asperger’s original description of his patients was, for a long time, only 
available in German and that his paper, the ‘Autistichen Psychopathe’, published in 
1944 coincided with Kanner’s (1943) original widely read paper describing autism.
Whereas Kanner described peculiarities of language such as echolalia and deficits in 
comprehension, Asperger highlighted a pedantic, almost adult-like use of language in 
the children he observed. He described anomalies of non-verbal communication such 
as body posture, eye gaze and most notably a lack of humour (Frith, 1991). Kanner’s 
description of autism was characterised by children either without language or who 
used strange personalised phrases, often obsessed with ordering objects and with an 
extraordinary memory for meaningless facts and most importantly of all seemingly 
oblivious to others. Asperger’s patients on the other hand demonstrated an interest in 
people, but lacked an understanding of social nuances and the rules of etiquette that 
govern interactions with others often appearing gauche and ungracious. Shortly after 
Asperger’s death in 1980 Wing (1981) published an account of her own cases that 
were strikingly similar to those of Asperger.
AS is now widely accepted as being underpinned by neurobiological dysfimction of 
the brain and disordered developmental processes resulting in cognitive, emotional 
and behavioural consequences and not related to methods of parenting or the child’s 
early experience (Wing, 1988).
Diagnostic criteria for Asperger syndrome
Opinion is divided as to whether AS and High functioning Autism (HFA) are in fact 
indistinguishable from each other or if AS constitutes a distinct disorder in its own
53
© Vanessa Biyant 2005
right. In spite of this, AS is now included as a separate category in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of mental diseases (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) under the heading of Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PDD). The features 
listed below are the main diagnostic criteria for AS in DSM-IV:
• Marked impairment in nonverbal behaviours such as body posture, eye gaze, 
facial expressions and other aspects of body language that initiate and maintain 
social interaction.
• Difficulty in initiating appropriate peer relationships.
• No significant delay in developing language, as in autism, although speech 
may be pedantic, stereotyped and literal but vocabulary and grammer are good. 
Communication is poor with a lack of social and emotional reciprocity and no 
engagement in shared attention ie. pointing out things of interest to others.
• An all-enveloping preoccupation with a very restricted and repetitive range of 
activities and interests evidenced through stereotyped patterns of behaviour 
and adherence to rituals or routines that have no fiinctional purpose. The 
individual may engage in hand or finger flapping or repetitive whole body 
movements. There may be an intense preoccupation with small details or parts 
of objects.
• The disorder will cause significant impairment to the person’s social and 
occupational functioning.
• Cognitive development, exploration of the environment and self-help skills are 
not significantly delayed although impairment to social interaction may impact 
on adaptive behaviour.
Due to impaired cognitive and language skills it may not be until the child starts 
school that problems with social functioning emerge. Visual-motor and visual-spatial 
abilities may be weak and the person may appear clumsy or awkward. The condition
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is often confused with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder due to symptoms of 
overactivity and inattention. It is diagnosed much more frequently in males than 
females and is more common in families where other first-degree relatives exhibit 
social difficulties or show features of autistic spectrum disorders. AS is a life-long 
disorder (DSM-IV, 2000)
Biological theories of Asperger syndrome
Biological theories suggest that AS may be caused by either genes, pregnancy or birth 
complications, congenital viruses or a combination of these factors (Gillberg, 2002). 
Research into the neurobiology of AS has focused on extrapolating findings from 
studies both on autism and AS itself to explain deficits in functioning.
The medial temporal lobes and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) are implicated in odor 
detection and identification respectively. Suzuki, Critchley, Rowe, Howlin and 
Murphy (2003) found that AS subjects were impaired on odor identification but not 
detection compared to matched controls, suggesting abnormal functioning of the OFC. 
Both the OFC and the medial temporal lobes are also thought to mediate social 
behaviour. Insult to these regions typically results in impaired social functioning both 
in human and non-human primates (Bachevalier, 1994; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; 
Adolphs, Tranel & Damasio, 1994) so it is interesting that Suzuki et al (2003) show a 
deficit specific to the OFC. It is not yet known if these findings generalise to autism 
but it may signal a possible differentiation from AS.
Animal lesion studies suggest three areas of the brain are involved in social 
functioning: the amygdala, the OFC and the superior temporal sulcus and gyrus 
(STG). Taken together Brothers (1990) refers to this triad as the ‘social brain’. 
Broadly, the amygdala receives visual, auditory, olfactory and somatosensory input 
and has afferent connections with and efferent connections to the limbic system, basal 
forebrain and the hippocampus, among other areas (Baron-Cohen, Ring, Bullmore, 
Wheelwright, Ashwin & Williarris, 2000). In humans, amygdalar stimulation is most 
commonly associated with fear and its accompanying autonomic arousal (increase in 
heart rate, release of adrenalin and dilation of pupils) in preparation for action. Three
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distinct groups of nuclei have been identified within the amygdala: the basolateral, 
centromedial and peripheral groups. In monkeys the basolateral nuclei neurons 
respond specifically to facial stimuli (Rolls, 1984). Studies of amygdalar lesions in 
monkeys have shown wide-spread impairment to social fimctioning (Kling & Brother, 
1992). Kling & Steklis, 1976 found that a failure to initiate social interaction or 
respond to social gestures led to social isolation and even death. These effects have 
been replicated in rhesus monkeys (Dicks, Myers & Kling, 1969) in vervets (Kling, 
Lancaster & Bentone, 1970) and in macaques (Kling & Cornell, 1971). Kluver and 
Bucy (1939) found that lesions in the monkey amygdala produced hypoemotionality, 
hyperorality and hypersexuality. Further lesion studies in monkeys have shown a 
reduction in maternal behaviour towards their infants and a stronger likelihood of 
neglect or physical abuse (Bucher, Myers & Southwick, 1970). Interestingly, 
amygdala lesions in infant monkeys do not disrupt attachment behaviour (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1999) but do negatively impact on social interaction with peers 
(Bachevalier, 1994). This fits well with observations that children with autistic 
spectrum disorders are more inclined to experience extreme anxiety when separated 
from their main care-giver (usually the mother) and become distressed when faced 
with new and unfamiliar surroundings. It is possible that impaired decoding and 
processing of social stimuli leads to greater dependency on attachment figures.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies show reduced amygdala 
volume in autism sufferers (Abell et al, 1999) and significantly less amygdalar 
stimulation in adults with HFA or AS compared to controls when differentiating 
mental states (e.g. sympathy, concern) inferred from facial stimuli (Baron-Cohen, 
Ring, Bullmore, Wheelwright, Ashwin & Williams, 2000). This study in fact showed 
that the clinical group demonstrated a complete absence of amygdalar activation when 
processing the stimuli. Interestingly, the clinical group had greater activation than the 
control group in the bilateral superior temporal gyri which are located in the ffonto- 
temporal neo-cortex. The authors suggest this may reflect compensatory mechanisms 
in which a complex and emotionally laden visual stimulus is processed through being 
verbally labelled by temporal lobe structures. Whilst this supports observations of an 
associative use of language (without reference to a conceptual or personally 
meaningful store of information) that is so characteristic of individuals on the autistic 
spectrum it also indicates that one part of the social brain is able to compensate for
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deficits in another part. Further, the role of the amygdala in the fear response has been 
widely demonstrated (Baron-Cohen et al, 2000). Accordingly, the authors suggest that 
AS individuals may demonstrate less fear arousal because of their amygdalar 
impairment. Further evidence for the neurobiological origins of AS comes from a PET 
(Positron Emission Tomography) scan study showing atypical ffonto-striatal 
activation in response to stimuli where the subject must assess what someone else may 
be thinking (Happe et al., 1996). Whereas controls showed activity in left medial pre- 
frontal cortex (LMPFC), AS subjects demonstrated an absence of activity in that area 
altogether. Instead, cortical areas directly adjacent to LMPFC were stimulated in the 
AS group (more than in the control group) indicating that deficits in neural 
functioning in AS appear to be highly circumscribed (Happe et al, 1996). Clearly, 
further research is needed to fully delineate the functional and compensatory 
mechanisms of these brain structures.
However, although biologically pre-determined discrete areas of the brain may be 
involved for specific functions it’s likely that through experience and brain plasticity 
that brain anatomy and function differs in each and every one of us by minute degrees. 
The question for research is what degree of difference or diversity constitutes 
pathology? As Cohen et al (2000) point out, in everyday life some people are 
exceptional at Maths or physics but find social interaction confusing whilst there are 
many who function well socially but find ‘non-social problem solving’ (Cohen et al., 
2000, p.355) difficult. It is interesting to note that the latter group are not so 
pathologised in the literature as the socially impaired group.
In addition to the above fMRI studies may be subject to artefacts of the scanning 
process itself, making interpretation complex. Also, how much do the observed neural 
correlates of behaviour reflect the primary organic deficit? In the autistic spectrum, 
neural growth mediated both through impaired early developmental processes and 
experience may differ firom one individual to another making a universal neural map 
in this condition, or in fact any condition, problematic.
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Psychological models of Asperger Syndrome
Psychological models of autistic spectrum disorders seek to conceptualise the 
hypothesised impairment to cognitive and emotional processing that may result from 
the underlying neurobiological deficits. One such theory of cognitive processing is 
proposed by Frith (1989). She suggests that the need to integrate information in order 
to make sense of and extract meaning from the environment is normally achieved 
through the synthesis of context, gist and gestalt (Happe, Briskman & Frith, 2001), 
and terms this process as being one of ‘central coherence’ (Frith, 1989). In an 
interesting study. Happe et al (2001) explored whether families of children with 
autistic spectrum disorder tended towards a centrally coherent global style of 
processing or a more piecemeal and locally focused style of processing. They found 
that parents, especially fathers, were faster than controls at processing unsegmented 
block-design tasks. The authors suggest that superior performance on the task is 
facilitated through an ability to focus on the detail of constituent parts of the design 
rather than the design as a whole which may act to visually confuse or obscure 
possible combinations of blocks. Shah and Frith (1993) had similar results with 
autistic subjects on the Weschler Block Design task (Weschler, 1981) and propose 
that local detail processing confers an advantage over global processing in these tasks. 
Happe et al (2001) also found that fathers from families with autistic spectrum 
disorder had significantly faster performance compared to controls on the Embedded 
Figures Task (EFT), (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971) where the goal is to 
detect a simple figure that is hidden within a much more detailed and complex shape. 
Additionally, the experimental group made fewer errors than controls when judging 
the absolute dimensions of illusory figures, that is, their judgement of stimuli was not 
significantly effected by its presentation within an illusory context that had the effect 
of making the stimuli appear larger or smaller than it actually was. This might be 
because processing at a local rather than a global level may lead to less assumptions 
or predictions being made about the attributes of a stimulus. Normal contextual 
processing may be likened to priming where the brain is cued to remember past 
instances of similar stimuli. This of course is an adaptive process which in some 
situations may confer an advantage. HoWever, on tasks such as the EFT and the 
Weschler Block Design, making assumptions about specific stimuli on the basis of 
past experience with similar stimuli could actively impede performance.
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Other studies show similar results in favour of detail-focused processing in families 
with autistic spectrum disorder. Baron-Cohen and Hammer (1997a) found superior 
performance for fathers of children with autistic spectrum disorders on the EFT, 
whilst Landa, Folstein and Isaacs (1991) found less coherent and more fragmented 
narrative performance in parents of autistic children than in controls.
Given that these studies suggest a cognitive phenotype or style of weak central 
coherence in people with autistic spectrum disorder, what are the implications for AS 
individuals? If AS and autism differ only by degree and do not represent distinct 
disorders, should a slightly less weak central coherence processing style apply to AS. 
Results from Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (2001) show that both AS and HFA subjects 
were significantly impaired in their ability to mentally integrate fragments of a visual 
stimulus, and that the autistic group performed significantly less well than the AS 
group. Both groups were unimpaired at recognising whole objects from a single part 
(e.g. part of the core of an apple, which was sufficiently detailed to suggest the 
complete object). However, a possible confound to this study concerns who was 
assigned to each group. DSM-IV classifies autism as being with or without language 
delay depending on the amount and type of other concurrent symptoms which could 
possibly lead to an individual being diagnosed with autism rather than AS. Jolliffe et 
al (2001) differentiated the groups on the basis of early language development so that 
all subjects without a history of language delay were classified as having AS. The 
authors point out that some of the individuals in the AS group may be regarded by 
DSM-IV as having autism without language delay.
When Asperger first presented his clinical cases, the most striking feature in his 
description was that of naïve and peculiar social interaction with others. Although his 
patients were not shy or avoidant of social situations they tended to behave in a veiy 
one-sided and ego-centred way, with a complete disregard or lack of understanding 
for the rules that govern social behaviour, making them appear somewhat gauche and 
impolite. Wing (1981) noted, in addition to the above, an absence of pretend and 
symbolic play together with a lack of initiation of shared attention and activity. These 
features suggest a profile of an individual who lacks the ability to imagine the 
experience and mental state of others and who is unable to manipulate representations
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of other people’s mental states for the purposes of ambiguous situations or creative 
pursuits. The ability to infer the mental state of other people and make predictions 
about their subsequent behaviour (whether or not the content of that mental state is 
congruent with what is actually true in the external world) has been termed by Baron- 
Cohen (1985) as having a Theory of Mind (TOM). Studies with low-IQ autistic 
children have frequently shown that they are unable to understand stories where the 
protagonist believes something to be true when it is if fact false (Baron-Cohen, 1985; 
1988; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), that is, they cannot predict the subject’s 
behaviour on the basis of his or her false beliefs. Autistic children typically predict 
behaviour on the basis of what they know to be actually true. The Sally-Ann task 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) has been widely used in tests of TOM: Sally and Ann, two 
doll protagonists, are in the same room. Sally places a marble in basket A and then 
exits the room. Ann then moves the marble to basket B, Sally then comes back into 
the room. Where will Sally look for the marble? Autistic children generally say Sally 
will look in basket B where the marble actually is, rather than where Sally believes it 
to be because they are unable to understand that people can hold false beliefs about 
the world. Normally developing children pass these so-called first order TOM tests at 
around four years of age and go on to pass more sophisticated second-order TOM tests 
around six years old (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985). The latter test the subject’s ability to 
predict a protagonist’s behaviour on the basis of their (the protagonist) false belief 
about another person’s true belief. According to Leslie (1987) the capacity for 
symbolic play (using one object to represent another) and thinking about the mental 
state of others (TOM) are indicators of metarepresentational ability. Both require the 
individual to tolerate and negotiate ambiguity. Some authors regard autism as showing 
specific developmental delay in metarepresentational ability (Baron-Cohen, 1989a; 
Leslie & Frith, 1990) but do acknowledge the likelihood that first order TOM may 
develop at a later stage.
Bowler (1992) tested fifteen adults with AS on first and second order TOM tasks. Of 
those nine subjects whose developmental history was available, none had ever 
engaged in joint-referencing behaviours (e.g. pointing out objects of interest to 
another person, looking alternately at a person and object whilst pointing to the 
object), pretend play or creative pursuits in either child or adulthood. However, results 
showed AS subjects to be as capable as controls in solving first and second order
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TOM tasks. Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington (1991), also found AS subjects could 
solve TOM tasks whereas HFA subjects could not. This may offer some basis on 
which to clinically differentiate AS from HFA without necessarily assuming entirely 
disparate pathology. It is perfectly possible that the two conditions may share some 
inhibitory and/or excitatory neurobiological pathways whilst being dissociated on 
others. However, if AS subjects demonstrate a capacity for TOM without ever having 
engaged in symbolic play, this raises obvious problems for metarepresentation theory 
(Leslie, 1987) as an explanation for the observed social impairment (Bowler, 1992). 
Hermelin and O’Connor (1985) argue that people with autism and AS may solve 
TOM problems through logical, computational processing rather than using intuitive 
skills in the emotional domain and term this as a Togico-affective’ state. According to 
this theory, due to their relatively intact cognitive skills AS subjects are able to 
compensate for and circumvent deficits in intuition when solving TOM tasks but have 
problems when it comes to real life (Bowler, 1992). This implies that individuals with 
AS may have knowledge about other people’s minds but are unable to apply it 
successfully in the outside world. It may be that neurobiological impairment leads to 
information processing in the cognitive domain that is efficient but linear and solitary 
without reference to its ecological utility and interpretive function. This fits well with 
evidence from neuropsychological studies that show AS subjects to be unimpaired on 
tests of executive function in an experimental situation (Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, 
Brereton & Tonge, 2001; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Tonge, Brereton & Bellgrove, 2002). 
Executive function requires attention, cognitive spontaneity and flexibility as well as 
the inhibition of some responses and initiation of others. Whilst AS individuals 
perform at the same level as controls on these tasks they seem unable to generalise 
these skills to meet their daily living requirements, so much so that they may need 
sheltered accommodation and employment.
A study using more advanced TOM tasks that required the subject to d e t e c t pas 
has shown AS and HFA individuals to be impaired in interpreting the mental state of 
others (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 1999). AS/HFA children 
were matched with controls on chronological and verbal mental age and had passed 
first and second order false belief tasks. The children listened to stories after which 
they were asked if anyone in the story had said something they shouldn’t have, and to 
identify what that might be. They also had to recognise that the faux pas had occurred
61
© Vanessa Bryant 2005
as a result of a false belief AS/HFA children with an average age of 12 years 
achieved scores equal to normative data for 7-9 year old girls and nine year old boys.
Assessment Issues
It is still unclear and will probably remain unclear for some time as to whether AS and 
HFA constitute distinct disorders or are variants along a continuum. To some extent 
these issues may resolve as diagnostic systems move ever more towards dimensional 
rather than categorical classification, but currently, assessment for the clinician is 
fraught with theoretical concerns over the conceptual validity of AS as a condition in 
its own right. Although AS and autism are now included separately in both ICD-10 
and DSM-IV, a clear diagnosis may be confounded by common criteria and confusion 
over distinguishing features for each condition. For example, some individuals with 
normal IQ may show social and repetitive abnormalities such as a failure to develop 
peer relationships and hand or finger flapping (common criteria for autism and AS) 
with no early language delay (criteria for AS only) but do have difficulty in initiating 
or sustaining conversation with others and have never engaged in make-believe or 
imaginative play (criteria for autism) (Howlin, 2000). Also, significant delay in 
language development is cited in order to differentiate autism firom AS but it is not 
clear how this delay may be measured and assessed. DSM-IV and ICD-10 do not 
offer any guidelines on diagnostic criteria for children who may have used single 
words at age two and phrase speech by three years, but show significant delay in other 
linguistic areas such as receptive language and reciprocity (Howlin, 2000). Although 
DSM-IV indicates that diagnosis of autism takes precedence over AS in cases where 
criteria for both are met, interpretation in clinical practice and research is far from 
universal. Various studies have differentiated between HFA and AS on the basis of 
motor clumsiness, current cognitive and linguistic skills or no early significant 
language delay but rarely adhere to strict diagnostic guidelines (Manjiviona & Prior, 
1999). This has resulted in an array of contradictory findings with no clear evidence 
for or against differing levels of cognitive, motor, social or neuropsychological 
impairment in AS and HFA. Further, liberal interpretation of diagnostic criteria has 
led to AS being misused as a label for social and obsessional disorders, learning
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disability (non-verbal) and pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise specified 
(Klin, Volkmar, Sparrow, Cicchetti & Rourke, 1995).
Given the above, various diagnostic systems and criteria have been formulated to 
classify AS but there remains a paucity of actual assessment instruments. Although 
Asperger’s (1944) original account of his cases is evocative and detailed, in practice a 
more concise method of assessment is needed. From her own observations Wing 
(1981) felt that language can sometimes be poorer and more delayed than Asperger 
first described. She also notes that thought processes are pedantic, narrow and logical 
rather than original and creative as Asperger had suggested. Gillberg and Gillberg’s 
(1989) criteria for AS largely concur vrith that of Wing, whilst Tantum (1991) 
differentiates between children and adults stating that symptoms of autism in the 
former may actually indicate AS instead.
Co-morbid psychiatric disorders in Asperger syndrome
Soderstrom, Rastam and Gillberg (2002) suggest that neuropsychological deficits in 
AS may pre-dispose the individual to developing personality problems. In a study of 
personality, 27 out of 31 AS subjects had high scores on harm-avoidance and 
significantly below-average scores on measures of self-directedness and 
cooperativeness. Soderstrom et al (2002) propose this may reflect immature character 
development and a poor sense of integrity which according to Svarkic, Whitehead, 
Przybeck and Cloninger (1993) could pre-dispose the individual to developing 
personality disorder. Added to this, AS individuals may be more at risk fi*om 
developing psychiatric disorders than autistic individuals due to the somewhat covert 
and subtle nature of their problems which may go unnoticed in childhood (or may not 
be considered as warranting specialist intervention) but may still manifest in odd and 
eccentric behaviour. This could lead to marginalisation and isolation by peers 
resulting in disorders such as anxiety and depression. It may be critical for service 
providers to consider these issues when allocating resources for early screening and 
assessment procedures.
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Assessment tools for Asperger syndrome
The Autism Behavior Checklist (ABC) (Krug, Arick & Almond, 1980), and the 
Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R), (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994), 
have both been used in diagnosing AS and HFA but are not sensitive to differentiating 
the conditions. The Diagnostic Interview of Social and Communications Disorders 
(DISCO), (Wing, Leekham, Libby, Gould & Larcombe, 2002) is a semi-structured 
interview for diagnosing autistic spectrum and related disorders and psychiatric 
conditions. As mentioned above, AS individuals may be at particular risk from 
developing psychiatric problems, but what is less clear is the extent to which they are 
driven by AS itself or are co-morbid. Assessment tools are useful in this respect, but 
ultimately the experience and skill of the clinician must be called upon. Currently 
however, a patchy and limited knowledge of AS amongst mental health workers may 
confound accurate diagnosis. In spite of these concerns, the DISCO is a valuable aid 
in that it seeks a full developmental history from birth including information on visuo- 
spatial skills, self-care and independence. It also asks for a detailed description of 
current behaviour as well as assessing responses to sensory stimuli and checks for the 
presence of motor stereotypies and repetitive activity. In this respect, although the 
DISCO is not able to differentiate AS from other forms of autism it can be used to 
make recommendations concerning the education, employment, domestic and social 
needs of all individuals on the autistic spectrum. It is suitable for use with children and 
adults of all abilities. Interestingly, the authors point out that on the basis of clinical 
experience and research they feel there is little to warrant differentiation of AS from 
other autistic spectrum disorders.
Assessment instruments specific to AS such as The Australian Scale for Asperger 
Syndrome (Garnett & Attwood, 1995) suffer from a lack of data on reliability and 
validity (Howlin, 2000). In fact the only instrument that provides detailed reliability 
and validity data is the Screening questionnaire for Asperger syndrome and other high 
functioning autism spectrum disorders in school age children (ASSQ) (Ehlers, 
Gillberg & Wing, 1999) with test-retest correlations of r > .90 and inter-rater 
correlations of r = .66 The authors also found that scores on the ASSQ corresponded 
closely with diagnosis (p = .0001). However, even the ASSQ does not differentiate
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AS/HFA. Although both the Disco and the ASSQ do not differentiate AS/HFA they 
do seek to draw out the extent of subtle patterns of functioning and behaviour and help 
to establish a profile of strengths and needs, which in conjunction with a full 
neuropsychological assessment may inform an intervention.
Intervention
Education about AS is critical for parents and teachers in that it may lead to greater 
understanding and tolerance of unusual behaviours and may be especially important 
where children with AS are receiving mainstream education. Low self-esteem in 
children with AS can sometimes result from feelings of anxiety, frustration and 
despondency (Szatmari, 1991). A brief, problem solving focus is indicated rather than 
insight-oriented psychotherapy. There is no evidence to suggest that the latter has any 
benefit at all for either children or adults with AS (Szatmari, 1991). Low self-esteem 
may also result from isolation, and in this respect Attwood (2003) has developed a 
programme for use with children and adults with AS that helps develop friendship 
skills. Children learn how to join a group of their peers appropriately and develop 
skills in cooperation and dealing with conflict. Cooperative, rather than competitive 
games are encouraged with an emphasis on contributing to a common goal whilst 
acknowledging the suggestions of others. Further elements of the programme include 
affective education, cognitive restructuring, stress management and self-reflection.
Treatment for adolescents and adults with AS aims to improve adaptive functioning 
in areas of socialisation, communication, imagination and daily living skills, as well as 
helping to alleviate some of the more negative symptoms and behaviours such as 
anxiety, depression and aggression. In view of the specific impairments to conceptual 
processing of information in AS, skills are best taught using explicit and rote methods 
where verbal instructions reflect a sequential, parts-to-whole approach (Klin & 
Volkmar, 2003). Problem solving strategies can be applied to situations that are 
frequent and troublesome.
Social skills training is typically aimed at compensating for the social impairment
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caused through TOM deficits in AS individuals. One such programme for adolescents 
(Barnhill, Tapscott-Cook, Tebbenkamp & Smith-Myles, 2002) was adapted from 
Teaching Your Child the Language of Social Success (Duke, Novicki & Martin, 1996) 
and involved identifying different emotions implicit to voice intonation and facial 
expression and teaching the meaning of utterances such as ‘ahh’ or ‘mm’, using 
flashcards, modelling, videos, role-play and reinforcement through feedback. In 
addition, recreational activities were encouraged in order to foster friendship and to 
practice skills under more ecologically valid conditions. Participants were reminded to 
maintain eye contact and notice and respond to non-verbal communication. There was 
limited evidence for the efficacy of the programme with no significant difference 
between pre and post-test scores for non-verbal communication skills. However, 
71.4% of participants did show a non-significant increase in these skills, and perhaps 
more importantly, 75% developed and maintained friendships within the group. Other 
studies of teaching TOM to children with AS have shown limited success in 
transferring skills to social situations (Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Hadwin, Baron- 
Cohen, Howlin & Hill, 1997).
Conclusion
AS represents a pervasive and life-long impairment to an individual’s social and 
emotional functioning. Research indicates a biological aetiology with profound 
implications for developmental processes in childhood and beyond. Detailed 
assessment of the individual is essential in order to establish their pattern of 
functioning and intervention needs to be targeted at enabling the person to develop to 
the best of their ability and reach their full potential. This is essential so that the risk of 
isolation and secondary psychiatric disorders is reduced. Theoretical arguments over 
the classification of AS as distinct from HFA may reduce as services are encouraged 
to address the individual’s strengths and needs.
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Older Adult essay
Outline some of the major life transitions 
and their impacts faced in older age. 
What contribution can psychological theory 
and practise make to understanding 
and managing such transitions?
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Introduction
The dramatic increase in life expectancy during the 20* century means many more 
people are negotiating the transitions of later life. This has significant implications 
both for the individual and the society they live in. The growing numbers of people 
over the age of sixty five present new challenges to service provision in that as a 
cohort they have aged during one of the most expansive socio-economic and culturally 
diverse periods of our history and will reflect the hopes, desires, ambitions and 
disappointments and losses of that age plus their own individual interpretation and 
internal experience of themselves. Many older people will be living out their final 
years in a society they hardly recognise where the formative experiences which 
shaped them in their youth may go unacknowledged. Set within this context the 
impact of transitions for older people such as bereavement, illness, moving into 
residential care, multiple losses and so on will most certainly effect a differential 
response in psychological terms. It is vital that psychology and the related disciplines 
seek to understand this response in terms of the individual’s unique experience.
In considering the complexity of the ageing person’s past experience, present 
functioning and vision of the future this essay necessarily takes a developmental 
perspective which is conceived as a framework in which the individual meets and 
negotiates challenge and transition. The essay begins by exploring the developmental 
theories of Erikson and Levinson before considering how, in the face of change, a 
coherent and continuing sense of self may be maintained through flexible and adaptive 
strategies. Developmental theory, research and practice are linked through a 
consideration of the various forms of reminiscence and their effects.
Erikson’s (1950) developmental theory of the life span
Erikson developed his theory to reflect, as he saw it, the negotiation of developmental 
tasks that an individual must face at particular stages of their life from birth through to 
death. Erikson argued that development is a dynamic process in which psychological 
development is continuously influenced by the successful negotiation or not of
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previous and current developmental challenge. Further, this process takes place within 
the society of the ‘other’ such that the world of the newborn infant and beyond is 
populated by adults in the midst of their own continued and life-long challenge.
According to Erikson each stage offers up specific psychosocial tasks that ideally 
should be fulfilled in order to develop ego qualities or strengths that eventually, in old 
age, facilitate ego integrity in the face of declining abilities and the move towards 
death. He described ego integrity in old age thus:
“It is a post-narcissistic love of the human ego -  not the self -  as an 
experience which conveys some world order and spiritual sense....”
(Erikson, 1963 p. 241).
The first psychosocial task the baby encounters in response to crisis or challenge is 
that of developing a sense of trust rather than mistrust. The ensuing tasks through to 
school age are conceived as developing a sense of autonomy rather than shame and 
doubt, initiative rather than guilt, and industry rather than inferiority. Beyond school 
age comes adolescence and young adulthood in which forging one’s identity and 
developing a capacity for intimacy become the focus for growth. Role confusion and 
isolation respectively may result from unsuccessful negotiation of these stages. 
Middle adulthood brings the challenge of generativity, that is, a sense of guiding and 
caring for the next generation which is expressed either through one’s own children or 
in the wider society. Erikson suggests that even those individuals bound by 
‘philosophical and spiritual tradition’ (ibid.) to lead a celibate life are in fact just as 
concerned with generativity through the charily and care they bestow on the 
community. In the absence of generativity, stagnation may set in. Finally in old age 
integrity vies with despair, despair signalling a fear of death and regret for the life 
lived, although despair may be hidden and disgust expressed instead especially 
towards the young.
Table one gives an outline of Erikson’s stages of the life-span together with the 
possible outcomes of developmental challenge and emerging ego qualities.
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Table 1. Erikson's Eight Stages o f  Man, taken and adapted from
Childhood and Societv (Erikson. 19631
Stage Developmental task Ego quality
Infancy Basic Trust v Basic Mistrust Hope
Early childhood Autonomy v. Shame and Doubt Willpower
Play age Initiative v. Guilt Purpose
School age Industry V. Inferiorily Competence
Adolescence Identity v. Role Confusion Fidelity
Young adulthood Intimacy V. Isolation Love
Middle adulthood Generativity v. Stagnation Care
Old age Ego Integrity v. Despair Wisdom
Erikson believed that wisdom in old age could only emerge as a result of a full and 
active involvement in the world in the previous developmental stages. With this 
comes an acknowledgement of human experience, both individually and as the family 
of man, in all its beauty and pathos. Erikson’s concepts of positive and negative forces 
essentially mirror the ontological consequences of being both agent and recipient in 
the world in an individual and collective sense and stress the continuous interactive 
nature of existence. Erikson also emphasises an acceptance of the time one lives in 
and the ability to perceive universals of human experience being expressed now and in 
the past as important for maintaining integrity and not fearing death. This may be 
especially difficult for some older people who inhabit a world where they may have 
become disenfranchised by the culture around them and have not engaged vigorously 
in the generative period of middle age.
Erikson’s theory is underpinned by psychoanalytic concepts and as such is dynamic, 
assuming a global, meta-perspective of development. The strength of psychoanalytic 
theory has always been that it provides a complete account of personality development 
and as such may give insight into how one encounters the implicit and explicit 
transitions of old age. According to Havighurst, Neugarten and Tobin (1968) it is 
likely that successful ageing is dependent on personality factors as much as it is on 
physical or mental deterioration. They found that although elderly people who 
remained active and engaged had high levels of satisfaction and happiness, personality
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traits also impacted upon the relationship between level of engagement and perceived 
quality of life. Neugarten (1988) suggests that people pursue a style of ageing that 
reflects their personality and experience.
Although highly influential, Erikson’s theory has been heavily criticised for its lack of 
clearly defined stages and descriptions of developmental crises (Coleman & 
O’Hanlon, 2004). Erikson formulated his theory during the 1950’s (reflecting the 
customs and mores of that time) when rigorous empirical investigation in 
developmental theory had not yet taken hold and when classical styles of writing and 
theorising in psychology were still very much in the ascendancy. Nevertheless, 
Erikson’s concepts have since been taken up by researchers and received empirical 
support especially in relation to wisdom and generativity.
The generative activities implicit to guiding and supporting the next generation may 
be particularly important in the contribution they make towards gaining insight and 
wisdom in later years. McAdams and de St Aubin (1992) developed a complex 
model, grounded in the theory of earlier researchers such as Erikson (1950) and Kotre 
(1984), to measure generative concerns, commitments and actions through the use of a 
20-item self-report scale, a sentence completion task and a 50-item behavioural 
checklist respectively. Although criticised for its individualistic western perspective 
and lack of cultural sensitivity the measures have good relative validity and reliability. 
Stewart, Osgrove and Helson (2001) report findings from a longitudinal study in 
which three groups of women were followed from graduation through to middle age. 
They found that generativity increased steadily with age but particularly between early 
and late middle age, that is between the forties and fifties. These findings would seem 
to support a continued development of generativity in preference to Erikson’s discrete 
developmental task of middle age (Stewart & Vandewater, 1998). However, as 
Coleman and O’Hanlon (2004) argue, the onset and occurrence of generativity is 
likely to be influenced by many other factors such as early experience, caring for frail 
parents and socio-economic status. In terms of the effects of generativity, Keyes and 
Ryff (1998) found a strong positive association between all aspects of generativity and 
social and psychological well being except for those adults who had high levels of 
primary obligations.
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Wisdom is a difficult concept to define. Whilst Baltes, Staudinger, Maercker and 
Smith (1995) hypothesise a knowledge-based state of wisdom, others view wisdom as 
an integration of affect and cognition. Kramer (1990) suggests that wisdom translates 
as spiritual reflection. Sternberg (2001) and Webster (2003) feel that an empathie 
understanding of others is critical in the development of wisdom. However, although 
it is likely that wisdom taps into all these qualities lack of consensus over definition 
makes its measurement problematic. In this regard interview-based methods probably 
offer the most comprehensive route to measuring wisdom. Baltes, (1987) used focus 
groups in which participants were given vignettes of challenging situations and were 
then invited to consider out loud what course of action they might take and what 
factors would influence their decision. Conversations were rated according to the 
degree in which they demonstrated factual knowledge, a cost-beneflt analysis as a 
rationale for the advice offered, and the significance of past, present and future 
context. This approach is promising in that it has real ecological validity and can reach 
varied cultural, socio-economic and age groups which may be more difficult with 
questionnaire measures.
In terms of life-span experience many researchers argue that wisdom is relatively rare. 
Erikson, Erikson and Kivnick (1986) suggests that wisdom can only manifest if 
certain criteria from earlier stages have been met such as early experience with adults 
who are sensitive and responsive to the child’s emotional needs. However, an 
interesting study by Staudinger, Maciel, Smith and Baltes (1998) revealed the 
differential effect of professional training. They found that Clinical Psychologists 
were more likely to score highly on knowledge-based aspects of wisdom than other 
professionals such as teachers, lawyers and architects. It could be argued that 
psychologists select their profession on the basis of personality variables and this, 
rather than training effects the development of this aspect of wisdom. However, the 
authors caution against drawing strong conclusions as they did not include measures 
of creativity and social intelligence.
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Levinson’s theory of development
Levinson, Darrow, Klein, Levinson & McKee (1978) undertook research in which 
forty American men between the ages of 35 and 45 were subject to a series of in-depth 
biographical interviews. The interviews covered areas such as work, education, 
friendship, marriage, politics and religion. They found clear evidence to suggest 
developmental stages similar to Eiikson’s and sub-divisions of ‘era’s and ‘periods’ 
within those stages, some being stable and others unsettled and challenging. Levinson 
et al (1978) found that the timing of developmental periods were relatively similar 
across their cohort varying only by about two or three years and identified middle age 
as falling between 40 and 65 and late adulthood as 60 plus. Their findings denote a 
life structure which is comprised of the self, the impact of socio-cultural factors on the 
individual and the selfs involvement in the world. Conscious and unconscious 
components of the self, some of which have their beginnings in earlier development, 
may to some extent influence which aspects of the self are expressed or inhibited 
within the environment. The key issue here is that both the individual and the 
environment are defined by each other. This is interesting for its link to Erikson’s 
concepts of wisdom and spirituality in old age whereby realisation and enlightenment 
allow the individual to acknowledge the random, symbiotic nature of human existence: 
“an individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one life cycle..with one 
segment of history” (Erikson, 1963, p. 241). But this also raises questions over what 
factors mediate a positive acceptance of the transient nature of existence (a state of 
integrity) or a tortured one ( a state of despair) as expressed in the irreconcilable plea 
of the poet Dylan Thomas: “do not go gentle into that goodnight.. .Rage, rage against 
the dying of the light”. The very finite period of each human life juxtaposed with the 
continued existence of the species makes for this awful paradox, one which Erikson 
perhaps attempts to resolve at a higher level during his own old age when he talks of 
‘some sense of premonition of immortality’ (Erikson et al, 1986, p. 336).
Developmental theories have been criticised for being limited to a particular socio­
cultural context. They do not address diversity and individuals whose lives fall 
outside of the conditions necessary to fulfil particular developmental tasks (Coleman 
& O’Hanlon, 2004). However, it can be argued that Erikson’s adult developmental
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tasks and ego qualities are universals and as such are negotiated through all kinds of 
relationships and challenging life experience that transcend cultural norms.
Riley (1973) rejects the idea of fixed developmental periods altogether and points 
instead to socio-historical change as the driving force of the perceived differences 
between the generations. However, fixed developmental periods driven by biological, 
cognitive and affective change are accepted as a given for infancy, childhood and 
adolescence so why not beyond albeit in a more fluid sense? One reason for this may 
be that earlier research into ageing has been heavily influenced by sociological 
theorists whose interest in social trends may have obscured or left out altogether the 
internal experience of individuals and the changing sense of self throughout the life 
span. In therapeutic terms this is even more significant. As Crusey (1986) points out, 
in dealing with the problems of the older person, therapists may tend towards 
manipulating their external world to the detriment of concomitant psychic conflict. 
This may be particularly important where the person has suffered life-long unresolved 
losses which may have compromised earlier efforts at separation and individuation 
and contribute to a heightened fear of death. Continued efforts are needed to ensure 
that all aspects of functioning are addressed in delivering services to older people.
Disengagement Theory
To some extent, psychological and social factors had received attention in Gumming 
and Henry’s (1961) controversial Disengagement Theory. They argued that the 
changes brought about by ageing such as withdrawal and physical decline were in fact 
a normal and healthy part of the ageing process but largely perceived by society to be 
deleterious and to be avoided at all costs wherever possible. Disengagement referred 
to the relinquishing of social obligations by the individual and society’s withdrawal of 
its demands on the individual, ushering in a new, liberated way of being for the older 
person. This is interesting in that one is distancing oneself from the context in which 
one has known and experienced life and may lead to a re-evaluation of long-held 
opinions and beliefs about the self, the world and others. Within the family and 
systemic therapies, removing context is recognised as a very powerful process, 
opening up new insights for individuals.
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Disengagement Theory was heavily criticised over concerns that it may allow social 
policy makers to reduce services to older people and legitimise inadequate 
institutionalised care (Coleman & O’Hanlon, 2004) and for its theoretical 
generalisations that took no account of the diversity of older people (Achenbaun & 
Bengston, 1994). However, Gutmaim (1987; 1997) partially supports the principle of 
disengagement in older people but gives it greater utility in that it becomes the vehicle 
for a new engagement with the values and beliefs and religious practices of their 
culture. He argues that elders become guardians of those symbolic and abstract 
elements through their increasing passivity which in turn is observed and reflected on 
by other younger individuals.
Post-modern western society has to a great extent disenfranchised older people in their 
role as protector and exponent of cultural values and beliefs. The imposition of the 
work ethic on society (amongst other things) as highly desirable may have led to a de­
valuing of other ways of ‘being’. This is true for younger people as well in that real 
choices about raising children are limited and driven by the necessity of two incomes 
in order to live. This is a huge paradox in that the burgeoning social-democratic 
thinking of the west heralds diversity as a central focus of political initiative and yet 
only seems able to tolerate diversity at an individual level if we all eventually appear 
to be doing more or less the same at a societal level. Hence the popular media image 
of an eighty year old is that they should be a slightly less active version of a sixty year 
old. These issues present real difficulties for younger health care professionals on two 
levels: First, they are steeped in an enterprise culture which may inhibit validation of a 
‘wise old age’ and second they may have only experienced a boundaiy-less, 
homogenised culture in stark contrast to the structured, value-laden world the older 
person may inhabit. However, it may be that these concerns are mediated somewhat 
through the common internal experience of both client and therapist. King (1980) 
suggests that within a psychodynamic formulation, older people are operating within 
chronological, psychological and biological timescales that are all subject to 
unconscious processing which is in itself timeless. The primitive phantasies of the 
unconscious are as significant for the younger therapist as they are for the older client.
Tomstam (1997) suggests that imposing mid-life values and patterns of living on older
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people was in part responsible for the controversy surrounding Disengagement 
Theory, and argued that a further withdrawal in late life on a level of spiritual 
meditation that transcends cultural belief and practice was a necessary and natural part 
of the ageing process. This links well with Erikson’s ‘premonition of immortality’ 
(Erikson et al., 1986, p.336) and may function to facilitate a connectedness to all life 
rather than just the particular moment in time one is bom into, which in turn may 
make death easier to accept. Tomstam’s theory of gerotranscendence suggests that a 
decreasing interest in the social world and the material concems of life accompany 
greater insight into all aspects (good and bad) of the self Coleman and O’Hanlon 
(2004) link these processes to the healing quality of Life Review in old age (which is 
discussed below) and cite Gutmaim’s (1987) concept of ‘passive mastery’ as 
indicative of a volitional withdrawal in older people and increasing dependence on 
‘interiority’.
Tomstam (1997) asserts that although cultural factors do impact upon an individual’s 
development in later life, intemal resources are implicit to the process of 
gerotranscendence which he describes as a developing cosmic awareness where the 
boundaries of time and space have less significance, death is not feared. Self-interest 
decreases and a more altmistic outlook develops. There is an acceptance of the self 
and experience, for what they tmly are and an increased need for solitude with less 
interest in superficial relationships. However, it would seem vitally important to 
distinguish just what aspects of behaviour can be attributed to any form of 
disengagement with the extemal world as opposed to those aspects that signal 
maladaptive coping strategies driven by depression or other psychological problems.
The normative stage theories of ageing explored so far delineate a developmental 
process as distinct from a coping process. Coleman and O’Hanlon (2004) question 
whether this distinction is warranted. After all, development must surely occur at the 
level of observable qualitative shifts and at the level of cognitive re-evaluation and 
appraisal in response to life events and the ageing self. The ageing self being both a 
separate and related entity. Further, Rowe and Khan (1998) argue that many biological 
and social factors influence the ageing process, whilst Baltes and Baltes (1990) 
suggest that ageing should be conceptualised within a framework that acknowledges 
the variability between, and the ‘plasticity’ within individuals in their capacity to age
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successfully.
The cognitive and physical decline and personal and social losses of late life might 
lead to an automatic assumption by others that most older people, as a matter of 
course, do not age successfully and experience more depression and anxiety and are 
more fearful than the rest of the population. In addition Brandtstadter and Greve 
(1994, p.52) argue that ‘construction of the self and personal continuity’ are under 
considerable threat during that decline. Surprisingly, research shows no evidence to 
suggest a general decrease in self-esteem in older people (Robins, Trzesniewski, 
Tracy, Gosling & Potter, 2002; Coleman, Ivani-Chalian & Robinson, 1993) or an 
increase in anxiety and depressive disorders (Kunzman, Little & Smith, 2000; Dietz, 
1990). How do some older people maintain their continuing sense of self in the face 
of change and move towards wisdom, integrity and spiritual awareness?
Stabilising and coping processes in older people
Brandstadter and Greve (1994) explore coping processes in their theory of self­
representation and self-esteem during the transition to old age. They suggest that 
problems may arise when:
“firmly entrenched self-referential beliefs are threatened 
by discrepant evidence...when personally valued aptitudes, 
traits, or dispositions vanish or lose their individuating 
valence... .when structures...that provide a stable 
directional context and support a sense o f “internal” 
or “extemal”continuity are disrupted”
(Brandstadter & Greve, 1994, p.55).
Long held aspirations about the person one hopes to become that is, the ‘normative’ or 
possible self, may, during the active period of one’s life be inspiring and motivating, 
as long as they are feasibly attainable. However, in old age the non-realisation of 
those goals may herald depression and self-alienation depending on the person’s 
ability to adopt and adjust to a more realistic view of what is possible. Brandstadter 
and Greve (1994) propose that discrepancies between the actual and normative self
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can be negotiated in three different ways through the processes of Assimilation, 
Accommodation and Immunisation.
Assimilation
Assimilation refers to problem directed action in which the individual may engage in 
phases of self-evaluation and adjustment in order to preserve the feasible attainment of 
the hopes, values and goals that have always been part of their normative or possible 
self-concept. The degree to which an individual can be self-corrective will be driven 
by their perception of self-efficacy and available resources (ibid.).
Accommodation
Accommodative processes may develop when assimilative efforts prove to be futile 
because prior goals are no longer attainable. This necessarily involves a 
disengagement from and devaluing of those prior goals as defining the normative self. 
With this comes a realisation that long-held beliefs/values about the self as defined by 
those goals must be relinquished. By adjusting normative expectations about the self 
to be more in line with the actual perception of the self Brandstadter and Greve(1994) 
suggest that a decrease in self-esteem is avoided. However, this realisation may be 
extremely painful and induce varying levels of dysthymia/depression during the 
transition from assimilation to accommodation. At this point therapy could focus on 
both reducing the attractiveness of goals that are no longer attainable and on an 
adjustment of goal preference to what is possible, thereby enhancing the person’s 
sense of control and efficacy. A readiness to flexibly adjust personal goals may protect 
against depression (Brandstadter & Greve, 1994). In addition, Brandstadter, Wentura 
& Greve (1993) found that the level of depression accompanying perceived 
developmental loss is moderated by the degree to which subjects compare themselves 
in a good light to similar-age individuals.
Research shows that assimilative and accommodative processes are mutually 
exclusive and underpinned by increases in age. In a meta-analysis (n=3689)
85
© Vanessa Bryant 2005
Brandstadter and Renner (1990) found that on measures of Tenacious Goal Pursuit 
(TGP) and Flexible Goal Adjustment (FGA) - reflecting assimilative and 
accommodative strategies respectively - both men and women increasingly use FGA 
as they age whilst reducing their use of TGP. Brandstadter and Greve (1994) strongly 
suggest that these processes do not signal resignation or regressive tendencies but 
function primarily to maintain a positive view of the self.
Immunisation
When self-referential beliefs are resistant to discrepant evidence the individual is in 
effect immunising themselves and negating self-threatening evidence through data- 
oriented and concept-oriented processes. An example of the latter might be that in 
order to stabilise and enhance their self-concept an older person may downplay 
previously held ideals about physical beauty and decide that wrinkles are an indication 
of laughter lines or of a life that has been well-lived. The interpretation of the 
function and meaning of appearance to the person, that is its self-referential 
significance may be highly important to their self-esteem. Within a rational 
framework alternative interpretations of ‘evidence’ may function protectively and 
adaptively.
Life Review and Reminiscence
Working with older people may lead the clinical psychologist to think of their 
difficulties such as physical illness, cognitive decline, bereavement and other losses 
soley in terms of their current situation, that is the problems of being old. However, as 
Woods (2003) points out, taking a developmental perspective admits the whole of the 
person’s life to their current situation and allows a consideration of that person as 
child, adolescent and adult and all the experience contained therein. One of the ways 
in which this perspective can be facilitated is through the process of Life Review 
(Butler, 1963) which has come to define a particular category of reminiscence, that is, 
a narrative, integrative understanding of the person’s past in terms of the possibilities 
it might offer for the resolution of difficulties surrounding transitions, and for further 
change and development. Life Review is driven by Erikson’s concept of the search for
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ego integrity (Santrock, 2002) involving introspection and self-reflection and as such 
is not necessarily a skill that all older people will have the capacity or need to develop 
(Lieberman & Tobin, 1983). Butler’s (1963) original concept of life review indicated 
integration with the current self-concept of memories that may have been long 
forgotten. Giving up or revising long held perceptions of the self could of course 
precipitate great distress or a sense of despair (Myers & Schwiebert, 1996) and defend 
against its use especially in those who are relatively content anyway. A longitudinal 
study by Wink and Shiff (2002) supports this view. In a sample of 172 participants in 
their late sixties and mid-seventies that had been followed since childhood they found 
that only 22 per cent engaged in a struggle for improved self-understanding with the 
rest of the sample being either unclear or showing no evidence at all to support such a 
struggle. However, engaging in life review had a positive association with 
generativity, creativity and spirituality (Wink, 1999) as well as a global measure of 
negative life events. Wink and Shiff conclude that life review is more a product of 
past difficulties than a life free of conflict. Nevertheless, Haight, Michel and Hendrix 
(2000) report significant improvements to self-esteem and life satisfaction as well as 
reduced levels of depression in a cohort of nursing home residents who received life 
review as an intervention.
A particular application of life review is that it could be integrated with an attachment- 
focussed intervention where early anxieties related to dependency and separation may 
resurrect themselves in later life as chronic loneliness (Cohen, 1982 ) and/or 
depression. In this regard the Adult Attachment Interview (Main, Kaplan & Cassidy, 
1985) further developed and extended by Crittenden (1999) could assist in assessing 
the impact of attachment style on the interpretation and response to threat in old age.
Other forms of reminiscence have sometimes been shown to be maladaptive, such as 
excessive rumination on painful memories without resolution, reflecting guilt and 
regret (Coleman, 1986) and may signal depression. Excessive recall and paradoxically 
avoidance of painful memories in old age can also be linked to post-traumatic stress 
disorder. Avoidance of trauma memories as a coping mechanism ensures their potency 
(Brewin, 1998) whereas a coherent narrative of that trauma should allow for its 
development and integration into a person’s life story that is still personally significant 
but no longer disturbing (Coleman & O’Hanlon, 2004). This is particularly relevant
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for survivors of the holocaust and world wars.
Different functions of reminiscence have been cleverly delineated through the use of 
scales such as Webster’s (1997) Reminiscence Functions Scale. In addition to the 
more positive functions such as ‘intimacy maintenance’ or ‘problem-solving’ the scale 
also assesses ‘Bitterness revival’ which could act to justify continued negative thought 
and affect towards others (Webster, 2001). However, the downside of this function is 
its association with a reduced sense of personal well-being (Webster, 1998). This type 
of scale could be a useful aid in tracking down the source of unresolved conflict in 
older people.
Conclusion
There are many areas of working with the elderly that have not been covered in this 
essay due to space limitation. These areas include the special needs of diverse groups 
such as cultural, religious and ethnic minorities, the learning disabled, advanced old 
age and the terminally ill. Instead this essay has taken a broad approach and focussed 
on illuminating the link between developmental theoiy, research and practice to 
enable an understanding that problems in late life are not simply a reflection of an 
older person’s current situation but reflect the passage of their lives. A developmental 
perspective promotes an understanding of what it is to age and takes into account 
declining physical and cognitive capacities together with the unresolved issues of the 
past, and the struggle to maintain a continuing sense of self, all of which may combine 
to produce wisdom and integrity or varying degrees of psychological difficulties. This 
essay has also sought to emphasise how the diversity of old people is somewhat 
invalidated by an enterprise culture: the very thing that old people have in abundance, 
experience and wisdom, does not find a vehicle of expression in our society and may 
account for feelings of alienation and depression.
However, that is not to say that discrete psychological problems do not exist for older 
people. For example, the disorienting experience of re-locating, recovering from 
surgery or the sudden loss of a child for an aged parent bring unique difficulties
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whatever the level of growth and development and may require specialist intervention.
More research is needed to explore quality of life and the factors that mediate it in 
older people. This may help to delineate current research findings that suggest the 
relationship between relatively adequate levels of well being and ageing is by no 
means straight forward and poorly understood.
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Summary of Adult Mental Health Case Report
Cognitive behavioural therapy with a 22 year old woman 
Presenting with Obsessive Compulsive disorder and 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Some details have been changed to preserve anonymity. 
All names used in the report are fictitious.
April 2003 
Year 1
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Adult Mental Health Case Summary
This 20 year old white British woman was referred to the community mental health 
team by her GP for help with compulsive checking and ritualistic behaviour. She had 
not received psychological therapy before but was taking medication for depression.
Assessment
On assessment Sarah described her behaviour as interfering with her life on a global 
level. She had obsessive thoughts about arguments with close family and friends and 
engaged in and ritualistic behaviour in order to ward off ‘bad’ things happening to her 
or her five year old son. She was also very worried about the physical threat her ex­
boyfriend posed and repeatedly stated how unsafe it felt to live in her flat. He had 
subjected Sarah to physical and emotional abuse in the flat throughout the time they 
were together. Her obsessions and rituals took the form of not moving any object at 
all in her flat as she felt that somehow this would invite bad events to happen. This 
behaviour was so extensive that she was only able to be in the flat during the late 
evening and early morning. For example, she was unable to change bed-clothes or 
wash up dishes. Consequently Sarah and her son spent most of their time at Sarah’s 
parents’ house.
Sarah described her sleep as poor. She was very anxious in the flat, and reported being 
hyper-vigilant to sudden noises, repeatedly checking doors and windows before going 
to bed. Sarah often saw her ex-boyfriend’s face and feared that he was somewhere in 
the flat.
Sarah suffered from separation anxiety as a young child and was later bullied at 
school. Her mother also suffered from anxiety and depression and her father had 
recently made a suicide attempt in response to ill-health.
Initial formulation
Sarah’s symptoms of recurrent obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviour 
indicated the presence of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (CCD. Her compulsive
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behaviour was repetitive and ritualistic and aimed at reducing subjective anxiety and 
gaining control over her environment. She also met DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis 
of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in that she had recurring episodes of 
numbing, re-experiencing and was hyper-aroused in response to stimuli related to past 
trauma. Sarah’s flat represented a global stimulus for memories and intrusions of past 
trauma that was complicated by the very real and current threat of her ex-boyffiend’s 
presence in the vicinity. It was possible that trauma was significant in the genesis of 
Sarah’s obsessive and compulsive behaviour. Janet (1903) suggested that in some 
cases OCD was caused by ‘emotional shock’. Sarah’s history indicated that she had 
had little control over her environment when she met her ex-boyfriend and it was 
likely that the relationship compounded her sense of helplessness and was significant 
in the development of her depression. The beliefs and assumptions that were driving 
Sarah’s excessive anxiety over arguments may have been related to thoughts about 
pleasing others. Displeasing others through disagreement may have signalled rejection 
and isolation for Sarah and bring to mind negative affect associated with past episodes 
of bullying.
Action Plan
Sarah wanted to address her obsessive compulsive symptoms as they were having 
damaging effect on both Sarah and her son. These symptoms were only one aspect of 
her difficulties but within the time available it was agreed with Sarah to concentrate 
exclusively on this one area. The effectiveness of behavioural treatments for OCD is 
well documented (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989), whereas 
outcome studies for a cognitive component to treatment are less conclusive. However, 
it was not possible to include in vivo exposure/response prevention strategies in the 
therapy sessions as the trainee’s supervisor felt the threat of Sarah’s violent ex­
boyfriend posed a considerable risk to safety. However, Salkovskis and Kirk (1989) 
suggest that a cognitive component in treatment may be helpful in complex cases and 
suggest an approach that aims to modify distorted thinking patterns in order to reduce 
distress.
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Intervention
Sarah attended for seven sessions and cancelled three. She was ambivalent about 
therapy at the beginning but this changed towards the middle of treatment and she was 
keen to attend.
The overall aim of therapy using the Salkovskis and Westbrook (1989) approach is, 
through Socratic questioning, to encourage the client to consider an alternative view 
of their situation. In Sarah’s case this meant introducing her to, and reinforcing 
throughout therapy, the idea that it was not the content of her thoughts per se that 
caused distress but the meaning she attached to them. Initially, the work focussed on 
creating a shared understanding of a cognitive conceptualisation of Sarah’s obsessions 
and compulsions. This involved socialisation to an adapted cognitive model of OCD 
(Salkovskis, Forrester & Richards, 1998). Further psychoeducation focussed on the 
normalisation of intrusive thoughts and their relationship to taking action, with regard 
to Sarah’s appraisal for being responsible for avoiding argument and disagreement 
and also in respect of the Thought Action Fusion model (TAF) of Rachman (1993).
Sarah was provided with homework sheets to record the content of her intrusive 
thoughts so that verbal reattribution techniques (e.g. questioning the evidence, 
generating rational responses) could be applied in the sessions. However, Sarah was 
extremely reluctant to complete the sheets and on the advice of the trainee’s 
supervisor this issue was not pursued. Further sessions focussed on exploring with 
Sarah the maintaining factors in her obsessive-compulsive behaviour and challenging 
the irrational basis of her magical thinking. We also practised detached mindfulness 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994) and addressed Sarah’s tendency to attribute negative 
outcomes to events and generated alternative perspectives. We explored the 
circularity of negative affect and cognitions.
Outcome
Objective measures of change showed that there was no improvement in Sarah’s 
mood. However, she had challenged her beliefs by effecting change in her behaviour 
in that she had recently washed her son’s clothes and cooked a meal in her flat. This
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was a real achievement for her. Her PTSD symptoms were still very distressing and 
she attended further sessions with the supervisor after the trainee had left the service.
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Summary of Learning Disability Case Report
Extended assessment of a 26 year old man 
with learning difficulties presenting with 
self-induced vomiting and challenging behaviour
Some details in this report have been changed to preserve anonymity. 
All names used in the report are fictitious.
November 2003 
Year 1
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Learning Disability Case Report
John was a 26 year old white British man with severe learning difficulties and autism. 
His mother phoned the team to ask if we could see John as he had recently been veiy 
aggressive towards her and his father. He was also making himself vomit and would 
not let his parents leave him in a room by himself. A formal referral was made 
through the care manager.
Initial assessment
John’s parents reported that John was often agitated and restless in the early evening 
and was refusing to get ready for bed at around 10pm. He had taken to throwing 
various large items out of his bedroom window and shouting ‘I’m not going to that 
place, cancel the bed’ meaning the respite centre which he attended in the middle of 
each week. During these times John ‘glazed over’ and appeared to be ‘in a world of 
his own’. On one occasion John’s father had to defend himself from John with a 
rolled up newspaper. These were traumatic and distressing occasions for the whole 
family and afterwards John would often ask ‘what’s wrong with me’ or ‘why did you 
make me do that’. John needed constant reassurance about routines and was veiy 
upset by any last minute changes that were made. He did not particularly look forward 
to going to the day centre and often had to be collected from there by his mother in 
response to phone calls from staff, usually because he had been sick. John did not like 
his mother to engage in activities outside the home and she found that her life had 
increasingly been ‘put on hold’ when John at home. John’s mother felt they ‘couldn’t 
do without respite care’ whilst his father questioned whether he should be ‘going there 
at all’. They both felt that John enjoyed going to his work placement one day a week 
and attributed this to the small, friendly and predictable environment that it offered.
Developmental history
John’s birth was induced at 28 weeks and he suffered hypoxia. He developed epilepsy
f>
at 10 years of age and had problems with fine and gross motor control. He was 
diagnosed with autism when he was 17 years old. However he had learnt to say certain 
phrases very well even though he lacked an understanding of the wider meaning of
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language and had limited social interaction skills.
Initial formulation
John always had major problems separating from his mother and it is likely that his 
behaviour at weekends was driven by his anxiety over respite care and his mother’s 
absence in the middle of the week. John’s learning disability and autism may have 
precluded the formation of a secure attachment with his mother and the ability to 
predict when or how he could regain proximity in her absence. Such absence may 
have been perceived by John as a threat to his safety (Bowlby, 1973). However, the 
pathway from his anxiety to his behaviour at increasingly aggressive behaviour at 
night was not clear and needed further investigation. It was also considered that John 
was experiencing a delayed adolescence and with it a growing awareness that he had 
limited control over the environment and few opportunities to make real choices. He 
no longer wished to go to bed at 10pm and may have felt angry and frustrated that he 
was unable to communicate his feelings and wishes to his parents.
Action plan
Further assessment of John’s difficulties was needed to inform the intervention 
process. The assessment covered the following areas: cognitive and emotional 
understanding; ability to function in other settings; a functional analysis of John’s 
target behaviours that included information about the communication function of 
ecological variables such as T want’ or T feel’.
John’s parents gave their consent for the assessment to be carried out. It was agreed 
that John’s verbal consent would be sought before each assessment was carried out.
Extended assessment
John would not participate in an assessment of his IQ and walked out of the room. 
However he did agree to collaborate in an administration of the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982) which assesses receptive 
language ability. John obtained a score equivalent to that of a seven year old. The test
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revealed that John had difficulties focussing his attention and tired very quickly.
John’s ability to correctly identify emotions was mixed. He was able to label the 
emotion correctly on pictures of individual faces but had difficulty in assessing the 
sentiments being expressed in pictures of groups. However, during this part of the 
assessment John revealed that he was ‘quite keen’ on a girl who attended the day 
centre and that ‘it wasn’t fair’ that he had respite care in the middle of the week. His 
ability to express himself was further evident in that he was able to say why he had 
been unhappy in respite. It was because he had missed his mother.
Further meetings with John’s parents focussed on a functional analysis of target 
behaviours but also revealed that they were not clear about what they were requesting 
for John. This seemed to reflect a reluctance to acknowledge that John was no longer a 
child and would at some point move out of the parental home. Understandably they 
wanted more time to themselves but also felt sad that John may have to live 
somewhere else. The fhistrated behaviours they described during these meetings were 
very similar to that expressed by any adolescent.
Interviews with care staff
The respite care manager described several incidents where John had placed objects in 
his throat and choked. Staff felt this was to provoke them into calling John’s mother 
so that he could go home. However, they decided to stop positively reinforcing his 
behaviour after which it ceased happening. This indicated that John was able to 
modify his behaviour according to consequences.
Further formulation
John’s anger occurred when aspects of his immediate environment were not under his 
control, such as having to switch the television off. Novaco (1979) suggested that 
cognitive mediation of anger refers to cognitive processes that influence each other 
before, during and after a triggering event, that is, prior expectations influence 
attention during the event and the resulting behaviour. John may have perceived his 
lack of agency as unfair, holding his parents responsible, thus priming him to 
experience anger when being asked to get ready for bed or turn the television off. At
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these times John’s behaviour was ultimately reinforced by the continued proximity of 
his mother as she would often sit with him until he eventually fell asleep about 3.30 in 
the morning.
Recommendations
It was recommended that John’s parents should start looking for a residential facility 
that would meet John’s needs with regard to a predictable and structured environment 
but would also encourage John in developing some independence as a young person. 
It was hoped a support worker would be appointed to assist John in the transition 
between home and residential care and also to provide an appropriate relationship 
outside of the parental one. The need to support John’s parents in understanding the 
communicative function of John’s behaviours and to develop effective strategies for 
interacting with him was also recommended.
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Summary of Child and Family Case Report
Motivational interviewing and cognitive behavioural therapy 
with a 16 year old female presenting with eating disordered behaviour
Some details in this report have been changed to preserve anonymity 
All names used in this report are fictitious.
April 2004 
Year 2
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Child Case Summary
Clare was a 16 year old white British girl who was referred to the Child and Family 
service by her GP over concerns about her restricted diet and episodes of self-induced 
vomiting.
Assessment
Clare presented as very quiet and withdrawn. She was tall and quite slim although her 
body mass index of 20 was within the normal range. She said she was depressed but 
felt that her weight was adequate and didn’t know why people were so concerned 
about her. She felt fully in control of her diet and did not see any reason to increase 
her food intake. However, she acknowledged that she had irregular periods and was 
often very tired and cold which sometimes impacted on her ability to complete her 
college work or go out with friends. However, she was meticulous about her college 
assignments and worried constantly that she would fail them.
Clare said that when she ate whatever she liked, she would then look in the mirror and 
hate what she saw. At these times she would Tose it’ and hit out at her legs or head 
and would have to make herself vomit. She also described screaming uncontrollably. 
Clare said that she didn’t trust many people and would never confide in anyone.
Previous therapv
Clare had been referred to a dietician who reported that Clare was not eating enough 
to meet her dietaiy requirements. She was doubtful that Clare would accept her dietary 
advice. Clare had not sought any help for her depression.
Background history
Clare was one of three siblings. Another sibling died of cot death at the age of four 
weeks when Clare was two. Clare’s mother and father separated when she was five 
years old. Clare felt that her father blamed her for the break-up of the family and he 
insisted on reminding her of this every time she saw him. Throughout her childhood 
she remembers arguments with her father who was often angiy and drunk when he
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visited, although he was never physically abusive. She was upset that her mother 
allowed him into the house on these occasions and felt that his needs were always 
given priority.
Clare had a history of separation anxiety and ‘jealous’ behaviours towards her brother 
and sister. As a small child and after her father had left, she had extreme temper 
tantrums and threatened to jump out of the window if her mother showed any 
affection towards her father on his visits.
Measures
Clare had a score of 35 (extremely severe range) on the Beck Depression Inventory II. 
She was also given a food diary and measures of self-esteem and eating disordered 
behaviours but refused to complete them.
Formulation
Clare’s symptoms of dieting and cognitive distortion with regard to her body shape 
were consistent with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa (DSM-IV TR, 2000). Her 
difficulties were formulated within a psychodynamic model.
Bruch (1988) proposed that anorexia nervosa represents a defective self-concept 
which is experienced as a fear of inner emptiness or badness. Clare may have 
internalised from a very young age feelings of being ‘bad’ as a result of her father 
telling her she was to blame for her parents separation. The tensions between her 
mother and father may have led to her mother being emotionally unavailable for 
Clare, intensifying those feelings of rejection and ‘badness’. After the separation Clare 
may have conflated her father blaming her for the break up with the death of her 
brother. This may have led to her later feelings of being out of control and 
overwhelmed by this realisation of an internalised bad self. Bruch (1988) argued that 
‘badness’ must be concealed at all costs and so the person becomes perfectionist in 
areas they can control, such as diet or academic performance.
Clare’s affect dysregulation and restricted eating may have reflected a struggle to find 
some self-respect. In addition, Clare’s rigid cognitive style evidenced by her
107
© Vanessa Biyant 2005
reluctance to trust anyone indicated that she wanted to protect herself from further 
rejection and left her poorly equipped to negotiate periods of transition such as 
adolescence when further integration of cognitive and emotional processing is taking 
place.
Precipitating causes
Clare said she had been teased at college about her weight before she started 
restricting her eating. A subsequent lowering of self-esteem and sense of loss of 
control may have led Clare to become depressed
Maintaining factors
Bruch (1988) suggests that anorexic patients cling to ‘early childhood concepts’ 
delaying the development of abstract thinking and consequently giving rise to 
cognitive distortions such as polarised and magical thinking. Clare’s mistrust of 
everyone was a demonstration of all or nothing thinking and may have been an 
adaptive strategy as well as a maintaining factor. Not trusting anyone protected Clare 
from ever having her core beliefs about her own ‘badness’ confirmed. However, 
periodic reminders from her father regarding blame and her fear of being out of 
control maintained the need for Clare to demonstrate control over other areas of her 
life such as eating.
Action Plan
In consultation with colleagues in the eating disorders service it was agreed that I 
could continue to see Clare on my own as long as her weight did not fall below the 
normal range. Clare would also be monitored by the dietician who was part of the 
child and family team.
The primary aim of therapy was to increase and stabilise Clare’s calorie intake. 
However, her presentation suggested she had little motivation in changing her 
behaviour and contra-indicated a psychodynamic approach to therapy. Clare’s 
resistance to change was conceptualised by the Stage of Change Model (Prochaska & 
Di Clemente, 1992). Clare appeared to be at the precontemplation/contemplation stage 
in that she didn’t really acknowledge overtly that she had a problem at all but at the
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same time had sought help through her GP. Recent approaches to enhancing 
motivation for change in eating disorders have a strong cognitive-behavioural 
component (Vitousek et al., 1998).
It was decided that a motivational model of therapy might be helpful to Clare. She 
agreed to attend the centre for a block of 8 sessions.
Outcome
During the course of therapy Clare experienced considerable distress. On one occasion 
at home she had been screaming and shouting uncontrollably about her weight and 
called an ambulance to take herself to casualty after her mother had refused to be 
drawn into a conversation about her appearance.
However her behaviour was difficult to interpret. In our last session together she 
appeared to be very happy generally and had just started seeing a boy at her college. 
She had also been in touch with an old girlfriend and felt much less isolated than 
previously. There was no way of knowing if her improved mood was due to the 
therapy or to these new relationships. Her unwillingness to collaborate on homework 
tasks and her resistance to challenging her thoughts and beliefs about herself 
suggested the latter.
Clare continued to be monitored by the team’s dietician after her appointments with 
the trainee came to an end.
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Summary of Elective Case Report 
Forensic Service
Neuropsychological assessment of a 32 year old man 
detained in a special hospital, presenting with Schizophrenia 
and a history of drug and alcohol use
Some names and details in this report have been changed 
in order to ensure confidentiality
September 2004 
Year 2
110
© Vanessa Bryant 2005
Elective Case Report
Mr Cox was a 32 year old white British man who was detained in a maximum security 
special hospital under Section 47/49 of the Mental Health Act (1983) under the 
category of Mental Illness. On admission he was referred to the psychology 
department of the hospital for a neuropsychological assessment in order to give a 
detailed picture of his strengths and needs.
Background
Mr Cox had been transferred to the hospital from a Regional Security Unit (RSU) in 
response to concerns about the level of risk he posed to staff. He had destroyed 
property and assaulted a female psychiatrist.
Assessment
Presentation
Mr Cox felt aggrieved at being detained in the hospital and did not think his behaviour 
had been unreasonable. He appeared sleepy and confused. He made reference several 
times to his wife and children although there was nothing on file to support his either 
being married or having children. He was apprehensive about our meeting saying that 
his reading and writing were not very good. Rather confusingly he then went on to say 
that he had won a prize for reading when he was 13 years of age. However, he agreed 
to the assessment and maintained a good humour throughout our sessions together.
Psvchiatric historv
Mr Cox had been diagnosed with Schizophrenia in 1998 although later his symptoms 
were also attributed to aspects of personality and a long history of drug and alcohol 
abuse. Mr Cox had made extensive use of cannabis, diazepam, heroin and 
hallucinogenic agents during his early adolescence. He described himself as a 
‘cannabis lover’. During a stay in prison in 2000 his mental health deteriorated and he 
was transferred to the RSU.
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Personal historv
Mr Cox was subject to a chaotic and disruptive family environment throughout his 
development. He was described by teachers as hyperactive and was sent to a boarding 
school for children with challenging behaviour. He violent behaviour at the school led 
to his being taken into care at 10 years old. Mr Cox left school at fourteen and since 
then had spent most of his time detained in prison or hospital.
Previous assessments
A speech and language assessment indicated that Mr Cox had poor literacy and 
language skills and suggested ‘pervasive developmental problems’.
Assessment
Mr Cox was assessed with a series of tests that were selected to tap into a possibly 
broad range of difficulties that he was expected to demonstrate. From his history of 
Schizophrenia and substance use it was predicted that Mr Cox would evidence deficits 
in short-term memory, visuo-spatial function, visual search and scanning ability, 
sequencing of information, cognitive flexibility and goal-directed stategies. His 
reported history of hyperactivity and dyslexia was unreliable. However his 
presentation and the results of the speech and language assessment suggested that he 
would demonstrate limited language ability and show some degree of impersistence in 
his approach to testing.
Mr Cox was unable to read any of the words on the NART making it impossible to 
assess his pre-morbid functioning. His overall level of functioning fell within the 
extremely low range with an IQ of 68. He had the most difficulty in holding, 
transforming and sequencing information in working memory and visuo-perceptual 
and spatial organisation. He also found it very difficult to concentrate and kept making 
comments that distracted him from the task in hand. On tests of abstract reasoning 
and verbal comprehension his scores were well below average.
Mr Cox was very impaired on measures of memory and new learning. Although he 
was able to copy a design quite well, he was unable to reproduce it immediately after. 
Similarly he was unable to recall any of the conceptual detail of a story. His memory
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for faces and topographical stimuli was consistent with his general level of 
functioning. His performance on tests of visuoperceptual organisation (HVOT) 
suggested a degree of fragmentation in his conceptualisation of the stimuli. This 
inability may have reflected executive impairment in that he was unable to perceive 
the ‘whole’ picture. In addition his poor abstract and verbal reasoning skills on the 
WAIS-in were indicative of impaired concept formation. Lezak (1995) suggests low 
scores on this HVOT task reflect psychotic disturbance but this was not consistent 
with Mr Cox’s presentation during the assessment.
It was clear from the results and the way in which Mr Cox approached almost all the 
tests that his memory was severely impaired. He was veiy aware of this in that he 
quickly became flustered when challenged by the tests. However, coupled with his 
impaired ability was his tendency towards distractibility and consequent inattention 
and reduced processing of stimuli. The literature suggests that poor short-term and 
working memory in heavy drinkers may relate to encoding rather than retrieval errors. 
Thus, attentional deficits together with Mr Cox’s low levels of impulse control may 
have caused or compounded his memory impairments and may have been related to 
his alcohol and cannabis use. However, attention and memory impairments are also 
recognised as core deficits in Schizophrenia (Randolph, Goldberg & Weinberger, 
1993). It was also considered that Mr Cox’s attention difficulties may have reflected 
an early developmental disorder and was driving his challenging behaviour. 
Unfortunately this could not be clarified further as it had not been possible to assess 
pre-morbid functioning.
Recommendations
Although Mr Cox’s test results confirmed the predicted impairments they were unable 
to illuminate aspects of aetiology. However, in terms of care planning, his impaired 
memory, attention and language skills may have impacted substantially on his 
interactions with staff and patients and on his ability and motivation to engage with 
the therapeutic regime of the hospital. These considerations were highlighted in the 
subsequent report and it was recommended that any intervention with Mr Cox should 
be pitched at a non-threatening and easy to understand level.
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Summary of Older Adults Case Report
A psychodynamic formulation and intervention 
with a seventy year old woman presenting 
with a history of anxiety
Some details have been changed in this report to preserve anonymity 
All names used are flcititious
April 2004 
Year 3
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Older Adults Case Summary
Lilian was a seventy year old white British woman who was referred to the Older 
Adult’s psychology service by the manager of the mental health day facility that she 
attended. The manager reported that Lilian was veiy anxious and continuously seeking 
support and reassurance from staff about routine day to day issues.
Assessment
Lilian’s anxiety was palpable in that she sat hunched in her chair and rubbed her face 
with her hands throughout the session. She avoided eye to eye contact and broke down 
in tears several times. However, she welcomed the opportunity to talk about her 
problems.
Lilian reported that she had no confidence and felt inadequate and inferior when in 
company. She hated upsetting people and tried to avoid doing so. She found it difficult 
to relax and her sleep was fretful. Consequently she felt exhausted most of the time. 
She was in the process of divorcing her husband and felt that her anxiety had 
worsened.
Lilian’s scores on the HADS confirmed she was suffering from anxiety and was 
clinically depressed.
Historv
Lilian felt that her three children thought she was selfish for divorcing their father, but 
that she could not have carried on in a marriage where she felt intimidated and 
humiliated. She had recently embarked on another relationship and described her new 
partner as kind and considerate. Even so, Lilian was apprehensive about expressing 
herself in this relationship and feared losing her partner if she disagreed with him. 
She worried about her children’s opinions and their perception of her as disloyal. For 
much of her marriage she had been angry and frustrated. In contrast, her new partner 
made her feel like a human being. It was difficult for her to relax into this new 
freedom and she feared the worst, almost as if it would be taken away from her.
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Lilian remembered her mother and father as being very unhappy together. Her father 
‘just lived in the house and drank a lot’. Lilian and her eight siblings were ashamed of 
him and worried that he would embarrass them in front of their friends. Her abiding 
emotional memory of home was a lack of ‘true affection’ with ‘no warmth or kisses’. 
On one occasion she overheard her mother saying to her father ‘if we hadn’t had 
Lilian we would be a lot better off. Consequently, Lilian said that she knew what it 
was like to feel ‘unwanted’.
Between the ages of six and nine Lilian suffered the loss of three of her siblings 
through illness and world war two. She had also lost a nephew in adulthood whom she 
was very close to and thought of as her own son.
Psvchiatric historv
At forty five years of age Lilian was diagnosed with Schizophrenia that did not 
respond to medication. Electro convulsive therapy eventually reduced her symptoms 
but she had suffered with anxiety ever since.
Previous interventions
Lilian had been offered cognitive behavioural therapy on three separate occasions in 
the preceding 4 years but had never been able to engage with it to any great extent.
Formulation
Lilian’s difficulties were formulated within a psychodynamic model, given that 
cognitive conceptualisations in the past had not been fruitful.
It was possible, given the circumstances of Lilian’s family and the inevitable strain 
with providing for so many children whilst coping with an alcoholic husband that 
Lilian’s mother was not emotionally available for her. As an infant this could 
effectively have left Lilian in a state of unrelieved anxiety. According to Bion (1962) 
failure of the mother to contain the infant’s anxieties may result in avoidance of some 
situations liable to provoke anxiety although the person themselves may feel they are 
continuously persecuted. Further it was likely that at an unconscious level, Lilian’s 
internal representation of her parents was one in which neither of them acknowledged
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or met the emotional needs of the other. This developing unconscious awareness of 
family dynamics may have led Lilian to believe that her own emotional needs would 
also not be met. The degree to which Lilian could approach situations liable to give 
rise to anxiety was indeed limited in that she felt driven to avoid her husband’s and 
her children’s annoyance and irritation at all costs. It was difficult for Lilian to 
tolerate perceived difference of any kind without becoming overwhelmed. Bion 
suggested that the infant’s developing capacity to think about experience may be 
impeded if unbearable feelings remain ‘raw’ rather than transformed. The life 
transitions of divorce and a new partnership that Lilian was negotiating had proved to 
be very stressful. Although Lilian had left an unhappy marriage she was temporarily 
moving through a very uncertain period and her fears of abandonment may have been 
reawakened by this process.
Action Plan
Lilian wanted to reduce the anxiety she was experiencing and in the first instance 
agreed to attend for 10 sessions of therapy. It was decided that a psychodynamic 
approach may be of help to Lilian as she felt that she wanted to understand why she 
had always experienced so much anxiety in her close relationships.
Lemma (2003) suggests that suitability for therapy needs to be considered within the 
context of ‘our own experience with the patient in the room’ and in this regard the 
trainee felt that Lilian’s level of engagement during assessment indicated that she 
could engage in a brief psychodynamic intervention that focussed on her core conflict 
of abandonment and to make explicit her functioning within relationships through 
interpretation of the transference and countertransference. Some additional sessions 
were also planned with her partner and children in order to address some practical 
issues surrounding her divorce.
Outcome
Lilian evidenced change in two important areas. First, there was an improvement in 
her relationship with her children and secondly there was a shift in her thinking 
around her new relationship which had started from a position of idealised romance
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but eventually progressed to a more realistic appreciation of what was possible. She 
continued sessions with another psychologist at the service after the trainee had left.
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Adult Meutal Health Placement
Core placement -  October 2002 -  March 2003
This placement was based in a large Community Mental Health Team serving a wide 
multi-cultural population and situated in a general hospital with an inpatient facility.
I was supervised by a clinical psychologist who had recently completed training and 
was very enthusiastic about the role of psychologists in the community. He gave me 
first-hand experience of what I could expect when I qualified. During supervision we 
focussed on a CBT model to formulate client’s problems but I was also encouraged to 
think about the clients in the wider context of their relationships and life 
circumstances. I also had the opportunity to be supervised jointly with another trainee 
and her supervisor. Group supervision sessions were very stimulating and productive. 
My supervisor also encouraged me to broaden my assessment and formulation skills 
with a psychodynamic model.
I undertook home visits both with by supervisor and other team members, including 
the social workers and community psychiatric nurses. This gave me some insight both 
to the role of those team members in caring for clients and also with regard to the day 
to day difficulties that clients face when suffering from long term mental illness. I 
also visited community homes and day facilities.
I conducted my Service Related Research Project at this placement and enjoyed 
having contact with patients who may not necessarily have been referred to a trainee 
for psychology input. Staff were very appreciative of the research study and gave me 
their support throughout its duration.
I had the opportunity to co-facilitate a group on the inpatient ward focussing on the 
topics of depression and stress and found this to be very rewarding.
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Learning disability placement
Core vlacement -  October 2002 -  March 2003
This placement was situated on two sites with two different supervisors. The primary 
setting was within the community mental health team for people with learning 
disabilities and was located in the middle of the town. The other site was located in 
nearby countryside in one of the old long-stay hospitals for people with learning 
disabilities. It was in the process of being closed down with just a few remaining 
patients waiting to be offered places in community homes. Mostly, this location was 
used for psychiatrists and psychologists to see clients based in the hospital as well as a 
facility for presentations and training.
I carried out a number of extended assessments in this placement in order to assess 
clients’ strengths and needs. This was often requested by other services when clients 
were moving from the parental home to a community home. An extended assessment 
covered cognitive, communication and daily living skills and gave me the opportunity 
to become familiar with psychometric testing in this client group. The comprehensive 
assessment of clients required consultation with all of the other professionals involved 
in their care. This included visiting parents, home managers, day-centre managers, key 
workers and work-placement supervisors. I also carried out dementia and behavioural 
assessments in the community in order to plan and implement interventions in 
collaboration with other professionals.
The placement covered the full range of learning disability and served clients ranging 
in age from mid-adolescence to older adults. I also had the opportunity to observe my 
supervisor in an intervention with a learning disabled couple who had a young child 
and required assistance with parenting skills. In addition, I was able to take a CBT 
approach with a client who was mildly learning disabled.
In particular this placement gave me insight into the relationship that evolves between 
professionals and clients, not least because of the intermittent life-long involvement 
that may develop for the latter.
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Child and Family Placement
Core placement--October 2003 ^ March 2003
For this placement I joined a busy Child and Family team in an affluent suburb of 
London serving a community that was dominantly white British but also had a strong 
multi-cultural population.
This placement was co-supervised on two different sites and provided different 
models of working: CBT, Behavioural and Systemic. I had the opportunity to co­
work with my supervisors within both these models, with children and their parents. I 
also had the opportunity to participate in work with families as an observer (behind a 
one-way screen) and to offer reflections during the sessions to the team. In addition I 
received supervision from and gained valuable experience of working with other team 
members. In particular I gained knowledge of psychoanalytic and attachment models.
I carried out a range of psychometric testing on this placement. I also had the 
opportunity to make observational assessments of children in playgroups, schools and 
the family home. These assessments addressed difficulties relating to: Asperger’s 
Syndrome; Attention Hyperactivity Disorder; Ring Chromosome -22 disorder. I co­
facilitated a group for dealing with anxiety in adolescence and gained extensive 
experience of working with an eating-disordered client.
I gave a presentation to the team about early experience of trauma and its implications 
for cognitive and emotional processing. This provoked a lively debate.
There were many opportunities in this placement to attend team meetings and 
psychology team meetings. These were always very interesting and incorporated a 
reflecting team in which I took part.
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Elective Placement 1 -  Forensic Service
Elective Placement 1 -  Avril 2004 — September 2005-07-22
This placement was situated in the psychology department of a maximum security 
special hospital which served many high-profile patients. The average stay in the 
hospital for patients was approximately ten years. Most patients, but not all, had 
committed a serious criminal offence. I worked with patients who had committed 
murder and sexual offences.
Patients presented with a broad range of cognitive, emotional and communication 
difficulties and often severe mental illness. I had the opportunity to work with clients 
who had very disturbing and violent histories, mostly very early on in their 
development. I carried out a range of assessments with regard to likelihood of re­
offending and acknowledging responsibility for the offence. These were very detailed 
processes and required patients to talk in detail about and reflect on the nature of their 
past offence and their current perspective on it. This was a very rewarding aspect of 
the assessment. I also used a CBT intervention in working with a client who had 
difficulties with impulse control and addiction to alcohol. Additionally, I 
implemented a narrative approach with this client as he had recently been bereaved 
and wanted to explore many unresolved issues.
I had the opportunity to co-facilitate a group with a fellow trainee for Dialectical 
Behaviour Therapy and Borderline Personality Disorder on a female ward. We 
received weekly supervision for this from the team who had attended a training course 
for DBT. The group ran for eight sessions.
I conducted an extended neuropsychological assessment with a patient who evidenced 
significant cognitive impairment and received supervision from the consultant 
neuropsychologist.
This placement expanded my knowledge and thinking around social and cultural 
issues both with regard to their significance in the evolution of patients’ difficulties 
and in the provision of services.
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Older Adults Placement
Core placement- October 2004-M arch 2005
This placement was situated in a community mental health team located in a hospital 
serving the mental health needs of the older adult population. The psychology 
department was housed in a separate building to the rest of the team.
My supervisor was a clinical psychologist who had extensive experience working with 
older adults and used an integrative approach in her work. In particular we focussed 
on a narrative model and Erikson’s life span model with regard to clients’ unresolved 
issues and bereavement. Using these models, I had the opportunity to work closely 
with a client for the whole placement on issues of regret and loss. I worked on my 
own and with my supervisor for a number of individual clients and couples, and also 
with clients’ families. My supervisor observed me with clients on two occasions and 
was able to give me valuable feedback about my work. We were also able to use role 
play and active listening to explore some of the issues that may be pertinent to older 
adults. .
I carried out psychometric testing with people suffering from dementia, stroke, and 
cognitive impairment both in the hospital and in clients’ homes and made home visits 
with other team members. I had the opportunity to give a presentation about 
Alzheimer’s disease to nurses on the ward and attend a workshop on formulating 
clients’ difficulties in different models.
This placement showed how an older person may be involved with and highly 
dependent on many services. I had the opportunity to liaise with those agencies and 
also other professionals such as neurologists, occupational therapists and prosthetic 
technicians.
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Elective placement (2) Specialist psychological therapies -  Family Therapy
Elective vlacement (2) -A vril 2005 -
This placement was situated in a centre for specialist psychological therapies that also 
included psychology and psychotherapy services. My supervisor was a clinical 
psychologist and family therapist. I also received supervision from a family therapist 
at the centre and group supervision from a clinical psychologist who was external to 
the service and acted as a consultant to the team.
This placement gave me the opportunity to work with many families for either one or 
two sessions or for the whole of the six month placement. I always worked vrith a co­
worker, either as an observer or a keyworker. The centre operated within a family 
systems model and had video and one-way screen facilities which were extensively 
used. I also made several home visits to clients with my supervisor. I gained broad 
experience of relationship issues for couples and families within the context of mental 
illness. My ability to reflect on my own relationships expanded a great deal as a result 
of this experience. There were excellent facilities for teaching and presentation which 
the psychology and psychotherapy departments utilised on a regular basis.
In the next two months it is proposed that I will undertake a short research study in 
assessing one year post-treatment outcome for clients.
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*A patient satisfaction survey 
o f a Clozaril clinic''
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ABSTRACT
Aims
Patients suffering from psychosis and taking Clozaril are at risk from developing 
Agranulocytosis (a life threatening blood condition) (Macpherson,1992) and must be 
carefully monitored whilst taking Clozaril. To address this issue a Community Mental 
Health Team introduced a special outpatients clinic for Clozaril users in order to 
provide a safe environment for the prescribing of Clozaril. Staff wanted to find out 
how satisfied patients were with the clinic and also whether or not patients preferred 
attending the clinic or the inpatient psychiatric ward (the old system).
Method
Nineteen patients completed the Satisfaction Survey for People using the Clozaril 
Clinic. The survey asked questions about the following areas: Quality of
information; clinic opening times and location; waiting times; quality of consultation 
with clinic staff; efficiency of clinic procedure; facilities in the coffee/waiting area and 
overall impressions of the clinic with suggestions for improvements.
Results
Patients generally expressed high levels of satisfaction with the service. In particular 
they felt they had been well informed about their illness, medication and reasons why 
they needed to attend the clinic. Most patients were seen within 15 minutes of their 
arrival and were satisfied with this. Patients preferred going to the clinic rather than 
the old system of attending an inpatient ward although some patients stated they 
missed seeing the doctor. Patients felt looked after and cared for by clinic staff. 
However, some patients stated that the clinic did not always afford them complete 
privacy when asking questions about their illness or related issues.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years the trend in the health service towards evaluation of services by 
patients has become the norm. An audit of patients’ views and opinions is now seen 
as fundamental to the provision and continued development of a comprehensive health 
service. This process has in part been driven by past criticism of service providers 
(Department of Health & Social Security, 1983). A government white paper Working 
for Patients (Secretaries of State for Health, Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland, 
1989) underlined the contribution to be made by patients in service evaluation. More 
recently, in line with clinical governance initiatives a user-centred approach in the 
deliveiy of health care and treatment has been adopted as one of the guiding principles 
of the government’s National Service Framework (National Service Framework, 
2003) for adult mental health services. This requires all health service providers to 
ensure that regular audit of service users’ views is an integral part of their practise.
The aims of the current study were to find out how the needs were being met of a 
group of patients who attend a Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) clinic that 
monitors and prescribes Clozaril medication. Clozaril is one of the new atypical anti­
psychotic drugs used in the treatment of psychosis and produces fewer of the 
extrapyramidal symptoms (e.g. tremors and muscular rigidity) associated with the 
older style neuroleptics. However, Clozaril can cause a condition known as 
Agranulocytosis, in which white corpuscles in the blood fall to dangerously low levels 
and may be life-threatening (Macpherson, 1992). It is essential that patients are 
carefully monitored through blood tests for the duration of their Clozaril use.
The introduction of a Clozaril clinic was prompted both by the specific medical needs 
of patients and also by the inadequate arrangements that had been in place. Previously, 
patients were required to go to the psychiatric inpatient ward (where occasionally they 
may have been inpatients themselves) and could wait for up to three hours to have
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their blood taken by a doctor, during which time, potential for disruption on the ward 
was great, either between patients or from the competing demands made on staff 
Furthermore, no one person was responsible for coordinating the blood testing and 
‘blood alert’ procedure whereby the patient and the pharmacy would need to be 
informed if the result of a blood test indicated that Clozaril should be discontinued. 
The Clozaril clinic was introduced in May 2002 with the following specific aims; To 
provide a caring and professional service to Clozaril patients; To educate patients 
about their illness and Clozaril; To offer a safe environment for prescribing Clozaril 
and also to alleviate pressures on inpatients and ward staff (appendix 1). The clinic 
aims to provide a welcoming atmosphere where patients have the opportunity to talk 
with each other and build supportive relationships with staff. These ‘non-specific’ 
factors have been shown to be important to patient care and may help to significantly 
reduce hospitalization (Fraser, Fraser, Delewski, 1985).
The aims of the current study were to assess if the original goals of the clinic were 
being fulfilled and to find out what patients like and don’t like about the clinic 
together with any improvements and changes they would like implemented.
METHOD
Participants
Out of twenty seven patients attending the Clozaril clinic, 21 patients (70.37%) 
agreed to take part in the study. Of the other six patients, three declined to take part 
and a further three were considered too thought disordered by the researcher to give 
reliable responses to questionnaire items.
All patients had been diagnosed as suffering from psychosis prior to their first 
appointment at the clinic. Mean age of patients attending the clinic was 40.13 years 
(range 26 -  67 yrs). Patients were drawn from Afro Caribbean, Caucasian and Asian- 
British populations.
Measures
Three different sources were utilised to compile the Satisfaction Survey for people 
using the Clozaril Clinic (appendix 2). First, four patients were chosen at random from
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Clozaril clinic files and telephoned by the researcher. These patients were asked if 
they would like to suggest which areas of service provision were most important to 
them. This process yielded communication, information, clinic opening times and 
empathy. Second, clinic staff were consulted on their ideas for questions related to the 
original aims set out in their document ‘Clozaril Clinic Operational Policy’ (appendix 
1). Furthermore, staff wanted to find out if patients actually enjoyed coming to the 
clinic and if there was anything they missed about going to the ward. Third, guidance 
on patient satisfaction surveys and items for inclusion was found on the Department of 
Health website (NHS Trust-based Patient Surveys).
The questionnaire (appendix 2) consisted of 41 items that covered the following five 
areas: Provision of information regarding the patient’s illness and Clozaril (7 items); 
convenience of clinic location and opening times (4 items); quality of facilities in the 
coffee/waiting room (7 items); waiting times, length of consultation and quality of 
interaction with clinic staff (14 items); efficiency of clinic procedure (4 items) and 
overall opinion of the clinic (5 items). Additionally, 3 open-ended questions asked 
‘Was there anything particularly good about your visit to the Clozaril Clinic?’; ‘Was 
there anything that could have been improved?’ and ‘Anything else?’.
Each of these areas were idiosyncratic in response options ranging from a yes/no 
response for questions such as ‘The clinic staff have given me clear information about 
why I need to attend the Clozaril clinic’ through to whole sentences where patients 
were asked to give an explanation for their level of satisfaction. For example, the 
question ‘How do you feel about the length of time you spend in the clinic consulting 
room?’ gave response options of ‘very satisfied’, ‘satisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’ and ‘very 
dissatisfied’ followed by ‘Why?’. This was felt to be useful in providing the CMHT 
with the reasons that may drive levels of satisfaction.
The questionnaire was piloted on 3 patients. This process did not reveal any anomalies 
and they were included in the final analysis.
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Procedure
Data was collected at the clinic over a period of 6 weeks on Tuesday mornings in 
order to maximise contact with the cohort.
It was thought that Clozaril patients may be coping with a number of issues that could 
impact upon their motivation to take part in the study. For example, the side effects of 
Clozaril (e.g. drowsiness and weight gain) and enforced isolation through reduced 
social activity and unemployment. In addition Tilbrook (1997) cites impairments to 
working memory, paranoia and confusion as possible obstacles to an elucidation of 
patients’ views. So, in order to maximise the response rate, it was decided to approach 
patients in a proactive way, face to face in the waiting room when they attended the 
clinic. This approach had the added advantage of providing assistance with filling in 
the questionnaire (should the patient require it) and to rectify immediately any missing 
data. The researcher was also able to reiterate that the survey was confidential and 
that a decision to take part or not was entirely volitional. Patients were assured that 
their treatment would not be affected by their participation or non-participation in the 
study. Questionnaires were completed by patients in the waiting room. A small side 
room was available for the patients who required assistance from the researcher (n=5).
Five patients who took part did not attend the clinic during the period of data 
collection (for various reasons). They were telephoned by the researcher to ask if 
questionnaires could be posted to them for completion and return in stamped 
addressed envelopes to a non-hospital address. These questionnaires were numbered 
in order to assist follow up of non-respondents. A brief covering letter was enclosed 
(appendix 3). By the time of writing this report two of the postal questionnaires had 
not been returned and are not therefore included in the analysis.
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RESULTS
Section A: Provision of Information
Items 1-5 in this section were assessed using a yes/no response (table 1). Collapsing 
these items revealed a mean of 85.6% of patients felt that clinic staff had given them 
clear information about their illness, Clozaril, potential side effects, reasons for 
attending the clinic and clinic procedure. Item 4 ‘the clinic staff have given me clear 
information about why I need to attend the Clozaril clinic’ is notable for its 100% yes 
response. A multiple choice response on items 6 and 7 shows a mean of 86.4% of 
patients felt clinic staff had given family or friends the ‘right amount’ of information 
about their illness and reasons for attending the clinic (table 2). Taken as a whole, 
items 1-7 show a mean of 86.6% of patients felt that they and their families/friends 
had received clear and sufficient information from clinic staff with regard to their 
illness and reasons for attending the clinic.
Table 1. Patients’ YES/NO responses to items 1-5 Table 2. Patients’ responses to items
of the Provision of Information Section A. 6&7 of the Provision of Information
Section A.
Item RESPONSE
Yes No
The clinic staff have given me 
information about my illness 
that is understandable and 
clear.
15 4
The clinic staff have given me 
information about Clozaril 
that is understandable and 
clear
16 3
The clinic staff have given me 
information about the possible 
side effects of Clozaril 16 3
The clinic staff have given 
me clear information about 
why I need to attend the 
Clozaril clinic
19 0
The clinic staff have given me 
clear information about the 
Clozaril clinic procedure 15 4
Item
*one missing data 
point
RESPONSE
How much 
information 
about your 
illness have 
clinic staff 
given to your 
family or 
someone close 
to you?
*
How much 
information 
have clinic staff 
given to your 
family or 
someone close 
to you about the 
reasons why 
you need to 
attend the 
Clozaril clinic?
Not enough 3 2
Right amount 15 17
Too much 0 0
No family or friends 
were involved 0 0
My family or friends 
didn’t want or need 
information
0 0
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Section B: Convenience of clinic location and opening times
Over half the patients (57.9% n= ll) took less than half an hour to get to the clinic 
with 42.1% (n=8) taking half an hour or more. All patients used public transport to 
travel to the clinic with 47.4% finding it ‘very convenient’ to do so and 36.8% 
‘convenient’. Of those who found public transport inconvenient for travelling (15.8% 
n=3), only one patient related this to the time it took them (over half an hour) whilst 
two other patients cited work commitments (less than half an hour) and tiredness (half 
an hour).
Patients demonstrated an equivocal response to appointment times with 42.1% 
favouring an allocated time and 57.9% preferring to drop in during clinic opening 
hours (the present system). However, 95% of patients found clinic opening times 
either convenient or very convenient suggesting perhaps that preferring an allocated 
appointment may be related to issues not related to convenience. A ‘Why?’ option 
should be added to this item for future use.
Section C; Quality of facilities in the waiting/coffee area
Patients were generally very positive in their views about the waiting/coffee area. The 
surroundings were evaluated as being calm, clean and tidy and with adequate seating 
by 94.7% of patients (items 3, 4 &5). All patients except one felt that hot drinks 
should be available when they arrived. However, 28% of patients said that coffee and 
tea was not always set out by the time they arrived at the clinic (items 1&2). Tables 3 
and 4 show these results.
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Table 3. Patients’ responses to items 
1-4, Section C. (*one missing 
data point).
Item YES NO
Do you think coffee/tea 
should be available in 
the waiting area? * 17 1
Is coffee/tea always 
available when you 
arrive? * 13 5
Is there always a place 
to sit in flie 
coffee/waiting room 
area ?
18 1
Is flie cofTee/waiting 
room area always clean 
and tidy? 18 1
Table 4. Patients’ responses to item 5, 
Section C.
RESPONSE
Item 5: Is the 
cofTee/waiting 
room noisy?
Noisy 0
Noisy 0
Not noisy at all 10
Just right 8
Too quiet 1
Suggestions for improving the facilities included soft music, snacks, a greater variety 
of teas (herbal) and biscuits. Five patients commented that the waiting room was a 
relaxing place to sit before having a blood test. Another patient reported feeling 
uncomfortable waiting with ‘some other people’
Section D: Waiting times and consultation
Patients demonstrated high levels of satisfaction with waiting times, in fact 77.7% 
were satisfied and 22.3% very satisfied. No patients responded with the dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied options. The median waiting time fell between 5 and 15 minutes with 
5 patients waiting more than 15 minutes. The average consultation lasted between 5 
and 10 minutes (83.3% of patients), with only one patient spending more than 10 
minutes in the consulting room. In all, 89.5% of patients were satisfied (78.9% 
satisfied, 10.6% very satisfied) with the length of consultation and 10.5% were 
dissatisfied (table 5). Interestingly, the Why? option for this item was only utilised by 
patients who were satisfied: ‘It’s not too long’ (satisfied, less than 10 minutes); ‘I am 
happy that I’m attended properly’ (very satisfied, less than 10 minutes); ‘I just feel it’s 
something that has to be done so I don’t mind being in the clinic for any length of 
time’ (satisfied, less than 10 minutes); ‘Because you can’t expect to talk to a nurse in 
the same way as a doctor’ (satisfied, less than 10 minutes). These responses seem to 
indicate that some patients value a consultation in terms of how short it is rather than 
the actual business of the consultation itself whilst others relate the length of
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consultation to the member of staff they are seeing, which may impact upon their 
expectations of that consultation.
Table 5. Patient satisfaction with waiting times and 
length of consultation, Section D.
(*one missing data point).
Item
RESPONSE
How do you 
feel about the 
length of time 
you wait to 
have your 
blood tested? *
How do you feel 
about the length of 
time you spend in 
the clinic 
consulting room?
Very satisfied 4 2
Satisfied 14 15
Dissatisfied 0 2
Very dissatisfied 0 0
Sixteen patients (84.2%) felt that 
there was enough time during 
consultations to ask questions about 
their illness and that they could 
understand the answers whilst 17 
patients were satisfied there was
enough privacy to ask questions (89.47%). However, these items provided ‘yes 
definitely’ and ‘yes, to some extent’ options and responses were spread fairly evenly 
between the two (table 6). Patients reported the following reasons for not asking 
questions: embarrassment (n=l); forgetting (n=2); not enough time (patient (n=3)); 
not enough time (staff (n=l)). All patients reported that if they had questions about 
clinic protocols they would discuss them with staff.
Over half the patients (52.6%) said they saw the same member of staff on each 
appointment, and the same percentage of patients (not necessarily the same patients) 
stated this was important for them.
Table 6. Items 8 ,9  & 10 Section D.
Item 8 Item 9 Item 10
RESPONSE
Is fiiere enougli time 
during your 
appointment to ask 
any questions you 
may have about your 
illness or treatment?
Do you get 
answers you 
can
understand?
Are you gven 
enough privacy 
when discussing 
your illness, 
treatment or other 
important issues in 
your life?
Yes, definitely.
4 8 9
Yes, to some extent.
12 8 8
No.
0 0 0
I haven’t asked 
any questions. 3 3 N/A
I haven’t discussed 
any of these. N/A N/A 2 135
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Section E: Efficiency of clinic procedure
Of the Patients who had experienced a ‘blood alert’ four were contacted by staff 
within 2 days of their blood test and 1 patient within 3 days. Two patients (who had 
not been contacted) had experienced withholding of their medication by pharmacy 
when they arrived to collect it. Over half the patients (55.5%) stated that their 
medication was always ready for collection when they arrived at phannacy. Thirteen 
patients (68.4%) were satisfied with clinic procedure and 5 (26.3%) were veiy 
satisfied.
Section F: Overall opinion of the clinic
In general, patients had a good opinion of the clinic but with some caveats. Items 1 
and 2 (figures 1 and 2) show ‘fair’ and ‘yes, sometimes’ responses for a total of 8 
patients. However, reasons for these choices are not clear, as the ‘Why?’ option was 
not used by anyone. Nevertheless, most patients preferred coming to the clinic (75%) 
rather than going to the ward (0%) with 25% having no preference at all. Common 
reasons for preferring the clinic related to shorter waiting times, a cleaner and less 
noisy environment and more privacy. Other comments included ‘it can be annoying 
on the ward’; ‘there are less ill people around who might make me nervous’; ‘don’t 
have to go back to the ward’; ‘there are other patients on the ward who are unsettled’; 
‘I feel more cared for in the clinic’. Patients did however miss some things about 
going to Vine ward: ‘I enjoyed seeing staff; ‘I enjoyed seeing patients on the ward’; 
‘there may be the odd person I know to say hello too’; ‘I was attended by doctors’; 
‘talking to a doctor’; ‘I was at ease with the person attending me’.
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figure 1. Patients' overall rating of quality of 
care received at the clozaril clinic. Section F.
fair poor
11% 0% excellent
26%
good
32%
very good 
31%
figure 2. Do patients feel they are 
treated with respect and dignity at the 
clozaril clinic? Section F.
yes,
no
0%
sometimes 
32% ,
yes,
always
68%
Section G: open-ended questions
This section asked patients to say what they felt was good about the clinic and what 
they felt could be improved. Positive comments not already included in previous 
sections were ‘having my blood pressure and my temperature done’; ‘I like being 
weighed’; ‘relaxing, patients being attended to makes me feel better’. Suggestions for 
improving the clinic were ‘having a prognosis for my illness and explanation of how 
Clozaril works’; ‘I think I would like more privacy to check weight and health and see 
how you are, and be able to speak in confidence’; ‘leaflets about self-help and 
information, things one can do to help cope and keep cheerful’; ‘yes, blood test could 
have been done more quickly, sent to phlebotomy as difficulty in taking sample’.
CONCLUSION
The results of this survey show that overall, patients attending the Clozaril clinic 
expressed a high level of satisfaction with the service. In particular patients felt they 
had been very well informed about their illness, medication and the necessity of 
regular attendance at the clinic. The survey reveals that patients are satisfied with tea 
and coffee facilities and are able to experience the space as a relaxing environment 
prior to the blood test procedure. Just under half the patients would prefer a fixed 
appointment. The majority of patients are seen within 15 minutes of their arrival and 
are satisfied with this. The survey also demonstrated that patients do ask questions 
about their illness and related issues but with some reservations over the privacy of the 
environment and clarity of the answers. Concern over lack of privacy was elicited
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both through open and closed questions. The majority of patients preferred attending 
the clinic because it provided a caring, quieter and more relaxing environment than the 
ward. Patients had been upset sometimes by the ward environment and unsettled 
inpatients. However, some patients missed seeing ward staff and patients, and in 
particular missed speaking to and being attended by the doctor. A further study could 
ask patients what differences they perceive between seeing clinic staff and seeing the 
doctor.
As the cohort was relatively small, serious consideration should be given both to 
patients’ suggestions as to what could be improved about the clinic, and to areas that 
produced less than satisfied or negative responses. Also, it should be considered that 
the views of non-participating patients may either support or conflict with the overall 
levels of satisfaction found in this study. Less than satisfied patients may be less 
willing to express their views for fear of upsetting or alienating the staff involved in 
their care. Patients suffering from a severe mental illness have been shown generally 
to be less assertive and less confident in expressing themselves (Wykes, 1993). Also, 
as Fitzpatrick (1991) suggests, patient surveys tend to find high levels of satisfaction 
with services and this could be due to investigating areas that patients are satisfied 
with rather than dissatisfied with. If this study is repeated in the future these concerns 
should be borne in mind.
The results of this survey will be fed back to the clinic staff in July 2003. 
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Appendix 1
Clozapine Clinic Operational Policy
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CLOZAPINE CLINIC OPERATIONAL POLICY
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OPERATIONAL POLICY
The overall aim of the Clozapine Clinic is to ensure that it 
prescribes
and monitors the Clozapine prescription in a timely safe manner for 
those patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who are on 
Clozapine.
The clinic will:
. Assist in the care of all the patients on Clozapine
. Provide a comprehensive and professional service to these 
patients
. Educate patients about their illness and all aspects of Clozapine
. Provide opportunities for carrying out audit and research to 
improve the standards of care in the use of Clozapine
. Offer a safe and controlled environment for current outpatients 
who are being maintained on Clozapine.
Clinic Procedure
The clinic will be based at the CMHT outpatient department at 
The service will run on Mondays from 10.00 am to 1.00pm. Patients 
will attend by drop-in/appointment system. The operation of the 
clinic will be subject to regular review and the necessary alterations 
will be made to accommodate changes in for example fluctuations 
in the demand for the service etc.
Patients will be referred by their Consultant or Keyworker and will 
attend either on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis. This will be 
based on the length of time the patient is on Clozapine and on their 
blood results.
The Venepuncture will be carried out two days before Clozapine is 
dispensed in order to allow time for pharmacy to receive the results 
from CPMS.
The clinic staff will undertake the Venepuncture. It is also expected 
patient's mental state will be assessed  as and when necessary and 
appropriate action taken. Physical observations such as blood 
pressure, pulse, temperature will be carried out monthly.
The clinical staff will be required to keep up to date with current 
research developments in the use of Clozapine and attend 
training courses as required.
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2. Role of the SHO
2.1 SHO's will register the patient with the Clozapine Patient 
Monitoring Service (CPMS).
2.2 Refer the patient to the Clozapine Clinic by completing the 
referral form (APPENDIX A), which is available from the clinic.
2.3 Review all patients as requested by the Pharmacist and/or 
Nursing staff.
2.4 Ensure the repeat prescriptions are made in conjunction with 
the frequency of blood tests and are on file.
2.5 Inform the Pharmacist, CMHT, GP and the Clozapine Clinic 
when Clozapine is discontinued. The patient must continue with 
blood tests for four weeks after the last dose has been 
administered and is expected to continue the clinic without 
receiving the drug.
2.6 If a local blood test is taken ensure that the Pharmacist and 
CPMS are informed.
3. Role of the Clinical Staff
The Clinical Staff will act as resource for the multi-disciplinary team 
involved in the Clozapine Patient Monitoring Service and will liaise 
and co-ordinate with the patients, their carers, keyworkers, inpatient 
nursing staff, CPMS, pharmacist, consultants and GP,
The Nurse will:
a) Check that the referral form is fully completed and correct.
b) Liase with pharmacy about the dispensing of Clozapine 
when necessary
c) Ensure that a blood sample is taken in accordance with CPMS . 
requirements, packaged and collected by the CPM
courier service
d) Ensure that the Trust's protocol on Venepuncture is adhered to
e) Carry out on a regular basis a nursing assessm ent,
which includes an initial baseline, which is followed by a regular
record of patients' weight, blood pressure, pulse
and temperature,(APPENDIX B) and inform the Keyworker of the
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révélant changes
f) Monitor adverse effects of Clozapine and liase with Keyworker 
with regards to this
g) Inform patients of the dates they will be required to attend the 
clinic for blood samples and that these are recorded in their 
clinical notes and clinic diary
h) Inform the SHO and other relevant team members of red results 
as backup for the CPMS and pharmacy if necessary
i) keep a record of other concurrent medical investigations/physical 
investigations eg..EGG etc.
j) Liase with the patient's RMO or keyworker when concerned about 
the patient's mental and physical health 
k) Offer education and advice to patients who are starting or being 
maintained on clozapine 
I) Monitor patients' attendance and ensure that the DNA procedure 
is followed when a patient fails to attend (APPENDIX G) 
m) Ensure that all records regarding patients on Glozapine 
are correct and are updated regularly, 
n) For all outpatients, request a repeat prescription before the 
current one expires and send this to pharmacy 
0) Will notify their line manager of any planned absences and 
ensure that cover arrangements for the clinic are made.
N.B. The RMO and identified keyworker for the patient will 
continue to be responsib le for the overall care o f the patient 
e.g. CPA requirements etc. The clinic staff's role is to  ensure  
that CPMS requirements are met and to liase with the multi­
disciplinary team about the relevant chan ges in patient's 
mental and physical health and any adverse reactions to  
Clozapine.
4. Role of the Pharmacist
4.1 To receive acceptance of Clozapine from GPMS and liaise with 
the SHO and clinic about dosage
4.2 To dispense Clozapine and receive repeat prescriptions
4.3 Liaise with the SHO and the Clozapine clinic staff on issues  
related to Clozapine.
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Appendix 2
Satisfaction Survey for people using the Clozaril Clinic
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Section A (please indicate your response with a tick)
(1) The clinic staff have given me information about my yes no
illness that is understandable and clear.
(2) The clinic staff have given me information about yes no
Clozaril that is understandable and clear.
(3) The clinic staff have given me information about yes no
the possible side effects of Clozaril.
(4) The clinic staff have given me clear information yes no
about why I need to attend the Clozaril clinic.
(5) The clinic staff have given me clear information yes no
about the Clozaril clinic procedure.
(6) How much information about your illness have clinic 
staff given to your family or someone close to you?
not enough right amount too much
no family or friends were involved
my family/friends didn’t want or need information
(7) How much information have clinic staff given to your 
family or someone close to you about the reasons 
why you need to attend the Clozaril clinic?
not enough right amount too much
no family or friends were involved
my family/friends didn’t want or need information
I don’t want my family/friends to have any information
Section B
( 1 ) How long does it take you to travel to the clinic?
less than half an hour half an hour more than half an hour
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(2) How convenient is it for you to use public transport to get to the clinic? 
very convenient convenient inconvenient
very inconvenient 
don’t use public transport 
if inconvenient, why?
(3) Are the clinic opening times convenient for you? (please tick)
very convenient convenient inconvenient very inconvenient 
If  inconvenient when would have been more convenient?
(4) Would you prefer an allocated appointment time for your visit to the 
Clozaril clinic? (please tick)
yes no
Section C
(1) Do you think coffee/tea should be available in the waiting area? yes no
(2) Is coffee/tea always available when you arrive? yes no
(3) Is there always a place to sit in the coffee/waiting room area? yes no
(4) Is the coffee/waiting room area always clean and tidy? yes no
(5) Is the coffee/waiting room area noisy?
very noisy noisy not noisy at all just right too quiet
(6) What do you like about being in the coffee/waiting room area?
(7) Is there anything about the coffee/waiting room area that could be 
improved?
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Section D
(1) Do you see the same member of staff every time you attend the clinic? yes no
(2) Is it important for you to see the same member of staff every yes no
time you attend the clinic?
(3) If your family or someone close to you wants to talk to
the clinic staff, do they have enou^ opportunity to do so? (please tick)
yes, definitely yes, to some extent no
family/close friends don’t want or need to talk to clinic staff 
I don’t want family/close friends to talk to clinic staff
(4) How long do you have to wait to have your blood tested? (please tick)
more than more than more than 
5 minutes 5 minutes 15 minutes half an hour
(5) How do you feel about the length of time you wait to have your blood tested? 
very satisfied satisfied dissatisfied very dissatisfied
(6) How long on average do you spend in the clinic consulting room?
Less than less than more than
5 minutes 10 minutes 10 minutes
(7) How do you feel about the length of time you spend in the clinic 
consulting room?
very satisfied satisfied dissatisfied very dissatisfied 
Why?
(8) Is there enough time during your appointment to ask any questions 
you may have about your illness or treatment?
yes, definitely yes, to some extent no
I haven’t asked any questions
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(9) Do you get answers that you can understand?
yes, definitely yes, to some extent no
I haven’t asked any questions
(10) Are you given enough privacy when discussing your illness, treatment or other 
important issues in your life?
yes, definitely yes, to some extent no
I haven’t discussed any of these
(11) Do you have any questions about your health that are related to the Clozaril 
treatment that you want to discuss but do not?
yes no
(12) If yes to above, why didn’t you discuss these questions?
I  was embarrassed about mentioning them
I forgot to mention them
I didn’t have time to mention them
The member of staff didn’t have time to listen
There were too many interruptions
There was not enough privacy
Other
(13) Do you have any questions about clinic procedure that you want to 
discuss but do not?
yes no
(14) If yes to above, why didn’t you discuss these questions?
I was embarrassed about mentioning them 
I forgot to mention them 
I didn’t have time to mention them 
The member of staff didn’t have time to listen 
There were too many interruptions 
There was not enough privacy
149
© Vanessa Bryant 2005
(15) How satisfied are you with the way clinic staff take your blood? 
Very satisfied satisfied dissatisfied very dissatisfied
why?
Section E
(1) How soon are you contacted by staff if the result of your blood test indicates 
that Clozaril should be stopped?
1 day after blood test 2 days after blood test 3 days after blood test
none of these my blood test has never indicated
that Clozaril should be stopped
(2) Have you ever been told by pharmacy that you can’t have your Clozaril 
prescription when you have arrived to collect it?
yes no
(3) Is your clozaril prescription always ready when you go to collect it from the 
pharmacy?
yes no
(4) Overall how satisfied are you with the whole of the clozaril clinic 
procedure?
very satisfied satisfied dissatisfied very dissatisfied 
Why?
Section F
(1) Overall, how do you rate the quality of care you receive at the Clozaril clinic? 
excellent very good good fair poor
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(2) Overall, do you feel you are treated with respect and dignity while you 
are attending the Clozaril clinic?
yes, always yes, sometimes no
If not, why not?
(3) If you are a patient that previously attended Vine ward for your blood
tests, do you prefer coming to the clinic or did you prefer going to 
Vine ward?
Clozaril clinic Vine ward no preference
(4) What aspects of coming to the Clozaril clinic are better than going 
to Vine ward?
(5) What aspects of going to Vine ward were better than coming to the 
Clozaril clinic?
Section G
Was there anything particularly good about your visit to the Clozaril Clinic?
Was there anything that could have been improved?
Anything else?
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Appendix 3
Letter enclosed with questionnaire to postal respondents
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Dear
Further to our telephone conversation yesterday, I enclose a questionnaire for you to 
complete and return to me in the stamped addressed envelope. Thank you very much 
for agreeing to take part in the survey and please don’t hesitate to contact me if you 
need more information. To ensure confidentiality, please do not write your name on 
any part of the questionnaire.
Yours sincerely.
Vanessa Bryant 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Clinical Psychology 
University of Surrey 
GU2 7XH
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Appendix 4
Letter of thanks for feedback of findings
© Vanessa Biyant 2005
154
Mental Hea t
NHS
Our Ref:
Oate.i 
Vanessa Bryant
Dear Vanessa.
Just a note to say thank you for coming to see us dtÉjjjjBBCMHT on Friday is"' 
January 2CK)4 and presenting your research project o^ n eC iozah l Clinic, it v/as 
most informative and enjoyable.
Best wishes.
Yours sincerely,
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Qualitative Research Project
**More than the score: the role of 
Football in everyday 
Emotional expressions^
Year 2
2004
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Abstract
Objectives
This study explored the perspectives of committed football supporters in relation to 
the emotions experienced and expressed during matches.
Method
Five in-depth interviews were conducted with supporters of a number of clubs from 
the English League. Interviews were transcribed and analysed, using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis, in order to explore recurrent themes reflecting football 
supporters’ views about the utility of the football context to facilitate the experience of 
emotions and emotional expression.
Results
Results from the study suggested that participants experienced intense emotions 
connected to football that served a number of emotional functions. The ability of 
football to serve such functions appeared to be dependent on the perceived safety that 
the football context provided and was connected to concepts of social identity and 
enhanced self-esteem. A number of strategies appeared to be employed to sustain 
emotional well-being.
Conclusions
The results were discussed in the light of current theories of football and provide an 
alternative account for continuing football support that may have therapeutic value in 
the clinical setting.
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Introduction
There has been a great deal of interest in what drives football fans to support their 
team, with a number of theories originating from psychology, sociology and 
anthropology (Sloan, 1979). An obvious motivator is that football is a source of 
entertainment and Sloan argues that the attraction comes from the aesthetic qualities 
and the value of sport in shaping character and providing lessons on life (Pavli, 1998). 
An alternative theory comes from the work of Elias and Dunning (1986; Dunning, 
1999) identifying that football fans may seek emotional excitement that may be 
missing from everyday life. Another theory linked to emotion is that watching 
football can be cathartic for the supporter. Sloan (1979) notes that early research has 
suggested that watching aggressive acts will subsequently reduce feelings of 
aggression in the observer. However, more recent findings have found the opposite 
effect, with an increase in aggressive acts (Sloan, 1979).
Other motivators for supporting football relate to themes of identity. Cialdini, Borden, 
Thome, Walker, Freeman and Sloan (1976) identify a tendency to ‘bask in reflected 
glory’ where fans associate themselves with the positive aspects of their teams as a 
means to increase self-esteem. Allied to this, Jones (2000) suggests that supporting a 
particular team provides a strong sense of social identity which influences the person’s 
thoughts, feelings and behaviour. In addition, Sandy Wolfson (personal 
communication, 8* March 2004) has identified other psychological benefits of being a 
fan which include social interaction, tension regulation and intellectual challenge.
There are, therefore, a number of explanations for why football fans continue to 
support their team. Walton, Coyle and Lyons (in press) and Pavli (1998) found an 
alternative function of football whereby its specific, mle-govemed context permitted 
male fans to express emotion. Therefore, a further function of football is that it may 
provide a context for the safe expression of emotion. Following on from this, the aim 
of this research was to explore the potential utility of football as a vehicle for 
emotional expression.
As the research question was broad and essentially exploratory, it was decided that a
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qualitative methodology, specifically interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA: 
Smith, 1996), would be most appropriate. This is because IPA aims to reflect the 
views of the participants and create a dialogue with their thoughts and intentions using 
a ‘realist’ epistemology. IPA was felt to be relevant to this research on the premise 
that fans think and reflect about their experiences of football.
Method
How the idea was conceived
The topic was identified by one of the research team with a personal interest in 
football. Fellow researchers identified themselves as having an interest in the topic 
and the ways in which emotion is felt and expressed at football matches. In addition, 
some researchers self-identified as football fans.
How the schedule was constructed
An interview schedule (see appendix 1) was constructed from a review of the 
literature and questions that interested or puzzled the researchers during their 
discussions. The schedule consisted of structured contextual questions and semi­
structured questions. A timeline (see appendix 2) was also incorporated into the 
schedule to help identify when certain events happened during the respondents’ time 
as a football fan, and to facilitate their recall of surrounding circumstances in their 
lives at that time. The semi-structured questions aflbrded the respondents the 
opportunity to expand on their emotional experience of being a football fan in five 
major areas (Table 1);
Table 1: Areas explored in the interview schedule
No. Areas of exploration
1 Emotions felt
2 Emotions expressed
3 Concurrent life events
4 Exploring the expression o f  emotions at football and outside football
5 The psychological effects o f  being a football fan
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Selection of respondents
Respondents were gathered from associates of the researchers. Criteria for inclusion 
in the study were that participants described themselves as being long-term and 
committed football fans. Demographic details of the respondents are presented in 
Table 2 below.
Table 2: Demographic details of the participants
DemoaraDhfc Cateaorv Data
Gender Male 4
Female 1
Age Range 22-39 years
Mean 32.2 years
Ethnicity White British 4
Black British 1
Level of M.A./M.SC. 2
education B.A. 1
G.C.S.E. 2
Years as 
a football Range 15-33 years
M
Mean 22.6 years
Conducting the interview
Written consent was gained from each of the participants before the interviews 
commenced (see appendix 3). All interviews were conducted in a location convenient 
to the participant and lasted between forty-five minutes to an hour.
How the analvsis was conducted
/Lfk# IfM3 dkUzi liad Iseen collected  ^ (xxpies (>f 1fie transonpüs (xf eacti hiterview \vere 
distributed to all members of the research team for an initial reading (see appendix 4 
for an example transcript). The researchers met as a group to analyse one of the scripts 
to ensure that as much as possible they adopted a uniform approach to the analysis of
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the data. Each researcher then carried out a preliminaiy analysis of their own 
interview transcript by noting down in the left-hand margin anything that was of 
interest or significance. The team then met in order to contribute any additional 
comments or observations about each other’s transcripts. This entailed going through 
and discussing each transcript in turn thus giving a richer interpretation of the 
material. The researchers then agreed to analyse their own transcripts further and to 
identify the major themes emerging from the material. At a subsequent meeting they 
were able to identify a number of themes and subsidiary themes. The relevant parts of 
each transcript, according to these themes, were then collated in readiness for 
reporting the results.
Reflection
Members of the team reflected individually on their experience of the research process 
(see appendix 5). In addition, towards completion of the project, the researchers met 
as a group and reflected together on their experience of conducting the research as a 
team (see appendix 6).
Results
Themes derived from the analysis are shown in Table 3 overleaf. In view of limited 
space, the team decided to focus on the first five of the listed themes, as these 
appeared to afford the most interesting and evocative insights into the emotional world 
of the football fan.
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Table 3: Identified themes and sub categories
No. Theme and sub category
1 Phenomenology of emotion
a) Intensity
b) Duration
c) Fluctuation
2 Emotional function of football
a) Escape
b) Unsafe not to express
c) Therapeutic
i) Release
ii) Catharsis
3 Safety
a) The football environment
b) Impact of difference
4 Sustaining emotional well-being
a) Expecting the worst
b) Moving the goalposts
5 Wider effects on well-being
a) Belonging
b) Basking in reflected glory
c) A learning experience
6 Pride and shame
7 Loyalty
8 Football mirroring life
9 Team identity and fans’ identity
10 Quality of the narrative
Phenomenology of Emotions
Participants described that emotions experienced in a football context were more 
intense than in everyday life, describing how “emorioAK become e/gmenfa/...
Azg/ty aW  (Annette, line 525). Emotions ranged from the "j-Ager, 
gx/zz/ararioM" (Henry, line 112) to a ‘VoW «jg/Morzvrzrzo/z” (Jim, line 220). The intensity 
was accentuated by dramatic fluctuations in the course of a match or season. This 
emotional roller-coaster was welcomed by some participants - "zr gazz /gg/ r/zar 
zzor/zzzzg '.y gozzzg rzg/zr, aW  r/zgzz yzziyr .yzzcKc^ zz/y o^zzzgr/zzzzg fzzzTty ozz zYj^  /zga (^ aW  /ÿg '.y
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brilliant and life's fantastic^' (Annette, line 641), but was also seen as potentially 
dangerous - there’s some bad physical [...]  consequences to stressing yourself up too 
much or allowing yourself to go up and down too much'' (Andrew, line 321).
Participants were asked how long their mood was affected by an important match. 
Those who described a positive event (Andrew, Annette and Henry) described a 
sustained impact 'Hasting for weeks" (Annette, line 302), "certainly a good month or 
so"-, (Henry, line 190), whereas those recalling a negative event (Jim and Vincent) 
both reported a lowering of mood lasting around a week. It may well be that those 
who wished to bask in their team’s glory used strategies to keep their mood elevated 
for as long as possible and enable them to "hold on to these little moments of glory" 
(Andrew, line 235). Henry described "wanting to relive that goal time and time again 
[...] in my mind... on news bulletins or video or whatever" (Henry, line 181). 
Negative events also engendered intense emotions which might be prolonged "by 
being dragged up in the newspapers" (Vincent, line 89), but they seemed more 
fleeting, perhaps due to fans’ efforts to move on "and think, oh well -  they 11 do it next 
season" (Jim, line 268).
Emotional Function of Football
This theme emerged from the participant’s descriptions of the role that football served 
in allowing them to experience and express a range of emotions: "I don't know what it 
is about football [...] it's quite a good way of expressing your feelings" (Vincent, line 
243). Participants described how the pressures that build up in everyday life can 
undergo cathartic release in the context of a football match, "[football is] useful as a 
release for their emotions, it may be that they 're bringing stresses and strains from 
[...] their everyday lives [...] and maybe releasing it through that way" (Henry, line 
294); "[in everyday life] you end up internalising a lot, but you don V have to do that, 
you’ve paid your thirty quid" (Annette, line 514). In addition to releasing everyday 
stresses, football for some (Henry, Jim, Annette) represented a way of forgetting about 
day-to-day life: "it's an escape more than anything" (Jim, line 637); "it’s engaging 
and it's escapism" (Annette, line 659).
Participants were attuned to the "physical manifestation of emotion" (Annette, line 
335) both as an internal event: "I’ve had times where I've had to say to myself calm
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down because I ’ve got headaches and it’s felt like I ’ve burst a blood vessel in my 
head" (Andrew, line 318) and as an observable behaviour: "[I] just jump up and down 
and shout at [the referee] and probably swear a little bit and it makes me feel a little 
bit better" (Vincent, line 262). However the consequence of not venting emotions 
was also commented on: "ifyou don’tyou ’djust explode" (Annette, line 334).
Safety
Participants described how the safety and containment of the environment supported 
their emotional expression "there’s ten or eleven thousand other people doing it as 
w eir  (Vincent, line 246); "if you’re in the crowd[...], shouting quite literally like a 
dickhead [...] or being slumped in your seat with your head in your hands everyone 
else is doing it [there’s a] uniformity o f reaction" (Annette, line 343). Nonetheless 
participants described an acute awareness of difference and the effect this had on their 
behaviour whether due to their age or gender: "I was conscious of controlling what I 
was saying and the content of and obviously the language I was using, because of the 
presence of women and younger children" (Henry, line 331) or their identification as 
being from a minority group: "if there were more black people I would have wanted to 
say some different stuff" (Andrew, line 387).
Sustaining emotional well-being
Participants described techniques to protect themselves against the extremes of 
negative emotions by anticipating failure: "if you go in there thinking "oh we’ve got 
this sewn up’’ then you ’re going to be heavily disappointed -  so you always have that 
anticipation that you’re gonna lose" (Jim, line 286); "even if they’re playing 
Cheltenham Girl’s School you go into games thinking, well I know they can fuck this 
up" (Annette, line 234). This was made explicit by Henry: "I tend to... err on the side 
of...pessimism" (Henry, line 196); "I think I keep expectations low, in order not to be 
too disappointed’' (Henry, line 251).
Participants tended towards negativity rather than positivity. This could reflect the 
reality of being a football fan - "they’ve never done anything in that whole time 
[approximately 20 years] so why would I expect them to ever do anything" (Andrew, 
line 533). It could also be linked to the fear of enjoying success to the extent that
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future disappointment or failure would be too much to bear. One positive strategy 
used by participants involved emphasising different criteria by which their team’s 
value could be measured, in the absence of obvious markers of success such as 
trophies: "Tottenham are shit...but they've got a history and tradition of playing 
entertaining football and having entertaining footballers... show me something 
beautiful please" (Andrew, line 255). By focusing on different measures of success, 
fans could sustain their well-being and self-esteem in the face of mediocre team 
performance.
Wider effects on well-being
As well as providing a safe environment for emotional expression, the crowd provided 
participants with a strong sense that they were part of a particular community. Henry 
described, "a sense of belonging or an affiliation with the team" (Henry, line 520) and 
this was echoed by others: "it's quite tribal in respect of you're part o f one clan and 
they 're part of another clan and you've got to make sure your drwns sound louder 
than their drums" (Jim, line 438). There was a wider sense of a community of football 
fans which overarched team rivalries; "we’re all just football fans at the end of the 
day" (Vincent, line 324).
Discussion
Links between the themes
The results identified five major themes arising from the interview transcripts, and a 
coherent thread emerged linking these themes. The phenomenology of emotions 
showed that the participants were able to describe intense emotions connected to 
football, which served particular emotional functions for them. However, this 
appeared to be dependent on feelings of safety that the football context provided. 
Connected to the theme of safety were the notions of social identity and boosting self 
esteem through positive associations with the team and a number of strategies 
appeared to be employed for sustaining emotional well-being.
Focusing on the phenomenology of emotions, the participants produced rich and vivid 
descriptions of how they felt whilst watching football. This was likened to a roller­
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coaster which was characterised by dramatic fluctuations that were more intense than 
in everyday life, supporting the previous findings by Elias & Dunning (1986; 
Dunning, 1999). Therefore, a function of football for some fans could be gaining 
access to intense emotions otherwise not available to them.
Further to this, other emotional functions were identified, whereby football was an 
escape or distraction from the stress of everyday life. It was also described as 
‘cathartic’ or a way of venting pent-up stresses and strains, which resonated with the 
beliefs of the researchers where we had hypothesised that football may serve a 
‘therapeutic’ purpose in helping people express accumulated emotions from their 
everyday lives. However, this notion of catharsis deviates from that previously 
identified in the literature by Sloan (1979) who described a process of catharsis 
occurring through the observation of football (specifically aggressive acts). In the 
current study, the participants described a cathartic release through the expression of 
emotion rather than through observation alone, suggesting that a more active process 
may be required.
The theme of safety appeared to be a prerequisite to allowing people to express their 
emotions. Factors connected to safety included being part of the crowd (belonging) 
and sensing the uniformity of reaction. It was also apparent that the participants were 
aware that their emotional expression would be affected if they perceived themselves 
as different from others in the crowd. Being aware of differences within the crowd 
appeared to strongly influence participants’ feelings of safety and their ability to 
express emotions in the football context. Therefore, being part of the crowd and 
experiencing a sense of belonging helped the participants to feel safe, as well as 
providing a source of social identity (Jones, 2000). In addition, Cialdini (1976) and 
Jones (2000) identified that associating with a football team and its supporters can 
boost self-esteem through ‘basking in reflected glory’ and it was evident that the 
football fans defended themselves against negative emotions by being pessimistic 
about the team’s performance or by finding ‘alternative successes’ such as flashes of 
beautiful or inspired play, a concept also noted by Jones. This desire to protect 
oneself and sustain emotional well-being was commonly reported.
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Emotions outside the football context
When describing football events, the participants gave vivid narratives. This produced 
a powerful sense that during the interviews, participants were fully engaged in the 
process and were reliving the events they described. However, it was apparent that the 
participants did not produce the same richness of description for emotions in other 
contexts. This fits with Walton, Coyle and Lyons (in press) who found that football 
was a place were it was permissible to talk about emotions.
Although it was felt that the participants were fully engaged in the interview process, 
some people found it easier to recall their emotional experiences than others and in 
relative terms, all participants found it easier to discuss emotions in the football 
context than in other areas of their life. There appear to be four potential explanations 
for this. Firstly, the participants may have felt inhibited from a more general 
discussion of emotions due to not feeling ‘safe’ during interviews. This would 
support the notion that football serves as a vehicle for emotional expression.
A second explanation is that it could be an artefact of memory processes as the 
football emotions were particularly strong and possessed rarity value (Wagenaar, 
1986). In contrast, emotions at this time outside of the football context may not have 
had the same salience and significance for the participant, making them less 
memorable. In addition, memories of emotions were not specifically cued outside of 
football since participants were not asked to recall a specific event. Thirdly it is 
possible that the questions were less effective at facilitating the discussion of emotions 
outside of football. Finally, as participants were known to the interviewers, for some 
this may have inhibited emotional expression. However, there was no evidence to 
suggest that this had occurred.
Evaluation of the research
The validity of this research was evaluated against criteria proposed by Yardley 
(2000) who suggests that good qualitative research contains the essential elements of 
sensitivity to context, commitment and rigour, transparency and coherence, and 
impact and importance. The current study demonstrates sensitivity to context by 
consideration and discussion of relevant theories and evidence and by placing 
emphasis on participants’ perspectives, their socio-cultural context and the social
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context of the research process. Commitment and rigour has been evidenced by the 
thoroughness with which data was collected, analysed and reported. For example, this 
was conducted at both an individual and group level, suggesting the researchers were 
fully engaged with the data and research process (see appendix 5 & 6). Descriptions 
and interpretations have been accompanied by extracts from the data, resulting in a 
construction of reality that is both transparent and coherent to the reader. As a result 
the investigation provides a rich account of the emotional function of football. It has 
been able to elaborate on the nature of emotions and the conditions that football may 
provide in order to facilitate emotional expression, providing an alternative account of 
why so many people support football.
A potential limitation of the research may be that the interview schedule facilitated the 
exploration of emotions in the football context, but was less effective at exploring 
emotions in other areas of peoples’ lives. Therefore further research in this area may 
need to revise this aspect. A possible solution could be to use two timelines, one for a 
significant football event and one for a significant emotional event from everyday life 
(non-football). This may help to focus the participant’s mind on equally important 
and salient emotional events, allowing a better qualitative exploration of the 
participant’s emotions in each context. Additionally, the number of participants is 
problematic, as it is a small sample of people and further qualitative investigation will 
be necessary to be able to generalise the findings.
Implications for Clinical Psychology
In general, there has been very little published research on football in scientific 
forums, despite the preponderance of opinions disseminated through the media and 
social circles. The findings of this research tentatively suggest that being a football 
supporter may serve purposes for the fan which include the expression and 
experiencing of intense emotion in a way that feels safe and appropriate. This may be 
of interest to clinical psychologists as for some people, football may be a topic 
through which intense emotions can be described and understood. Certainly, a shared 
interest in football can be an instant way of connecting and joining in conversation 
with a stranger, a phenomenon described by several participants. Therefore, if nothing 
else, football may offer a means for clinicians to gain an initial rapport with a person. 
With creativity, it may also be a way to facilitate exploring or relating to complex
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emotions.
Ideas for further research
An idea to explore further is why some people may seek to experience intense 
emotions at football events. If people lack access to these emotional experiences in 
other areas of their lives, this would appear to be an area of interest to clinical 
psychologists.
Summary of the research
Overall, this research has met its aims, as a greater understanding has been gained of 
the role of football in the expression of emotion from five football supporters using 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (Smith, 1996). Whilst it is difficult to 
generalise from a small sample, the results have suggested that supporting football 
may serve purposes for the fan which are not commonly discussed in the existing 
literature. This relates to the finding that football may have utility in facilitating 
everyday emotional expression. Also, the highs and lows of football were seen as 
mirroring life, as Henry (line 509) articulately summarised - "[the team’s 
performance]  does act as a barometer sometimes for, for your own life".
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Background information sheet
The following information is collected so that people who read the final report can 
know more about the people who have taken part. However, you will not be 
identifiable in the research as the study is completely confidential.
1. How old are you? _____
2. How would you describe your ethnicity?
(Please choose one section from (a) to (e) and tick the appropriate box to 
indicate your cultural background).
(a) White
British □
Irish □
Any other White background, please write in below
(b) Mixed
White and Black Caribbean □
White and Black African □
White and Asian □
Any other mixed background, please write in below
(c) Asian or Asian British
Indian □
Pakistani □
Bangladeshi □
Any other Asian background, please write in below
(d) Black or Black British
Caribbean □
African □
Any other Black background, please write in below
(e) Chinese or Other ethnic group
Chinese □
Any other, please write in below
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What is your highest qualification? (please tick appropriate box)
None □
GCSE(s)/01evel(s)/CSE(s) . □
A level(s) □
Diploma □
Degree □
Postgraduate degree □
4. What is your current job (or, if you are not working, what was your last job)?
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Appendix 2:
The timeline
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Appendix 3:
Information Sheet and Consent Form
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INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM
An Exploration of the Relationship Between Team Performance and Reported 
Emotional State of Committed Football Fans
You are invited to take part in a study looking at the types of experiences reported by 
committed football fans. Your participation will help to develop an understanding of 
the types of feelings that supporting football can generate in fans and how these may 
relate to other events in your life.
If you agree to take part you will be asked a number of questions about your team’s 
performance and how you felt about this. You will be asked some questions about 
what it is like to be a football supporter. You will also be asked some more general 
questions about yourself.
The interview will be audiotaped and the conversation will be transcribed to provide a 
paper copy of the interview. On this paper copy all names and identifiable information 
will be changed to preserve anonymity. Once the study is completed, the audiotape 
will be erased. The anonymised paper copy may be kept as a record. All members of 
our research group will have access to the transcripts. If, at any time, you decide that 
you wish the tape to be erased immediately, let the interviewer know.
The total duration of the study is about 45 minutes.
You do not have to take part in this study if you do not want to. If you decide to take 
part you may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.
The data collected from your participation will be completely confidential.
I agree/do not agree to take part in this study. (Please delete as 
appropriate)
Signature of Participant:...............................................  Date:
Name in Block Capitals:..............................................................
Signature of Interviewer:.............................................  Date:
Name in Block Capitals: ...........................................................
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Appendix 4:
Example Interview Transcript
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Line Speaker
01 Teddy:
02
03 Henry
04 Teddy
05 Henry
06 Teddy
07 Henry
08 Teddy
09 Henry
10 Teddy
11
12 Henry:
13
14
15
16
17 Teddy:
18
19 Henry:
20
21
22
23
24
Text
The tape’s on. Okay I’m going to start with some 
contextual questions. Who do you support?
Arsenal.
As if I didn’t know that!
[Laughs]
Okay. How long have you been a fan?
About... thirty... three years. Yep 
Quite a long time then.
Suffering... [Laughs]. Long suffering
Long suffering okay. How did you start supporting
Arsenal?
I think I first became aware of the significance of football 
and teams and supporting teams around about 1970-71 cup 
final, day, on cup final day 71 and from that decided that 
it’s good, a good thing to support the team that wins the FA 
cup, so sort of following that really.
Could you briefly describe the things you do to follow your 
team?
I check the website, probably the official club website 
probably daily, umm, look out for the results err when I’m 
not actually watching or listening to matches. Try and 
watch the games when they’re on TV, if I can’t get to a TV 
I’ll listen to them on the radio and occasionally I’ll even 
make a visit and trip to watch a game.
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25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Teddy:
Henry:
Teddy:
Ok. And how would you rate your, how would you rate 
Arsenal’s performance at the moment on a scale of one to 
five, where one is veiy poor and five is excellent?
At the moment I’d probably put them on a three.
Ok. Ok the next bit... I’ll need this piece of paper and this 
is a timeline. It’s meant to represent your life past, present 
and future. We can use it to help you identify when certain 
things happened or occurred in your time as a football fan 
and what else might have been going on at those times. I 
will ask you a few questions and we can use the time-line 
when you are answering. I’d like you to describe for me 
some significant event that has happened over the time that 
you have been supporting Arsenal. It might be a positive 
event, like an important win, or it might be a negative event, 
such as relegation. Indicate on the timeline when it 
happened, and tell me something about it.
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41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 
61 
62
63
64
65
Henry: I suppose my first recollection, significant recollection 
would be the cup final in 1972. So we’re looking...this 
kind of stage here [writing on timeline]... they played in the 
cup final and lost that game to Leeds United 1-0. That was 
quite a downer, a veiy negative event. I would say the next 
recollection of the team was... in their performance in the 
late 70s, 78 to 80, and they appeared in three cup finals in 
succession winning one of them, I especially remember 
1979 cup final win against Manchester United. After that 
[laughs] the team went through I can only describe as a bit 
of a wilderness, barrens patch and, I think, the next 
significant event and I suppose this is one which is 
particularly poignant event for me cause I went, was the 
Littlewoods Cup Final at Wembley in 1987 and I actually 
was fortunate enough to be at the game to watch them win 
that 2-1. Particularly good. I’d, I’d being at a Wembley, 
Wembley Cup Final to watch the team win, excellent. The 
next year the 88-89 season was particularly significant 
because that was the year they won the championship, for 
in, for first time in about 20 years, and of course there was 
the err dramatic late winner at Anfield against Liverpool in 
that match. And I do particularly remember that, watching 
at home on TV, having given up hope of them winning it 
and then them scoring in the last minute, I think I can 
definitely recall screaming and rolling around [laughs]
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67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80 
81 
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Henry: on my sitting room floor when that, when that went in. 
That was another particularly uh memorable one and 
[unintelligible] a couple of good seasons following that, 
another championship win a couple of years later. Umm... 
1994 I remember... them winning the European Cup 
Winners Cup, the first time I remember ever seeing them 
win a European Final. Err, again the following year they 
appeared in the final again but happened to lose that one... 
and I would say it wasn’t until 1998 when I first saw them 
win the double... that, I really, again, really remember that 
cup final watching that with a friend round at his house and 
watching them beat Newcasical, err Newcastle United in 
the final 2-0, err win the double that was good. And then 
err again in 2002 winning the double again, umm... I 
suppose err devaluing it a little bit, that that the the trophies 
coming a bit too too thick and fast for me as an Arsenal 
supporter but err, no particularly enjoyable 2002 that that 
season there. And I think particularly from the year sort of 
98 onwards not only the winning of the trophies but I think 
it was significant that the style of play and the way that they 
played football was a significant improvement in what the 
team and certainly the club had served up before and the, 
they were playing with a style and panache I think which as 
an Arsenal supporter I certainly wasn’t used to so. Yea. 
That was good.
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92 Teddy:
93 Henry:
94
95
96
97
98 Teddy;
99
100
101 Henry:
102
103
104
105
106
107
108 Teddy:
109
110
111
145 Teddy:
146 Henry:
147 Teddy:
148 Henry:
Does that bring it up to the present?
Yep, to the current season, of course which, they’re 
currently umm trying to win the league title having more 
recently gone out of two competitions and I have to say that 
was a little sad, but umm, nonetheless playing good football 
again.
Ok, you you’ve identified a number across this time is there 
one of these which you feel is the most significant out of all 
those?
I think the one which, the event which... I think just due to 
the excitement and the climax of the season and the events 
was the 1989 league championship win at err Liverpool 
which I saw on the television, yeah I’d say that was the 
most significant in my lifetime. First time I’d actually seen 
the team win the league umm, but... so that was good, yeah 
very good.
Ok. I’m interested in how you felt about that event, the 
league championship win, and would like to ask you 
something about your feelings at this time. Can you tell me 
anything about your feelings at the time?
[laughs]... You said that you felt that exhiliration 
Hmmm hmmm
Umm, that excitement, was that throughout the match?
I think ummm
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149 Teddy:
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160 
161 
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
Henry:
Or were there other emotions that you felt during the 
match?
Oh certainly other emotions. I, as I said, as I said, prior to 
the umm the goal, the final goal going in there was a 
sinking feeling of of been here before, you know we’ve 
seen it, been so close, they’ve got so close this time. And 
there was the feeling of the inevitable, you know I felt 
resigned, I think it was that, that combination of of having 
resigned myself to the fate of them not winning sufficiently 
to win the league. Err, and and sort of thinking I can’t bear 
to watch this 11 want to go out now, but of thinking, for 
some reason, strange reason wanting to hang on there until 
the end in the kind of vain hope that something good would 
come. So I think it was the sheer unexpectedness of it and 
the kind of air of resignation, disappointment, feelings of 
despondency really, that had preceded the goal going in. I 
think that roller coaster if you like of emotions certainly 
was you know to the fore there, where you, you’re kind of 
sunk and sort of thought, oh well that’s it for another year, 
got so close and to this point, come to that. But then I 
think, you know to be lifted, in the way, there was no time 
for Liverpool to come back, and you knew, basically the 
last kick of the game, I think it was just, yeah, just from, 
complete low to high in the space of of, of a, you know, half 
a minute, it was, sheer exhilaration.
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174 Teddy:
175 Henry:
176
177
178
179
180 
181 
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194 Teddy:
195
And that exhilaration, that high, how long did that last for?
I think the, the intensity of the moment as I said the rest of 
the evening, I mean it was just impossible really to think 
about anything else or to hold a a sensible conversation 
about any other subject really and err, I I would say that 
probably stayed with me for a few days and I think reading 
about it, wanted to read every paper, see every report on the 
TV, you know, relive that that goal time and time again 
whether it was just in my mind or just, on news bulletins or 
video or whatever, I can’t remember whether I taped it or 
not. But I, I say, its, you know, for the next week or so just 
thinking about nothing else really, umm, apart from getting 
on vsith day to day life but it mean it was, it was that 
significant and I would say that the enjoyment of that has 
lasted, ever since although obviously that initial feeling of 
exhilaration obviously dissipates after a while, it was 
certainly, a good month or so I think umm before things 
really really moved on and err it was just a case of wanting 
to relive that moment by whatever means, whether papers, 
or reports or TV, whatever means possible really.
Was, was the, was the result of that match in line with your 
expectations?
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I tend to underplay or err on the side of caution or 
pessimism with these games and I, if I’m honest, although 
obviously willing and wanting them to win my head would 
have said, due to the form of Liverpool at that time, and 
Arsenal not having won a trophy, err for some, for a 
significant, the league championship for about 20 years, my 
expectations I think were, that the, the team wouldn’t win, 
certainly by the significant margin of two goals, to actually 
win the league, no my expectations were not, positive.
So knowing that, that it didn’t fit... your expectations 
weren’t positive, how did you think that affected how you 
felt?
I’m sure that, as I’ve said, umm relating to the kind of 
sensations leading up to the goal going in and the kind of, 
the air or resignation about everything, sinking into a kind 
of, oh well we gave it a good go you know, it was you 
know, a good tiy a good effort but in the end we just 
weren’t quite good enough. I think it was significant, that 
the expectations were, not there to win that actually 
produced the exhilaration of when they actually did win. 
So I think it was that combination, both over the build up to 
the game and actually during the course of the game, that 
led to the incredible high that followed the goal going in, 
yes.
187
© Vanessa Bryant 2005
220 Teddy:
221
222 Henry:
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241 Teddy:
242
When do you think you feel the strongest emotions during 
the match?
I think, [cough] strongest emotions are at the time of 
goals... either goals being scored by your team, or against, 
and the inevitable highs and lows, and... that exhilaration 
when a goal goes in especially when it’s a significant goal 
or err a winning goal, although of course during the course 
of a game you don’t know when a winning goal is going in 
but I think if they start to extend the lead by two or three 
goals, you become confident the team should win that 
match. But again, the lows occur umm, when, I think, 
particularly the opposing team scores, either really early on 
in the game, and you think oh no it’s going to be an 
avalanche and they are going to wop us sort of five or six 
nil, or I think towards the end of the game that the opposing 
team scores because, if it’s, particularly if it’s a tight game, 
there’s not many goals in it, you think, I think the tendency 
is to think well that’s it they, they’ve blown it. So I think at 
those times, err particularly strong and. I’d say they’re the 
particular low points of a game, when the opposing team 
scores.
On balance, do you think you experience more lows or 
more highs during a game?
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Again I think it’s umm, a, a kind of, almost like a defense 
mechanism, to kind of keep expectations low, and almost 
accentuate the negative in the belief that, if  something 
positive comes, or a goal comes, it’s more like, more of a 
bonus. So I think it’s like a deliberate, even though the 
evidence and the performance of the team, especially this 
season suggests that I should be confident and going into it 
expect expecting them to win, because actually in the 
league they’ve been unbeaten, but, umm, I think I keep 
expectations low, in order not to be too disappointed if they 
don’t fulfill them, [laughs].
You’ve described how you’ve felt about the, this event, the 
Avinning the league, and I’d also like to ask you something 
about what happened to those feelings. Did you show your 
feelings and how did you show them?
When I was at home and the goal, I was watching it on 
Television and the goal went in, yes, 11 think there was a 
high degree of, certainly the most intense shouting or 
screaming that I have ever experienced watching a football 
match, I think it was partly because I was in the safety of 
my own home, and umm... it was the sheer disbelief that 
that, of, of that going in that, that led to that. So I was 
extremely vociferous [laughs]
[laughs]
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When that goal went in, and I think almost uncontrolled in 
terms of rolling around the floor or, just jumping around for 
joy really yeah, certainly the most intense emotions I have 
ever experienced watching football, yeah, and I think partly 
that was due to, yeah, being at home and not being in a pub, 
but I I think if I was in a pub watching with friends or 
around watching, I would have done the same, I think there 
would have been a collective, even more of a collective 
So what did you get from showing those emotions and 
doing that?
A release [laughs] an amazing release, I mean it was, yeah, 
I don’t think it would have been safe to try and contain that 
in any other way [laughs], yeah [laughs].
Some people show their emotions more than others when 
they are watching a match. What do you think are the 
benefits or drawbacks of that?
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I think, I would say for a lot of people when I have actually 
been to games and watched or listened to them, as I’ve been 
there, taken notes on people it’s clear that people find it 
therapeutic in terms of a release for emotions, and, to some 
degree I think it’s quite healthy, people as a safety valve 
and having to have that outlet, it’s almost like in a safe 
contained environment where, I think due to the behaviour 
of those, those other supporters around them it appears to be 
quite the norm, to, certainly shout, sing or, you know, be 
emotionally... verbose or, or... trying to think of the right 
words, articulate, emotionally articulate the one, the when, 
when one normally is but, and I think a lot of people find 
that useful as a release for their emotions, it may be that 
they’re bringing stresses and strains from their lives, their 
everyday lives to sort of, that game, and maybe releasing it 
through that way, so I think that’s useful. But of course the 
downside to that is when that becomes over the top and it 
starts impinging either on those sitting around them and 
clearly people can get upset certainly by the use of, of foul 
language, and also of course when it overspills into abuse 
either of players or of opposing supporters, and its clearly, 
you know, the there are people who who, umm I think, 
abuse those situations umm to the effect of, detriment of 
other people.
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What about abusing the referee? Is that cathartic, is that a 
release or what is that?
In the same way that, I think its all again, its almost a, I 
think he’s amongst football supporters a legitimate target, I 
mean he’s, he’s the official so he, he doesn’t carry any 
favour in terms of any supporters but, again I suppose 
within reason I would say ok to have a go, have a question 
his decisions but, but again umm he’s a human being like 
anyone else and doesn’t deserve to be, verbally abused.
If you, one of the... you mentioned about the people around 
you. If you perceive the people around you to be different 
from yourself, does that affect the emotions you express?
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Interesting point. I, I, I, I compared umm a game, a match 
or matches that I’d watched err in the early 70s when 
standing on the North Bank terracing at Highbury to a 
situation where I was then sitting in the same stand but it all 
being all seated and I did compare the crowd that was 
around me in the early 70s, there was an all male crowd, err 
one of lots of singing and shouting and and foul language I 
have to say... umm to one where I found myself in later 
years, I think the early 90s, sitting in a stand vdth women 
arid children, almost a like a more family err environment, 
and I must say that, it did, I was more aware of what I 
myself was shouting and saying, in that, in the latter 
environment than I was earlier on because I think I was 
conscious of controlling what I was saying and the content 
of, and obviously the language I was using, because of the 
presence of women and younger children. I would say that 
it was more restrained, in that environment, certainly.
Ok, so the emotions you expressed might have been slightly 
more restrained, depending on the people that were around. 
Yes, certainly would have affected that, I was actually quite 
conscious of that yeah, at the time, I was there yeah.
If you perceive the people around you to be supporting a 
different team to yourself would that affect the emotions 
you express?
Absolutely umm [laughs]...
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And how so?
Good case in point, I actually went to a game at Arsenal, 
but I went with a friend of mine who was err a Spurs 
supporter, and because err, of the way things worked out I 
decided to go in to stand with him in the Tottenham 
supporters end... and it was amazing because, although 
Arsenal had the good fortune to win the game, when they 
scored, when Arsenal scored, of course, because I was 
surrounded and I mean compacted, surrounded in a standing 
terrace full of Tottenham supporters, I actually changed my 
responses to the goals, the Arsenal goals going in, so when 
umm the Arsenal goals went in, in terms of not jumping up 
for joy in terms of the release of that emotion, Fm sure I 
shouted words to the effect of oh damn [laughs] and it was 
clear by my, probably clear by my overreaction [laughs] to 
these events that, that it was probably quite, quite marked 
and false compared to the rest of the Tottenham, who just 
sat stony faced and silent [laughs] so, that that was how I 
dealt with that in that situation of course yeah. Although 
the release was there when the goals went in, the content or 
the, or the guise of it was certainly changed, because I, I, I 
feared that I would be abused either verbally or probably 
physically if I had of shouted, started shouting when that 
goal went in [laughs].
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Do you think that the umm, those emotions that you felt,
that release
Hmmm
The intensity of it 
Hmmm
Do you think that it was diminished because you had those 
different fans around you?
Yes, oh certainly
Would you have got a more intense burst of emotion if... 
Absolutely I would have been jumping and shouting for joy 
if I had of been with the right, set of supporters certainly. 
So I had to contain, you know even even voicing 
disappointment, I had to temper that or tailor that down, err 
simply because you, its clear, the normal reaction for an 
opposing supporter is really just not to do anything 
emotionally, just stand there stony faced and probably shout 
the odd word of verbal abuse at the player who had scored 
but certainly yeah it was more constrained, yes.
Ok, so looking at the timeline, Td like you to think about 
what things unrelated to football were going on in your life 
at that time. So when they won the league. Can you tell me 
something about that?
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I think at the time umm, I was, working as... as an estate 
agent... that’s right it was a career change and... I think, in 
a way the football provided an escape or a release... umm 
probably for the confusion or dissatisfaction, I was having 
err at the time in that, in that, in that job. Yeah I’d say it 
was a a positive distraction from an otherwise umm... 
transitional, career kind of move at the time, yeah. It was 
quite good. Although I had a a stable relationship with a 
girlfriend... ummm, most things were pretty ok, umm, but I 
I think football always acts especially when the team’s 
doing well as a welcome, escape from sort of day to day 
life, yeah.
So was it the estate agent part that was 
I think yeah, it was the uncertainty of having made a career 
change umm and and the dissatisfaction job dissatisfaction 
of the actual work yeah, it wasn’t fulfilling actually.
So that that part of it sounds quite difficult do you think the 
fact that your team were doing well... helped make things 
better?
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Absolutely oh yeah. I, I think umm, in the way that it acts 
and serves in most people’s lives it’s a welcome release, I 
think from the day to day life umm... that you have and I 
think if if things are p-possibly quite difficult or 
troublesome, in any err at any level then it serves as a good 
distraction umm a welcome release I think away from those 
day to day pressures yeah.
Cause you mentioned how you were kind of on a high for
about a month
hmmm
weren’t you, you were feeling 
absolutely
how do you think that affected?
I’m, I’m sure it had had a positive impact across the rest of 
my life and you know in terms of, who I was with and, who 
I was working wdth or you know in a small office or 
whatever I’m, I’m sure my mood would have been elevated 
and and was probably elevated at the time because of that 
umm result yeah that outcome yeah.
If Arsenal’s performance had been the opposite at that time 
hmm
do you think that would have affected other events in your 
life?
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... it’s hard to say umm, I don’t think to any significant 
degree, but I’m sure, that my mood, would have been, 
would have been sorry somewhat, lower or, I would have 
been less enthusiassic, enthusiastic, enthusiastic about my 
work or, relationships at at the time, so I’m I’m, yeah. I’m 
sure it does, although I think it’s difficult to put any kind of 
umm, tangible kind of measure on it. I’m sure it does have 
some, some err impact on your mood, yeah.
Do you think, is it easier to express negative emotions at a 
football match rather than showing negative emotions in 
other areas of life?
I think it, it, as I said the football environment certainly the 
crowd environment does, permit, the release of a lot of 
negative... emotions or thoughts... and I think consciously 
or subconsciously they can be channeled out... as a a you 
know through legiti legitimate targets like either the 
opposition, or the referee I think, yes. I, I think it’s almost 
like a, a kind of safe environment, to release that kind of 
negative emotion, even though I think it has umm potential 
negative outcomes in terms of the, players or referees and 
and the opposing supporters being overtly, abused, yeah. 
What makes it safer... to express negative emotions at a 
football match?
I think if you are sitting, sorry 
Rather than generally?
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If you are sitting with supporters of, your team, err the 
safety in numbers element I think you feel, you’re amongst 
like minded people, like thinking people, and and actually 
this is, you’re just following the consensus of what’s around 
you and if that’s the prevailing mood or, thoughts that are, 
you’re experiencing which obviously you can hear and pick 
up on, then you feel that security in actually endorsing 
what, what’s being said. So, it has to do with, with who 
you’re with yeah definitely
And similarly, is it easier to express positive emotions at a 
football match than it is to show positive emotions in other 
areas of your life?
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Yes... umm for the same reasons I think you’re, you’re 
amongst... you’re... tribe if you like, your, your you know 
your family or whatever they’re, they’re people of like 
minds who, who, who you feel it’s safe to release, it’s safe 
to release that that kind of emotion with and of course 
ironically they’re people you might only meet sort of once a 
week or may, once a month or once a year and actually 
probably don’t know them any more closely than you 
would someone in the street, but... err I think the... the 
bond that’s held between the football supporters is 
sufficiently strong... to allow... the safety err valve of of 
emotional release that probably, wouldn’t occur unless you 
were sort of either within the safety of your your own home 
or own family.
Changing focus a little. I’m interested in the differences 
between fans of teams that are winning and fans of teams 
that are losing. Do you think a team’s performance can 
affect how fans see themselves?
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...I think that’s quite umm...difficult question to gauge it 
but I mean in terms of behaviour, what you would normally 
find of course , is the, the team, supporters of the team that is 
winning, more exuberant, more vociferous... umm probably 
singing and chanting a lot more err and I would have 
thought that they would, they would obviously feel more 
positively about themselves and be looking to assert that 
through, the chanting and singing that would be going on. 
So I, I would think fi’om the behaviour of team’s supporters 
who were losing, it is a question of, they do want to 
encourage their team and some will react very positively, 
and keep chanting and singing for them, but undeniably, 
they’re aware, only too aware from the noise going on 
around them... umm... that they are on the, the wrong end 
of the, the result so I would have thought their self­
perception would, would definitely decrease or fall, 
absolutely, yeah.
What about outside the match, would the the performance 
of the team, whether they’re winning or losing affect how 
the fans see themselves when you’re away fi*om the match 
and during the week say?
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Yeah absolutely. I, I, I think the team’s performance, does 
act as a barometer sometimes for, for your own life and I 
think if, the team does suffer a particularly negative or bad 
result, there is a tendency either you want to, immerse 
yourself in a distraction to, to kind of, alleviate the mood 
and getting away from thinking about that, or, or I think, 
alternatively it can highlight other negative aspects or areas 
going on in your life at the time. But I think it can act as a 
trigger sometimes, to to channel your, other negative 
thoughts or emotions err with, yeah, yeah.
... Umm, what do you get personally from being a football 
fan?
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... I think there’s a sense of... I think there is a sense of 
belonging or an affiliation with the team... and following 
their progress, is is... a welcome distraction... and and 
almost umm, it’s like acting out successes or failures 
vicariously, err through someone else’s endeavours you 
feel... umm... a sense of not being in control of events and 
not, not being able to influence them but nonetheless 
emotionally bonded or attracted, to, that that end, I mean to 
their end sorry. So I argh. I, I think it’s... it is a question of 
feeling, of belonging really and, and being... part of 
something... hopefully... err something good... umm, that, 
you know can give you, the exhilaration and the pluses... 
but of course with that I think you have to buy into the fact 
that, there’s going to be some lows, and some 
disappointments on the way, but umm. I, I think the, the 
emotional appeal of of that err rollercoaster ride is, is too 
strong to kind of, for a lot of people anyway to kind of, 
distract so, yeah or detract from that so no it’s good... a 
positive thing.
That’s it 
That’s it
Yep we’re finished, thank you.
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Appendix 5:
Reflections from each of the researchers
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Personal reflection -  One
Reflections throughout the research process included consideration of the interview 
process as well as the conceptions and preconceptions that I brought to the project. 
The interview was conducted using a schedule of questions. I chose to stick fairly 
closely to this schedule, using only a small number of additional questions and probes. 
This was to ensure that, while the participant’s perspective was explored I did not 
influence the process by asking any ad hoc questions that could have been considered 
leading. The disadvantage of this, of course, is that there may have been some 
interesting avenues that were not explored in great detail, thereby limiting the data.
Being a female researcher who had not been committed to football in recent years may 
have had a positive effect on the responses given. The balance between what 
knowledge and interest I had about football against what I didn’t know about the topic 
made me genuinely curious during the interview. Evidence that this was picked up by 
the participant came from the elaborate explanation provided during the interview 
about the system by which teams play each other in a bid to secure league promotion.
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Personal reflection - Two
It was a slightly apprehensive time, choosing the research topic from the choices given 
and waiting to see who else would be interested. The topic seemed to provide an 
opportunity to add a light-hearted aspect to my clinical training, however this was 
somewhat dependent on my fellow researchers: would we get on, did they have 
similar ideas to mine about how the project might “go”, would we be able to negotiate 
whatever differences arose? Nevertheless I recall being pleased with the final group, 
one of whom I knew fairly well and the remainder I perceived to be friendly and 
sociable people.
Once discussions began it became clear that others appeared to have the same 
approach as I did. Banter and friendly rivalry emerged between those of us that were 
football fans; the remainder joined in with the laughter and sought to gain more 
understanding about the game. I can say with contentment that the subsequent steps 
in the research process passed unremarkably. We seemed to be able to listen to one 
another’s ideas, commenting on the positives and negatives where necessary; thinking 
back I hope that everyone felt as free as I did to both challenge and praise suggestions. 
I think the interview schedule is testament to our cooperative working style and when 
it arrived typed and formatted in my email box I was proud of and impressed with the 
finished product.
The interview itself was a somewhat nerve-wracking experience. I was conscious not 
only of how the participant perceived me but also what my fellow researchers would 
learn about me as a clinical interviewer. However I recall enjoying the interview - 1 
had thought myself a football fan until I conversed with my participant! He was able 
to engage me and take me into the very strong positive emotions he was still feeling 
despite the chosen event occurring some years previously. However my “high” soon 
became a “low” when the realisation of the arduousness of the transcribing process hit 
me. Remaining true to the recording was hard particularly where I perceived my 
questioning to be slightly flawed, yet I persisted in order to be faithful to the process. 
Throughout I wondered how my colleagues’ interviews had gone and how my 
transcript would “stand up” to theirs; had I gathered sufficient information to be able 
to generate themes, had I wandered too far away from the interview schedule?
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Handing over the completed transcript to the others was another anxious moment.
Reading the other transcripts was fun! Like my participant the other fans were 
engaging and even when describing a negative event were able to evoke feelings in 
me; the life of a true fan really amazed me! For example I recall keeping an eye out 
for the results of all the participants’ teams so that I could have some idea of how they 
might be feeling on that particular weekend. A similar amount of fun came through 
re-reading the transcripts with my colleagues; the banter remained and it felt like we 
were “quite good at this qualitative stuff” having generated a number of themes 
common to most or all participants.
The final stage -  the write-up seems to have gone almost too smoothly. Schedules 
have been kept to, joint writing has been enjoyable and a high standard of work has 
been produced. Despite the extra workload I shall really miss this project and am glad 
to have been left with new football friendships!
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Personal reflection -  Three
"It became apparent during the course of the research process that my interest in 
the subject of football and football fandom - which had originally been driven by a 
scientific curiosity rather than emotional involvement - had undergone subtle changes 
whereby I began to notice (and worry about!) the fortunes of the football clubs 
followed by the research interviewees, especially the club supported by my 
interviewee, poor old downtrodden, stigmatised Mill wall. I started to listen to the five 
minute sport slots after the news on television and even stopped to read the Sun at the 
newstands in the supermarket! All this was possibly exacerbated by Millwall's gutsy 
performance leading up to the cup final where sadly they were absolutely crushed by 
Manchester United, but nevertheless gave me real insight into what it must be like for 
the committed lifelong football fan and the emotional highs and lows of the football 
season. My reactions were a complete surprise to me and it will be interesting to see if 
they are sustained for any length of time. I might even go to a match next season!"
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Personal reflection - Four
When the topic was first proposed I expressed immediate interest, and was pleased 
when several others did too. I was a little surprised to see who joined the group -  as a 
football fan myself, I have a good idea which members of the course have an interest 
in football, and had expected more of these people to join us. On reflection, I was 
pleased with the group -  had there been less football fans, I would have worried that 
the project would be too distant from the topic, and could not express what I felt was 
important about football and emotions. However, I was also aware that in a group 
containing more (male) football fans, I may have felt the authenticity of my “fandom” 
challenged. As a female fan, I sometimes feel more pressure to prove my 
commitment, or display my soccer knowledge. Moreover, living far from my club and 
no longer going to matches, I am very aware that I do not feel as “true” a fan as in the 
past, and I was grateful that my research group would not be comprised of those 
whose season-ticket-holding dedication would expose me as the fraud I sometimes 
feel.
Throughout the project, I inhabited two roles, that of the fan as well as the researcher. 
An ongoing interest in the complexities of football fandom certainly helped in 
applying myself to onerous research tasks such as transcribing. Looking back at the 
transcription, I was also aware that my status as a fan helped the interview progress 
smoothly, as my participant (also female) knew of my interest in football and 
therefore a common language and understanding was quickly established, and a richer 
vein of information was tapped than might otherwise have been possible. However, in 
the course of the interview it was a struggle to maintain any semblence of an 
“outsider” perspective, to the extent that on occasion I finished my interviewee’s 
sentences for her, over-confident that nothing she could say about the emotional highs 
and lows of football could be a surprise to me.
Naturally, my participant and the others who took part described widely varying 
experiences and opinions about fandom and their feelings, and it was this privileged 
insight into the differences and commonalities of fans which was the highlight of the 
research for me. I was pleased that the write-up seemed to capture the passion, 
dedication and even some of the humour of our participants. Through this project, I
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have gained an insight and empathy into the experience of all fans, beyond the 
blinkers of traditional club rivalries. I also feel that working as a group has been a 
worthwhile experience, and a valuable introduction into qualitative research.
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Personal reflection -  Five
As an enthusiastic football fan, researching this area has been fascinating, engaging, 
stimulating and fun. I think this is largely attributable to my fellow researchers, who 
have delighted me with their similar interest and passion for the topic. We have been 
a great team and I feel proud to identify myself with them.
At the outset of this research we had a belief that football may serve emotional 
purposes for the fan which we had not heard discussed before. Consequently it was 
very satisfying to find that our participants described experiences that supported these 
beliefs and fulfilled the research question. However, the parallels between the 
research topic and our experience of it seem uncanny. For example, I recently found 
myself thinking that even if we don’t achieve a good mark, then we’ll still know that 
we had the most fun, or we were the best team. Clearly I was finding an alternative 
success to protect myself. There has also been a sense of unity, with people wanting 
to be involved in all aspects of the work and supporting each other.
The requirements of the course have affected the research, as the nature of the project 
has been influenced by the marking criteria. At one point this was particularly notable 
due to the request that we grade each others’ contributions. I felt very strongly against 
this as it seemed to jeopardize the integrity of our team-spirit, placing us in 
competition. Since this has been revoked, the project has rolled along very smoothly 
and entirely without hitches or conflict.
The use of IPA has been very effective, however, this methodology was restrictive 
and consequently frustrating in one instance. During a group meeting where we were 
analysirig each interview transcript, it was observed that one of the transcripts 
contained very little emotion. We were finding it hard to identify themes in the 
transcript and everyone seemed a little ‘flat’. In particular I found myself feeling 
subdued and having nothing to say about it. I remember thinking about this and 
wondering why I had nothing to say, at which point I was struck by the similarity 
between my feelings and the content of the interview. I felt nothing, and this seemed 
to reflect the content of the transcript which had very little emotion.
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At the time I found this fascinating, as it had a transference type quality to it, where I 
felt that I was picking up this ‘nothingness’ from the transcript and was feeling it 
myself. However, what could be done with this? It was an interesting observation to 
us as a group, but what use was it to the analysis? Nothing, really. This was 
frustrating as there was no way to discuss this, to articulate it, or to represent these 
feelings that the transcript generated, although at the time I found them striking. In 
retrospect, the best that I can make of these feelings is that they demonstrate how 
strongly we were engaged with the data from our participants.
I think the process of completing this research has changed my perception of football. 
Above everything, football is entertainment and drama, but having intimately 
encountered the beliefs of our participants, I can see that football is much more than 
that. There is a diversity and plurality of functions that football serves, and the next 
time that someone says to me “I don’t see why people get so excited watching adults 
chase a ball for 90 minutes”, I will have a number of opinions to share with them.
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Group Reflection
Towards the end of the project, we met as a group to share our reflections on our 
group processes. As discussion progressed, it quickly became apparent the extent to 
which our experience of being football researchers mirrored the experiences of the 
football fans we sought to describe.
We had entered into this research topic because football fandom was of interest to us, 
but also because we had a strong sense that the topic had the potential to be more 
light-hearted than the other proposed subjects. We welcomed the opportunity to 
incorporate a frivolous element into our cousework, as an escape from the day-to-day 
realities of clinical training. Looking back, we are pleased that this sense of fun was 
sustained throughout the project’s life. Opportunities for the use of football analogies 
in group discussion were rarely missed, and when difficult decisions regarding 
allocation of work or negotiating contrasting ideas arose, these humorous asides 
served to deflect potential tensions and make us a more bonded group. For example, 
when one of the group expressed a reluctance to work late, her commitment and 
loyalty to the project was questioned with accusations of being a “fairweather fan”!
The fact that the project was a “friendly” (rather than a “competitive fixture”) eased 
performance pressure and allowed us to develop as a team. Had the project counted 
towards our portfolio, perhaps there would have been more of a clash of individual 
preferences and styles. As it was, we seemed to forge a safe arena in which opinions 
could be expressed and ideas challenged, without damage to the group’s cohesion. As 
the project progressed, we became strongly bonded as a group, choosing to sit 
together in teaching sessions. On an occasion when one group member was unable to 
sit close to the others, he experienced strong feelings of isolation, likened to being 
seated amongst the opposing team’s fans! Comments made by members of other 
research groups, concerning our apparent organisation and the laughter so often heard 
during our discussions, increased our sense of belonging to a “football family”.
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Abstract
This study investigated the relatedness of superstition, anxiety and locus of control in 
men and women suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Although 
earlier research has shown that superstition and anxiety are not specifically associated 
with each other in a non-clinical population, it was hypothesised in the current study 
that the meaning and value placed on superstition as a possible coping/compensatoiy 
strategy in OCD may have implications for the level of general or ‘trait’ anxiety 
experienced by the individual. Thus the primary aim of the research was to 
investigate if holding superstitious beliefs fimctioned to reduce trait anxiety in OCD 
and whether these relationships were the same or different in men and women. A 
secondary aim of the research was to confirm results of previous studies that have 
found a positive association between superstition and an external locus of control. In 
addition, an exploratory hypothesis for the study was that an external locus of control 
would be negatively associated with trait anxiety. All participants (n=92) in the study 
were self-selected from charitable organisations that exist to support individuals 
suffering from OCD. Correlational methods were used to analyse the data from self­
completed questionnaire measures of obsessionality, superstitious belief, trait anxiety, 
locus of control and depression. Findings did not support the main hypothesis for the 
study: there was no negative association between superstition and trait anxiety. 
However, the second hypothesis was confirmed in that a strong positive association 
emerged between superstition and an external locus of control. Results also indicated 
an absence of support for the exploratory hypothesis in this study: trait anxiety and an 
external locus of control were not associated with one another. Further analyses 
showed that depression may be a significant contributory factor in the degree to which 
superstition, trait anxiety and beliefs about control may be experienced by individuals 
with OCD, especially for women. The relationship between superstition and 
situational or ‘state’ anxiety is discussed along with the clinical implications of the 
study. Suggestions for future research are given.
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1:0 Introduction
1:1 Foreword
The central topic of this research study is superstition and its relationship to the 
constructs of anxiety and locus of control in men and women with Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder. Superstitious beliefs and behaviours are phenomena that can 
present in both non-clinical and clinical populations (Frost et al, 1993; Vyse, 1997) 
and are widely thought to function as a way of maintaining an illusion of control in the 
face of uncertainty (Matute, 1994; 1995). Specifically, it has been argued that some 
individuals suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) evidence thoughts 
and ritualistic behaviours that are akin to a belief in superstitious ideals (Amir, 
Freshman, Ramsey, Neary & Brigidi, 2001). Anxiety is also a core feature of OCD, 
but its relationship with superstitious beliefs and behaviours and perception of control 
has not been widely studied. Recent research with a non-clinical population suggests 
that ‘superstitiousness is nonspecific and related more to perception of control than 
any specific form of psychological distress (Zebb & Moore, 2003)’. This raises 
interesting questions with regard to the effects of superstitious beliefs and behaviours 
on anxiety within OCD. Consequently, the current study was an attempt to extend the 
findings of Zebb and Moore in investigating the relationship of superstition to anxiety 
and locus of control within an OCD population with special reference to any gender 
differences that presented.
In order to provide a background to the current research, the introduction initially 
gives a definition of OCD before moving on to outline the severity and frequency of 
obsessions and compulsions that present in this condition together with a 
consideration of their gender differences and qualitative differences that may signal 
belief in superstitious ideals in a sub-set of patients. The aetiology of superstition is 
then addressed through an exploration of the perceptual and schematic processes 
implicit to the registering, storage and retrieval of information before moving on to 
discuss definitions of State and Trait anxiety. Subsequent sections focus on Locus of 
Control (Rotter, 1966) and its significance in the development of superstitious ideals 
as a method of coping with threat and uncertainty. A comparison of coping styles in 
OCD is then explored through a juxtaposition of the perceived passiveness of 
superstitious beliefs with the more active obsessions and compulsions that may
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characterise those individuals who tend towards perfectionism. It is then argued that 
anxiety may be experienced to differing degrees in these two groups. Particular 
reference is made to Zebb and Moore (2003) in the final part of the introduction where 
the specific hypotheses for the current study are stated.
1;2 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
1:2:1 Definition and diagnostic features of OCD,
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a condition characterised by persistent and 
intrusive thoughts that generate intense anxiety in the individual which may or may 
not necessitate the use of specific behaviours, that is, compulsive behaviours, in order 
to alleviate or reduce the anxiety (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989). Wells (1994) and Wells 
and Morrison (1994) suggest that obsessive thoughts in OCD are different to the kinds 
of intrusive thoughts experienced in excessive worrying.
Although evidence suggests that obsessions and compulsions present along a 
continuum and are to some extent present in non-clinical populations (Rachman & de 
Silva, 1978; Sher, Frost & Otto, 1983; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984; Stemberger & 
Bums, 1990), where obsessions and/or compulsions are considered excessive or 
unreasonable and cause significant distress to the individual then it is likely that a 
diagnosis of OCD is indicated. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, fourth edition 
(DSM-IV TR), (American Psychiatric Association, 2002) concludes that for OCD to 
be present obsessions should be recurrent and persistent and experienced by the 
individual as “intrusive and inappropriate” and cause significant anxiety or distress 
and that compulsions should be “repetitive behaviours or mental acts that the person is 
( driven to perform...aimed at preventing or reducing distress or preventing some 
dreaded event or situation” (p.462).
Obsessions may present as thoughts, images, ideas or impulses (Wells, 1997) and 
most commonly reflect fears about contamination (such as contacting disease through 
touching door handles etc.), (DSM-IV TR), (American Psychiatric Association, 2002); 
ordering or arranging objects (e.g. hanging out washing in a strictly predetermined 
sequence) (ibid); doubts around the completion of tasks (e.g. uncertainty about 
whether electrical appliances have been switched off or doors locked), (ibid); or 
doubting whether oneself has injured or intmded upon another person in some way,
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for example, knocking someone down when out driving or making spontaneous and 
unwanted sexual advances to strangers (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989). In the latter 
examples the sufferer may be so concerned about their culpability that they may 
revisit the scene many times, searching for evidence and reassurance that will refute 
the content of the obsession (personal communication). However, obsessions may or 
may not lead to compulsive behaviours (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). Salkovskis 
(1985; 1989) suggests that it is the degree of significance to the individual of the 
appraisal and interpretation of obsessive thoughts that is critical in the triggering of 
heightened anxiety and the evolution of compulsive behaviours. OCD sufferers may 
be compelled to neutralise their anxiety through engaging in long and repetitive 
behaviours or mental rituals that may be completely disruptive to their lives 
(Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989; Steketee, 1997; Wilhelm, Tolin & Steketee, 2004). Often, 
these mental rituals or behaviours have to be repeated a ‘good number of times’ or 
until ‘it feels right’ (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989). For example, an individual plagued 
with contamination fears may repeatedly wash their hands in a particular way (ibid) 
and then may repeat this sequence many times throughout the day often causing 
considerable damage to their skin (DSM-IV TR, 2002). Repeated checking in 
response to intrusive doubts about whether doors have been locked (Wells, 1997) can 
similarly take over the person’s existence causing great disruption to their lives. 
Distressing thoughts and images about harm occurring to the self or others may 
precipitate elaborate, covert mental rituals designed to neutralise such intrusions and 
the accompanying anxiety (Salkovskis et al, 2000; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Vyse, 
1997). Most typically, covert rituals may involve counting in particular sequences of 
numbers, either forwards or backwards a set number of times or repeatedly 
summoning up an image that is the opposite of the intrusive one (Salkovskis & Kirk, 
1989; Wells, 1997; DSM-IV-TR, 2002).
A wealth of research has shown that obsessive compulsive phenomena is also widely 
experienced in non-clinical populations albeit at a less intense level (e.g. Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984; Stemberger & Bums, 1990; Rachman & de Silva, 1978). 
Consequently, those processes are often investigated in non-clinical samples (e.g. 
Zebb & Moore, 2003; Sica, Novara & Sanavio, 2002; Frost, Sher & Green, 1986; 
Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau & Gagnon, 1992.
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1:2:2 Gender differences in OCD
In adults, the incidence of OCD is equally common in men and women (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2002; Kamo & Golding, 1991; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). 
However, gender may influence other demographic factors and the expression of OCD 
phenomena (Lensi et al., 1996). OCD onset tends to occur later in women than in 
men (Rasmussen Eisen, 1992; Castle, Deal & Marks, 1995; Noshirvani, Kasvikis & 
Marks, 1991; Flament & Rapoport, 1984; Lensi et al., 1996) and to be more often 
associated with depression (Noshirvani et al., 1991; Juang & Liu, 2001) and eating 
disorders (Fahy, Osacar & Marks, 1993). Women with OCD are more likely to 
present with a higher frequency of contamination fears and cleaning and avoidant 
behaviours (Lensi et al., 1996; Matsunaga et al., 2000; Marks, 1987), whereas in men 
a prevalence of social phobia (Marks, 1987), obsessive slowness (Roy, 1979), sexual 
obsessions (Castle et al., 1995; Lensi et al., 1996; Matsunaga et al., 2000) and need for 
symmetry (Rasmussen & Tsuang, 1986; Leckman, Grice & Boardman, 1997; Juang 
& Lui, 2001; Lensi et al., 1996) have been demonstrated. Using a non-clinical 
population Zebb and Moore (2003) also found that women had higher levels of 
contamination fears and cleaning behaviours than men but comparable levels of 
obsessive slowness. Dowson (1977) suggested that gender differences in frequency of 
contamination and cleaning symptomatology may particularly reflect sociocultural 
roles of men and women in western society.
In an Italian sample of two hundred and sixty three OCD patients, Lensi et al (1996) 
found that more males than females had suffered perinatal trauma and early onset 
OCD and were less likely to have ever married. Just under half the sample reported 
suffering co-morbid depression although no gender difference was found. 
Interestingly, females in this study had higher levels of co-morbid panic attacks and 
more aggressive obsessions than men. However, a Japanese study (Matsunaga et al.,
2000) found a higher level of aggressive obsessions in males compared to females and 
may, according to the authors, reflect the cultural landscape of Japan in its emphasis 
on interpersonal sensitivity and the tendency for males to be more frequently exposed 
to social gatherings where such processes are evoked. Women by way of contrast are 
more likely to experience aggressive obsessions in domestic situations, such as fears 
of harming their newborn baby (Matsunaga et al., 2000; Lensi et al., 1996).
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1:2:3 Qualitative differences in the content of 
obsessions and compulsions in OCD 
Although a common theme in obsessions and compulsions is the threat of and warding 
off of future harm, the expression of those fears may differ widely in OCD. One major 
difference may be that some obsessions and compulsions conform to laws of cause 
and effect whereas others do not. As Einstein and Menzies (2004) suggest, 
contamination fears and excessive cleaning (for example) do not require the 
suspension of scientific laws in order to maintain the beliefs; it is after all perfectly 
possible that some germs will remain however long an individual engages in cleaning 
behaviours. Although cleaning behaviours may be excessive in OCD sufferers they 
are often linked in a concrete fashion to the content of the obsessional thought. In 
contrast, mental rituals and overt compulsive behaviours that have superstitious 
content cannot be related in any possible rational sense to those events or phenomena 
which they are designed to obstruct from happening and do require the individual to 
suspend, or not acknowledge, scientific reasoning. For example, some individuals may 
have to count whilst walking through a door or close the door a set number of times 
either until they feel ‘complete’ or ‘just right’ and threat of future harm has been 
repelled (patient communication to author; Summerfeldt, 2004). There is no rational 
basis for believing these behaviours can affect the course of or prevent events 
happening in the external world. In support of this observation, Tobacyk and Milford 
(1983) found a significant positive correlation between superstitious beliefs and 
responses on the Irrational Belief Questionnaire (Newmark, Frerking, Cook & 
Newmark, 1973) in a student sample. Similarly, a later study found a positive 
association between superstition and irrational beliefs in a large sample of 
undergraduate students (Roig, Bridges, Renner & Jackson, 1998).
Superstitious obsessional thoughts and behaviours have also been linked in the 
literature to the processes which are thought to underlie Thought Action Fusion (TAP) 
(Rachman, 1993). Briefly, TAP refers to the process by which an individual is 
troubled with intrusive thoughts such as ‘I might have harmed my children’ and is 
then driven to either repeatedly check that they haven’t (overt behavioural response) 
or engage in some kind of mental ritual such as counting in predetermined groups of 
numbers a set number of times in order to neutralise the thought (covert behavioural 
response). Critically, in TAF the thought is experienced as being almost as bad as the
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event actually happening either through the ‘badness’ of the individual for having the 
thought in the first place or by the thought itself actually increasing the risk of the 
event happening Wells (1997) suggests that TAF reflects ‘a general purpose belief 
that intrusive thoughts reflect reality’ and that the mechanism of TAF ‘blurs important 
boundaries between internal (cognitive) and external events’ (p.240).
In OCD the differentiation between beliefs and behaviours that either conform or do 
not conform to scientific laws is striking in that it suggests distinct aetiological sub­
groupings of patients may exist under the umbrella of OCD. There has been no 
research to date that has investigated the determinants of the specific content of 
obsessions and compulsions in OCD and it is not currently known if specific beliefs or 
behaviours influence the course and severity of anxiety in OCD.
2:0 Superstition
2:1 Définition of superstition
Writing in the 1700’s Voltaire (cited in Jahoda, 1969) supposed that regarding 
something as a superstitious belief was to some extent relative to its social context and 
the degree to which the beliefs had gained credence among the population. In a similar 
vein, Marmor (1956) defined superstition as ‘beliefs or practices groundless in 
themselves and inconsistent with the degree of enlightenment reached by the 
community’. Other writers acknowledge the contribution of theology and religious 
practice in types of belief that could be evaluated as synonymous with superstitious 
thinking (Vyse, 1997; Jahoda, 1969; Reber 1995). One such example from theology 
was a belief that the left side of the body was unfavourable; omens appearing on the 
left side of the body were considered as warnings of evil (Reber, 1995). Modem 
psychological literature however tends to draw on empirical science to aid a more 
concise definition of superstition and one that is rooted in the assumption that the 
established laws of cause and effect are currently absolute and universal. Thus Keinan 
(2002) defines superstitious belief as belief in an ‘ability to achieve certain physical 
effects in a manner not governed by known principles of transmission of energy or 
information’. Ciborowski (1997) proposed that superstition invites a causal link
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between unrelated events. Such beliefs do not stand up to scientific examination but 
nevertheless are usually impervious to contradictoiy evidence (Zebb & Moore, 2003). 
Similarly, Tobacyk and Milford (1983) suggest that superstitious beliefs violate the 
principles of science, for example, beliefs that black cats bring good luck or that 
breaking a mirror invites misfortune (Dudley, 1998). Typically, and as these 
examples show, superstitious beliefs emphasise the invoking of good luck or the 
fending off of misfortune Vyse (1997).
2:2 Gender differences in superstitious beliefs
Research suggests that a possible gender difference may exist in superstitious thinking 
(Clarke, 1991; Irwin, 1993; Vyse , 1997; Dag, 1999). Zebb and Moore (2003) found 
that women had significantly higher scores than men on the Superstitiousness 
Questionnaire (Leonard et al, 1990). Similarly, Wolfradt (1997) reports significantly 
higher scores for women on the superstition subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale 
(PBS-R) (Tobacyk, 1991). Another study (Sica et al., 2002) using a non-clinical 
Italian sample of college students found that a higher proportion of women, compared 
to men, were classified as highly superstitious on a questionnaire listing common 
Italian superstitious beliefs such as ‘if you see a black cat are you worried about it?’. 
There were no differences in education or other demographic characteristics between 
the low and high superstitious groups suggesting that gender was a significant factor 
in level of superstitious belief.
The literature appears to reflect both positive and negative interpretations of the utility 
of superstitious beliefs that could be significant in terms of gender differences found 
in the studies above. A number of studies indicate that superstitious belief increases 
under conditions of stress (Gmelch & Felson, 1980; Keinan, 1994; Keinan, 2002; 
Malinowski, 1954; Padgett & Jorgenson, 1982; McCann & Stewin, 1984) and support 
the idea that individuals invoke superstitious thinking in response to uncertainty 
(Dudley, 1999). Superstitious thinking is also associated with social isolation 
(Tobacyk, 1985). It is possible that stress, uncertainty and social isolation are 
experienced differently in women than in men. Alternatively, Scheldt (1973) 
hypothesises that greater belief in superstition and the paranormal in women reflects 
historical social roles in that men were encouraged to take up scientific thinking 
whereas women were closely allied to religious issues. However this argument is
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weakened when one considers that positions of authority in the church have until very 
recently been monopolised by men. A more positive view of gender differences in 
superstitious belief and one that conflicts with the notion of superstitious belief as a 
response to stress is that women have a richer fantasy life than men which in turn 
lends itself to a greater belief in superstitious ideals (Blackmore, 1994) and may 
reflect the significance of personal experience over experimental (scientific) evidence 
(Randall & Desrosiers, 1980).
2:3 Superstitious beliefs in obsessive compulsive disorder
It has been suggested that for some individuals belief in superstitious ideals is 
tantamount to a worldview in which omnipotent external forces determine outcome 
and personal agency is limited (Tobacyk, Nagot & Miller, 1988). However, such 
beliefs are not exclusive to superstitious individuals (Zebb & Moore, 2003) and may 
commonly occur in obsessive-compulsive phenomena (Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, 
Neary & Brigidi, 2001; Frost et al., 1993; Freud, 1914; Salzman, 1968). Nevertheless 
the relationship between the two has not been extensively investigated (Vyse, 1997; 
Zebb & Moore, 2003). Indeed, there is scant research evidence to arrive at any 
unifying hypothesis with regard to how superstitious beliefs or tendencies may impact 
upon and mediate the co-existence, content and severity of more concrete obsessions 
and behaviours in the same individual. More importantly perhaps there has been no 
systematic study of superstitious ideals and the degree to which they may or may not 
be associated with anxiety in the OCD sufferer. Superstition itself is an elusive 
concept, one that has not traditionally been a favourite of psychologists, being difficult 
to measure accurately and viewed as a close relative of magical ideation (Amir et al.,
2001) that is more characteristic of some psychotic states. Its status as a worthy 
research topic is further hindered by its sometimes mythical origins and the value and 
interpretation of such collective beliefs by more traditional societies that have not, 
historically, been the subject of psychological investigation. However, many writers 
have hypothesised a relationship between superstition or ‘magical thinking’ and a 
reduction in anxiety in OCD (A. Freud, 1966; S. Freud, 1913/1966; Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980; Pitman, 1993).
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2:4 Aetiology of superstition
2:4:1 Perceptual illusion and bias in the development of superstitious beliefs 
One possible theoretical framework for understanding the evolution of superstitious 
beliefs focuses on the processes of learning and perception. Vyse (1997) suggests that 
the processes of contiguity and perception are highly significant in the development of 
superstitious beliefs and builds his argument upon the early experiments of the Gestalt 
school of psychology that began around 1910. The main protagonists of the Gestalt 
school, among them Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), discovered that the presentation 
and contiguity of stimuli can make us perceive something that is not really there. This 
phenomenon where the whole or the Gestalt is greater than or different to the sum of 
its constituents parts has at its core the principles of perceptual organisation. 
Wertheimer and his colleagues hypothesised that discrete and specific differences in 
the spatial configuration and temporal contiguity of stimuli influence our eventual 
perception of that stimuli. A classic demonstration of what Wertheimer termed the 
phi phenomenon is an experiment where two images are projected in succession onto 
a screen. The first image is projected as a line on the left hand side of the viewing area 
whilst the second image shows a line on the right side of the screen. Particular 
combinations of spacing and timing of the projected images will create an illusion 
whereby motion is perceived around and between the two lines even though the two 
lines themselves appear fixed in their left and right positions. Vyse (1997) describes a 
similar experiment with flashing dots and perceived motion between the fixed position 
of the dots and concludes that the critical time for the illusion to occur is a delay of 
one tenth to a quarter of a second between the presentation of images. Too long, and 
there is no movement, just two distinct images presented separately. Too short, and 
the two images appear simultaneously on the screen. The suggestion from these and 
similar studies is that the primary perceptual illusion has the potential to build in error 
and/or bias to information processing and that an eventual psychological analogue 
could possibly be a belief in superstition.
2:4:2 Schemas, bias and superstition
The laboratory studies of perceptual illusion discussed above illustrate how bias in the 
processing of stimuli can occur at a primary level and perhaps lead to inaccurate
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beliefs about the stimuli. It follows that the selection, processing and organisation of 
more complex information may be subject to the same or greater degree of error/bias 
and lead to inaccurate interpretation and retrieval. However, despite the cost of error, 
humans seem fundamentally driven to schematise in order to unify that which to them 
appears fragmented and inconsistent. Jahoda (1969) terms this as ‘active construction, 
not merely passive reception’ and suggests that superstitious beliefs may arise not just 
from the ‘loopholes....of first-hand sense impressions’ but as a result of constructions 
on both real and abstract information that we receive from others.
2:4:3 Bias in story-recall
The processes of recall and active construction of information are illustrated very well 
through studies of story- recall. Kashima (2000) found that subjects who were asked 
to memorise and then reproduce a short story through a chain of five or six people 
tended to reproduce familiar and gender stereotype-consistent information more 
accurately than that which was unfamiliar and stereotype-inconsistent as the number 
of reproductions increased. Examples of gender stereotype-consistent and gender 
stereotype-inconsistent propositions from the story used in the study were ‘This 
particular Saturday is extremely important because they are entertaining James’s 
employer’ and ‘Sarah tells James that she had so much fun drinking with the girls’ 
respectively. Interestingly^ gender stereotype-inconsistent information was 
reproduced as often and as accurately as gender stereotype-consistent information at 
the beginning of the chain but tailed off as the number of reproductions increased. 
This result supports an earlier study looking at cultural stereotypes by Allport and 
Postman (1947) who found that a story about a well-dressed black man standing next 
to a white man with a razor gradually transformed from a cultural stereotype- 
inconsistent story (for that particular historical period) into a stereotype-consistent 
story, resulting in the black man holding the razor in just under half of the 
reproduction chains. These studies give interesting insights about how gender and 
culture may privilege certain, and perhaps inaccurate, social constructions of memory, 
information and ideals, including superstitious thinking.
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3:0Anxiety
Charles Darwin writing in 1872 considered that anxiety was both a universal and 
adaptive process in man and other animals and could range from slight discomfort to 
extreme ‘terror’. Darwin described the observable physiological manifestations of fear 
as including increased perspiration, dilation of the pupils, trembling and changes to 
facial expression. Later, Freud (1924) referred to anxiety as being an unpleasant 
emotional state, as being ‘something felt’ that had physiological, experiential and 
behavioural aspects. Freud emphasised the adaptive frmction of anxiety as a 
necessary motivator to avoid or respond to danger and in this regard his Danger Signal 
Theory (1936) was in keeping with Darwin’s evolutionary conceptualisation. 
Importantly, Freud differentiated between experiencing anxiety in response to a real 
and objective threat and neurotic anxiety which he regarded as a disproportional 
emotional response to a perceived threat. Similarly, Basowitz, Persky, Korchin and 
Grinker (1955) conceptualised neurotic anxiety as ‘intense dread and 
foreboding... internally derived and unrelated to external threat’.
3:1 State and Trait anxiety
Cattell and Scheier (1963) used factor analytic techniques that consistently yielded 
two separate and independent conceptualisations of anxiety (Cattell, 1966). They 
found that loadings on the two factors largely differentiated between the fluctuating 
physiological arousal symptoms of anxiety and the more stable and enduring 
personality traits tapped by psychometric measures of anxiety, and labelled these state 
and trait anxiety respectively. Thus Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen and Marsh (1999) 
suggest that Catell’s (1963) research identified these two separate anxiety constructs 
as being ‘an unpleasant emotional state or condition that varies in intensity and 
fluctuates over time [state anxiety], and relatively stable individual differences in 
anxiety proneness as a personality trait [trait anxiety]’ (p.32).
State anxiety is most often described as an unpleasant conscious awareness of feelings 
of apprehension, tension and worry (Calvete, Estevez, Lopez de Arroyabe & Ruiz,
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2005) accompanied by increased arousal of the autonomic nervous system signalled 
through physiological-behavioural changes and verbal self-report (Spielberger, 1972; 
Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen & Marsh, 1999; Krause, 1961). In developing an 
operational measure of anxiety and building on Freud’s (1936) Danger Signal Theory 
and Catell’s definition of anxiety (Catell, 1966; Catell & Scheieer, 1958,1961,1963), 
Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene (1970) further defined state anxiety as a ‘temporal 
cross-section in the emotional stream-of-life of a person’ and emphasised its 
fluctuation in response to perceived threat.
Trait anxiety is invariably defined in terms of disposition and ‘anxiety proneness’, 
that is, the degree to which an individual may consistently ‘perceive a wide range of 
situations as dangerous or threatening, especially situations that involve....threats to 
self-esteem’ (Spielberger et al, 1999). This is consistent with Catell and Scheier’s 
(1963) original concept that trait anxiety reflected an individual’s ‘relatively 
permanent personality characteristics’ (Spielberger & Rickman, 1991). Although 
conceptually discrete from state anxiety, individuals high in trait anxiety tend to 
experience more frequent and raised levels of state anxiety than those low in trait 
anxiety (Spielberger, 1972; Spielberger et al, 1970; Spielberger et al, 1999). There is 
some evidence that levels of trait anxiety are associated with the quality of early 
parent-child interactions and negative evaluation by teachers or peers, the suggestion 
being that individuals with high trait anxiety tend to lack confidence and have low 
self-esteem (Purdue & Spielberger, 1966; Spielberger & Rickman, 1991).
3:2 Gender-related issues in anxiety
Epidemiological studies indicate that women tend to suffer higher rates of anxiety 
disorders compared to men (Kessler et al., 1994; Regier et al., 1988) although a more 
recent study (Carter et a l, 1999) found equal distribution across genders of anxiety 
disorder conditions comorbid with depression. An extensive literature search yielded 
only one German study that has investigated gender differences in anxiety conditions 
comorbid with OCD and subclinical OCD (Grabe et a l, 2001). This study revealed 
that women with OCD were more likely than men with OCD to suffer from comorbid 
social and specific phobias. The authors report that in most cases social and specific 
phobias pre-dated the onset of OCD symptoms and hypothesise a ‘predisposition for 
excessive anxiety responses’ in individuals with OCD. One potential avenue for such
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a predisposition has been investigated in an interesting study of children who have a 
parent with OCD (Black, Gaffiiey, Schlosser & Gabel, 2003). The study reported that 
they were ‘fearful, anxious children’ and that they were more likely than controls to 
be suffering from impaired social functioning, poor sleep and somatic complaints. 
Interestingly, children were more likely to have a diagnosis of broadly defined OCD at 
follow-up (2 years after baseline assessment of functioning) if their OCD parent was 
female. These results are consistent with an earlier study (Black, Noyes, Goldstein & 
Blum, 1992) that found OCD sufferers were more likely to have a mother with 
obsessional symptoms than a father with obsessional symptoms. Whilst there is no 
evidence to indicate whether male or female children experience or model anxiety 
differentially in relation to their same/opposite sex parent, the findings of these studies 
may have implications for the social and gendered construction of anxiety in children 
and the later development of anxiety-related disorders.
4:0 Locus of Control
4:1 Definition of Locus of Control
Locus of Control (LOC) refers to the beliefs that a person may have about the 
perceived influences that shape events and outcomes in their lives (Rotter, 1966; 
Levenson, 1981). The concept of Locus of Control (LOC) was originally conceived 
and defined by Rotter (1966) in his two-dimensional Internal-External Scale (I-E) to 
reflect belief about outcomes as being dependent either on one’s own behaviours 
(Internal) or subject to the actions of other people and/or events that were beyond the 
individual’s control (External). However, many authors have commented that beliefs 
or expectancies about the forces of control in one’s life are more complex than 
Rotter’s internal-external divide would suggest and should be considered as a multi­
dimensional construct (Berrenburg, 1987; Levenson, 1973; Harper, Oei, Mendalgio & 
Evans, 1990; Klockars & Vamum, 1975). Accordingly, Levenson (1973) separated 
Rotter’s (1966) single construct of externality into two separate scales of belief in 
Chance factors and belief in Powerful Others. Levenson (1981) asserts that the former 
reflects a belief that events in a person’s life are contingent upon the ‘basic unordered 
and random nature of the world’ whereas a belief in Powerful Others, although still
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externally oriented, is open to manipulation:
“a person... may perceive enough regularity in the actions
of such people [powerful others] as to believe that he or she can obtain
reinforcements through purposeful action”, (p. 15)
In a further reformulation of Rotter’s (1966) original LOC construct the Spheres of 
Control Scale (SCS) (Paulhus, 1983) reflects LOC again as a multi-dimensional 
construct comprising three potential spheres or dimensions that may operate in an 
individual’s life: Personal Efficacy, Interpersonal Control and Socio-political Control. 
According to Paulhus (1983) belief in Personal Efficacy refers to the non-social 
environment and the level of personal achievement that is attained whereas the 
construct of Interpersonal control reflects the degree to which the individual believes 
he/she has succeeded or failed in developing familial, social and intimate 
relationships. Paulhus (1983) suggests that the dimension of Socio-political Control 
reflects how much one may believe in the efficacy of the individual in fighting for 
causes and shaping policy in the systems that govern us. Paulhus (1983) points out 
that the SCS should be thought of as complementary to rather than superseding earlier 
LOC conceptualisations as it taps into areas of control not previously explored but at 
the same time does not deny the philosophical and theoretical reality of other 
constructs such as the Chance and Powerful others scales of Levenson’s (1973) multi­
dimensional LOC scale.
4:2 Gender differences in Locus of Control
Research has emphasised the assumption that individuals with an internal focus are 
characterised by positive health maintenance behaviours and increased psychological 
well-being relative to those individuals who tend towards external attributions 
(Wallhagen, Strawbridge, Kaplan & Cohen, 1994). Further, evidence suggests that 
women are more likely than men to attribute outcomes in their lives to external 
causes, that is to people or events that are not within their control (e.g. Deaux & 
Emswiller, 1974; Randall & Desrosiers, 1980; Zebb & Moore, 2003). Over forty years 
ago Janis and Field (1959) asserted that due to gender- role stereotypes, women were 
‘creatures of culture’ and less in control of ‘their own beliefs’.
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However, in Levenson’s (1972) initial validating study of the Multi-dimensional LOC 
scale, there were no differences between men and women in the degree to which they 
attributed outcomes in their lives as being either due to their own agency or chance 
factors, although men did have significantly higher scores on the Powerful Others 
scale than did women. This is puzzling but may reflect the social and demographic 
trends of the time in that men were still higher wage earners than women, and more 
often exposed to situations where powerful others in the workplace, such as managers, 
had the potential to considerably impact on their earning power and/or effect their 
chances of promotion. In contrast Mahler (1974) found that Japanese women had a 
greater perception than Japanese men that events in their lives were contingent on the 
actions of powerful others, and suggest that the concerns of women in such a 
traditionalist society as it was then may have been quite different to their western 
counterparts. Levenson (1981) suggests that Mahler’s findings were consistent with 
the poor status of women in Japanese society at that time. However, other studies 
from the 1970’s found no evidence to suggest a gender difference on these scales 
(Hall, Joesting & Woods, 1977; Zukotynski & Levenson, 1976 (cited in Levenson, 
1981)). More recently, the focus in research has shifted to the role that perception of 
diminished control may have for women in the etiology and maintenance of emotional 
illness (Barlow, 2002; Breslau, Davis, Andreski, Peterson & Schultz, 1997; Barlow, 
Chorpita, & Turovsk, 1996). Current conceptualisations (e.g. Barlow, 2002; Mineka, 
Watson & Clark, 1998; Zvolensky, Lejuez & Eifert, 2000) hypothesise that perceived 
limited control ‘represents a shared psychosocial diathesis for anxiety and depression’ 
(Brown, White, Forsyth & Barlow, 2004) and that women may be at greater risk than 
men of developing emotional distress because of their differential response to similar 
stressors (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001). However, research findings are equivocal. 
Heubeck, Tausch and Mayer, 1995 investigated perceived control over mental health 
in young unemployed males and females and found no gender differences in domains 
of control.
4:3 Methodological difficulties
There are not very many studies that have investigated the relationship between 
superstitious beliefs and locus of control (LOC) although those that have tend towards 
finding an externalised LOC for superstitious individuals (e.g. Peterson, 1978; Randall 
& Desrosier, 1980; Scheldt, 1973), Belief in superstitious ideals is also thought to be
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greater in females than it is in males (Zebb & Moore, 2003) and there is some support 
for this position in the findings of the studies below. However a definitive conclusion 
as to the relationship between superstition and LOC is problematic in that, as 
discussed above, the conceptualisation of LOC varies between studies either as a uni­
dimensional or multi-dimensional construct. Thus the studies themselves are fairly 
heterogenous through the use of different measuring scales in each, and more 
importantly, there are no studies that look at the impact of LOC and superstition 
exclusively in OCD subjects.
Although there is an absence of empirical research to refer to, it would seem that 
superstitious individuals rarely attribute their beliefs and the dire consequences thereof 
to people they don’t know and yet by their reckoning the external forces they believe 
in are all-powerful and non-discriminatoiy. The superstitious individual appears 
resigned and to have delegated responsibility for outcomes to an external force. The 
paradoxical nature of belief in a force that on the one hand can provide an illusion of 
control (Matute, 1994; 1995) but is not related to the efforts of the individual is 
puzzling. In contrast, religious beliefs also violate scientific laws but tend to focus on 
the contribution of the self in achieving personal growth and provide a degree of 
social support that appears to be lacking for the superstitious individual (Tobacyk, 
Nagot, Miller, 1988). The externality of superstition appears to imply that personal 
control or efficacy is problematic. In this regard, superstition and its relationship with 
personal and external control are reviewed below.
4:4 Research studies of superstition and LOC
Scheldt (1973) found that subjects who were classified as externals on the Rotter 
Internal-External Control Scale (Rotter, 1966) held more positive attitudes toward 
superstitious and supernatural beliefs than subjects classified as internals. However, 
regardless of internal-external status, female subjects tended toward holding these 
beliefs more than males. Schiedt (1973) urges caution however in interpretation of 
these results as sample size was small (n=43). Similarly, Peterson (1978), found that 
in a sample of Australian female trainee teachers (n=62) an external locus of control 
on Rotter’s scale was significantly positively correlated with self-oriented 
superstitious beliefs. A later study found a significant positive correlation between an 
external LOC (as measured by Rotter’s (1966) I-E scale) and belief in the supernatural
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(n=147) for both men and women (Randall and Desrosiers, 1980).
In further support of an external focus for superstitious individuals, Tobacyk, Nagot 
and Miller (1988) found a significant inverse correlation between the personal 
efficacy subscale of the SCS and the Superstition subscale of the Paranormal Belief 
Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) in a sample of college students (n=349). Finally, 
Zebb and Moore (2003) found a significant negative correlation (in females) between 
belief in superstitious behaviour and perception of anxiety control. This study used the 
Anxiety Control Questionnaire (AxCQ) (Rapee, Craske, Brown & Barlow, 1996) as it 
was conceptualised to embrace perception of ‘control over anxiety-related symptoms, 
reactions, and external problems and threats’ (p.289) rather than a more generalised 
LOC and as such represents a construct that straddles both LOC and related anxiety. 
The study showed that females both had higher levels of superstitious beliefs than 
males and evidenced stronger inverse associations between superstition and 
perception of control over anxiety related events. Zebb and Moore (2003) conclude 
that historically, societal factors may have contributed to a perceived reduction of 
control over the environment for females, prompting the development of superstitious 
beliefs in order to convey the illusion of control.
5:0 Superstition and perfectionism
Superstitious beliefs and perfectionist tendencies both in the OCD and non-clinical 
populations are of interest to this study because of the differential relationships they 
may hold with LOC and anxiety. On the one hand superstition is conceptualised as a 
powerful force external to the individual whilst perfectionism signals a high degree of 
personal responsibility and activity in affecting outcomes. They appear to oppose one 
another in the demands they make on the individual but are nonetheless both common 
to OCD. Since the time of Janet in the early 1900’s perfectionism has long been 
recognised as a core feature of OCD. Janet (cited in Pitman, 1987) suggested that 
feelings of uncertainty (arising in early childhood) about performing one’s actions in 
exactly the correct way triggered the need to develop perfection in perception and 
behaviour in order to reduce uncertainty and the accompanying anxiety. Mallinger
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(1984) emphasised that perfectionism in OCD functions as a means by which the 
sufferer can exert complete control over events that have the potential to harm them or 
others. Similarly, Frost and Di Bartolo (2002) propose that by adopting a perfectionist 
style mistakes are eliminated and thé risk of criticism is obviated, or at the very least 
significantly reduced.
Anxiety about the risk of not attaining perfection in a changing and sometimes 
uncertain environment may be continually present in some OCD sufferers which may 
make them ever more vigilant and vulnerable to developing cognitive distortions, and 
according to Frost (ibid), superstitions, so that at least an illusion of control is 
possible. However, evidence to link perfectionism with sub-sets of OCD type beliefs 
and behaviours including superstition is equivocal. Sica, Novaro and Sanavio (2002) 
found in a non-clinical sample of Italian students that those individuals who scored 
highly on superstitious beliefs also scored more highly on the cognitive domains of 
greater overestimation of threat, impaired mental control, contamination and worry, 
but were not characterised by perfectionist tendencies. Conversely, in a sample of 
female college students Frost et al (1993) found higher levels of perfectionism and 
checking but not cleaning in superstitious subjects than in those who were not 
superstitious.
Unfortunately there have been no further studies on non-clinical or clinical 
populations which could help to clarify and delineate the OCD sub-symptom clusters 
most commonly associated with superstitious beliefs. However the conflicting results 
of the two aforementioned studies are puzzling. Perfectionism and superstition per se 
appear to be naturally diametrically opposed in the sense that they present as two 
qualitatively different strategies in response to an uncontrollable environment. 
Perfectionism manifests as a very active and pervasive strategy in attempts to control, 
whereas superstition is often passive and is at best an inexact and risky strategy. As 
Sica et al (2002) point out, the expression of perfectionism is linked more to actual 
behaviours (Frost & Steketee, 1997) whereas superstition is more likely to be 
associated with obsessional thoughts. Frost et al (1993) found that superstitiousness 
had a stronger correlation with the Obsessive Thoughts Questionnaire (OTQ) 
(Bouvard, Mollard, Cottraux & Guerin, 1990) than with the Maudsley Obsessional- 
Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) (Rachman & Hodgson, 1977). Whereas the MOCI
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focuses on both obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviours, the OTQ focuses 
solely on unwanted obsessional thoughts and how distressing or disturbing they may 
be. The difference between the intense involvement of a perfectionist style compared 
to the passiveness of the superstitious individual may have respective implications for 
the level of anxiety experienced. This is discussed below.
5:1 Anxiety and perfectionism
Evidence suggests that certain aspects of perfectionism, most notably the social and 
maladaptive evaluation aspects correlate strongly with measures of trait anxiety. In a 
student cohort Deffenbacher, Zwemer, Whisman, Hill and Sloan (1986) found 
significant positive correlations for trait anxiety and the Demand for Approval and 
Personal Perfection item subscales of the Irrational Beliefs Test (Jones, 1969). 
Similarly, in subjects with a social phobia, Juster et al (1996) found a significant 
positive correlation between trait anxiety and two subscales of the Multi-dimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (MPS) (Frost et al, 1990) that measure evaluative concerns, that 
is. Concern Over Mistakes and Doubt About Actions. In another study, Flett, Hewitt 
and Dyck (1989) found a significant positive correlation between the Bums 
Perfectionism Scale (BPS) (Bums, 1980) and trait anxiety. There is some debate as to 
what dimensions of perfectionism are reflected in the items of the BPS but Frost and 
Di Bartolo conclude that as the BPS correlates strongly with items on the Concem 
Over Mistakes subscale of the MPS then it is more analogous to concems about the 
social evaluative aspects of perfectionism. More specific forms of anxiety have also 
demonstrated an association with perfectionism. Frost and Roberts (cited in Frost et 
al., 2002) found significant and positive correlations between scores on the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) (Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990) and items 
on the MPS subscales of Concem Over Mistakes, Personal Standards, Doubts About 
Actions and Parental Criticism.
The association with anxiety for these perfectionism scales is interesting in that the 
constructs being measured tap into areas of functioning such as responsibility and 
accuracy that are unlikely to concem superstitious individuals (Sica, Novara & 
Sanavio, 2002) who, from the studies already reviewed, tend to attribute responsibility 
for outcomes to extemal forces. The interesting question here is that as perfectionism 
represents such an active coping strategy and is consistently linked to high levels of
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trait anxiety and to other more specific forms of anxiety, to what extent would 
superstition, given that it is linked more to beliefs than behaviours and may be 
conceptualised as a somewhat inexact and passive strategy, mediate or attenuate trait 
anxiety? In OCD, if superstitious beliefs have become extreme and more or less 
globally present as a coping strategy in the believer, then it follows that in such 
individuals anxiety may not be experienced to the intense level of that typified by 
someone with more perfectionist tendencies who, at all costs, has to be actively 
engaged in the behaviours that reduce their anxiety and is therefore more or less 
continuously hyper-vigilant and physiologically aroused.
5:2 Superstition and anxiety
In line with the above hypothesis, Zebb and Moore (2003) doubt whether 
superstitiousness is a predisposing factor in the development of anxiety per se 
although they conclude ‘superstitiousness may be a predisposing factor for 
psychological distress in general, but not for anxiety in particular’ (p. 127). They found 
in a non-clinical sample that superstitious beliefs evidenced a strong association with 
symptoms of agoraphobia and social phobia as well as obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. They explain these results by suggesting that the common factor to both 
superstitious individuals and those experiencing psychological distress is a ‘perceived 
inability to control the environment around them’. Zebb and Moore suggest that it is 
perception of control or lack of it which mediates the development of various anxiety- 
disorder symptoms and thus may determine specific coping strategies. Their study 
shows some support for this position in that partial correlations (in males) attributed 
more unique variance to perception of control in obsessive-compulsive symptoms and 
other anxiety-disorder symptoms and general psychological distress than did 
superstitiousness. In females however, although perception of control again 
accounted for more unique variance in measures of general psychological distress 
(anxiety, depression & stress) and symptoms of agoraphobia and panic attacks, it was 
superstitiousness rather than perceived control that accounted for more unique 
variance in the checking factor on both the MOCI and PI obsessive-compulsive scales.
In the above study, at least in males, perception of control rather than superstition has 
a close, perhaps causal, relationship with the symptoms of anxiety disorders. But
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perhaps the most interesting finding of this study was the relationship it revealed 
between superstition, perception of control and general anxiety as measured by the 
anxiety subscale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). In males, once the effects of perception of control were partialled 
out there was no relationship at all between anxiety and superstition. In females 
although there was initially a significant positive correlation between the anxiety 
subscale of the DASS and superstition, the strength of the correlation was reduced 
after controlling for perception of control but was still stronger than the correlation for 
these variables in males. However, in both males and females there was a highly 
significant inverse correlation between anxiety on the DASS and perception of control 
when superstition was partialled out. Thus, when superstition was controlled for, 
individuals who perceived themselves as having little control over aversive events 
experienced higher levels of anxiety.
Conversely, Wolftadt (1997) found a positive correlation between trait anxiety and the 
superstition subscale of the revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS-R, Tobacyk, 1991) 
in a sample of German students (n=269). This was an interesting study in that it also 
yielded a significant correlation between superstition and the absorption/amnesia 
subscale of the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES, Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) 
which in turn showed a significant association with trait anxiety.
Finally, in terms of the relationship that anxiety has with superstition and LOC, 
Dudley (1999) found that exposure to an unsolvable word puzzle showed that 
individuals high on superstitious belief scored significantly higher than individuals 
low on superstitious belief on a subsequent task in which they were required to solve 
anagrams. It may be that attributing failure on the unsolvable task to internal rather 
than extemal factors yielded a resultant rise in anxiety and interfered with 
performance on the anagram task for the individuals who were low on superstitious 
beliefs. Unfortunately there was no anxiety measure included in the Dudley study but 
it is interesting to consider the possibility that in some instances, superstitious beliefs 
fimction to allow the individual to evade perception of failure thereby maintaining 
control and may mediate or even reduce the accompanying anxiety. This study 
suggests that in attributing control to extemal forces the superstitious individual can 
then function as optimally as is possible for them.
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6:0 Rationale for proposed research
The studies reviewed above show a complex relationship between anxiety, LOC and 
superstition in the non-clinical population and suggest a gender difference may exist 
in the strength of the relationship between superstition and anxiety and superstition 
and LOC (Zebb & Moore, 2003). Whilst OCD itself appears to be distributed equally 
across gender (Kamo & Golding, 1991; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2002), previous research suggests that women evidence 
higher levels of superstitious beliefs than men (Clark, 1991; Sica et al., 2002; Vyse, 
1997, Zebb & Moore, 2003) and are more likely than men to attribute event outcomes 
to extemal causes that are not within their control (Deaux & Emswiller, 1973; Randall 
& Desrosiers, 1980; Zebb & Moore, 2003). There are no studies as yet that have 
investigated if women with OCD are more anxious than men with OCD but the higher 
rate of comorbid anxiety disorders in females found by Grabe et al (2001) suggests 
that gender may be a significant factor.
The theoretical review and research studies outlined in the introduction also suggest 
that superstitious beliefs have a central role in the attempt to retain control over 
anticipated threat or uncertainty in the environment (Keinan, 2002; Dudley, 1999; 
Keinan, 1994; Zebb & Moore, 2003; Malinowski, 1954). It may be that the use and 
function of those beliefs in reducing anxiety becomes even more critical in OCD 
(Freud, 1913/1966; Pitman, 1987; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Pitman, 1993). If a 
person perceives or leams through past experience that outcomes are not contingent 
upon their response, they may adopt superstitious beliefs (unconsciously or 
consciously) as a global and dominant way of coping in attempts to attain an illusion 
of control over events. Such beliefs may assume huge importance as an anxiety 
reducing strategy within OCD and may reflect the termination, early on in 
development, of any logical attempts to deconstruct cause and effect. To date, these 
constructs have not been studied extensively, either in non-clinical or OCD 
populations.
Zebb & Moore (2003) investigated superstition and anxiety in a non-clinical 
population and found that these constructs were not specifically associated with one
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another. Although there is no empirical evidence to suggest that superstition and 
anxiety function the same or differently in OCD than in non-clinical populations, 
OCD symptomatology is thought to present on a continuum (Rachman & Hodgson, 
1980; Frost et al., 1993; Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Sher, Frost & Otto, 1983; 
Stemberger & Bums, 1990) and it is therefore reasonable to suggest that anxiety and 
superstition might operate in similar ways, possibly to varying degrees, in low and 
high obsessionality. Alternatively, superstition may function as a coping mechanism 
in reducing anxiety (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Freud, 1913/1966). In addition, 
previous research suggests that superstitious individuals may have an externally 
oriented LOC (Scheldt, 1973; Peterson, 1978; Randall & Desrosiers, 1980; Tobacyk, 
Nagot & Miller, 1988; Zebb & Moore, 2003). Accordingly, the current study was an 
attempt to further investigate the relationships between superstition, anxiety and LOC 
in an obsessional population, and to examine whether these relationships manifest 
differentially according to gender.
6:1 Hypotheses
Based on the reviewed literature the specific hypotheses for the current study were:-
1 Building on previous theory and research (Keinan, 2002; Freud, 
1913/1966; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Zebb & Moore, 2003) 
superstition may function in OCD as a global way of coping with 
uncertainty and reducing anxiety such that there will be an inverse 
association between superstitious beliefs and trait anxiety.
2 In an obsessional population, and in accordance with previous research 
(e.g. Tobacyk, Nagot & Miller, 1988; Zebb & Moore, 2003) there will 
be a positive relationship between superstition and an extemal LOC.
3. An additional exploratory hypothesis to the study was that if the
hypothesised relationships above (1 & 2) had validity, then an 
extemal LOC by virtue of its association with superstitious beliefs 
would show a negative association with trait anxiety.
In addition and in accordance with past research (Clark, 1991; Sica et al., 2002; Zebb
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& Moore, 2003) that has found superstition, anxiety and LOC to vaiy by gender, it 
was intended that all results would be explored in terms of possible gender 
differences.
7:0 Method
7:1 Design
A correlational design was used in the study in order to explore the hypothesised 
relationships between the constructs of superstition, trait anxiety and LOC in 
obsessional men and women and also to make comparisons with the findings from 
previous research that have used this design.
7:2 Ethical approval
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Central and South Bristol 
Research Ethics Committee and from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee (see 
appendix 1).
7:3 Procedure
All volunteers were recruited from charitable organisations that exist to support 
individuals with OCD. Advertisements (please see appendix 2 for a copy) for 
participants were placed on the websites of those OCD organisations and also in 
Christmas cards that were sent out to members by the organisations themselves. 
Interested individuals responded to the advertisement for volunteer participants by 
contacting the researcher either by telephone, letter or email. These individuals were 
then sent an information pack about the study plus a set of questionnaires. Please see 
appendix 3 for a copy of the information pack. The questionnaires are listed separately 
below.
A power analysis indicated that a sample size of 128 would be adequate in terms of a 
reliable and valid analysis of the data. However, approximately 190 potential 
participants initially contacted the researcher, resulting in 165 sets of questionnaires 
being sent out. Ninety-two of these were completed and returned to the researcher in
239
© Vanessa Biyant 2005
the freepost envelope provided. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Please see appendix 4 for a copy of the proposal submitted to the ethics committees.
7:4 Participants
A  total of 92 people took part in the study, 35 men and 57 women. The sample had a 
mean age of 40.44 years (s.d 13.40) with a range of 60 years, the youngest participant 
being eighteen and the oldest seventy eight.
The mean age of onset of OCD for the participants was 16.36 years (s.d. 9.71, median 
age =14, n=85). The mean number of years the participants had suffered from OCD 
was 25.01 years (s.d. 15.47, median =24, n=85).
In an additional form (see appendix 5) participants were asked if they had received a 
formal diagnosis of OCD either from a medical or psychological practitioner. Only 
eighty four participants responded to this question, seventy three said yes and eleven 
said no. Although it would have been more satisfactory to be completely sure of a 
diagnosis of OCD for all participants it was considered that some of the people taking 
part may have their own reasons for not wanting to pursue a diagnosis or were 
unaware that they could access help and support through a diagnosis from health 
professionals, especially those individuals who had only recently recognised the 
extent of their difficulties.
7:5 Questionnaire measures
7:5:1 Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988).
The Padua Inventory (PI) (see appendix 6) consists of 60 statements that reflect 
obsessional thoughts and behaviours. Factor analyses both during and post­
development suggest four component scales of Impaired Control Over Mental 
Activities, Becoming Contaminated, Checking Behaviours, and Urges and Worries of 
Losing Control over Motor Behaviours (Sanavio, 1988). Examples of questions from 
these scales respectively are; T find it difficult to make decisions, even about 
important matters’; T feel my hands are dirty when I touch money’; T have to do 
things several times before I think they are properly done’; T sometimes feel the need 
to break or damage things for no reason’. Stemberger & Bums, (1990) retained 
Sanavio’s (1988) four factor solution and have shown that the PI can transfer
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successfully from a romanic culture to an anglo-american one.
The PI has good internal consistency (coefficient a = .94) and good convergent and 
divergent validity in that it has a significant correlation (r = .66) with the obsessional 
subscale of the Symptom Checklist-90 revised (SCL-90) but not with the other SCL- 
90 subscales. The subscales of the PI also show significantly stronger correlations 
with the corresponding subscales of the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
(MOCI), (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977), for example, .68 for the checking subscales 
(Stemberger & Bums, 1990), than with the noncorresponding subscales. Sanavio 
(1988) achieved a test-retest correlation of .78 for men and .83 for women. Sanavio 
(1988) found that PI scores discriminate between OCD and ‘neurotic’ patients and 
suggest therefore that the PI can be used with both normal and clinical populations.
7:5:2 Obsessive Belief Questionnaire -  44 item version (OBQ-44)
(Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group(OCCWG), in press).
The OBQ-44 is a recently developed measure of obsessions and compulsions and was 
obtained by the author through personal communication with the OCCWG.
The OBQ-44 (see appendix 7) was originally comprised of 87 theoretically derived 
items that were considered to reflect obsessive thinking but in response to its length 
and high intercorrelations among some of the subscale items the OCCWG conducted 
factor analyses of the OBQ which yielded a 44-item scale, comprised of three factors 
subsequently labelled as Responsibility/Threat Estimation, Perfectionism/Certainty 
and Importance/Control of Thoughts. Examples of items from the three respective 
subscales are ‘I often think things around me are unsafe’, ‘even minor mistakes mean 
a job is not complete’ and ‘for me, having bad urges is as bad as actually carrying 
them out’. Items are scored on a 7-point Likert-type rating scale from ‘disagree very 
much (1) to agree very much (7).
Initial findings for the OBQ-44 show that Internal consistency is high in an OCD 
sample with Cronbach alpha coefficients of .93 for Responsibility/Threat Estimation, 
.93 for Perfectionism/Certainty, .89 for Importance/Control of Thoughts and .95 for 
the total score. The subscales of the OBQ-44 show good convergent validity with the 
subscales of the PI (Washington State University revision. Bums, Keeortge, Formea &
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Stemberger, 1996) (OCCWG, ibid). A recent study (Wood, Tolin & Abramowitz, 
2004) supports the three factor stmcture of the OBQ-44.
7:5:3 Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R, Foa, Huppert, Leiberg, 
Langner, Kichic, Hajcak & Salkovskis, 2002).
The OCI-R (see appendix 8) is an eighteen-item measure of obsessional beliefs and 
behaviours that has demonstrated its usefulness in differentiating between obsessional 
patients as distinct from patients with other anxiety disorders or non-anxious controls 
(Foa et al., 2002). Responses to the items on the OCI-R are scored on a five point 
Likert-type scale, signalling level of agreement, and range from 0 (not at all) to 4 
(extremely).
A principal components analysis yielded a six-factor stmcture of Washing, Obsessing, 
Hoarding, Ordering, Checking and Neutralising (Foa et al., 2002). An example from 
each of these subscales consecutively is as follows: T sometimes have to wash or 
clean myself simply because I feel contaminated’; ‘I find it difficult to control my own 
thoughts’; T collect things I don’t need’; T need things to be arranged in a particular 
order’; T repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them 
off; T feel compelled to count while I am doing things’.
With obsessional subjects the OCI-R has been shown to demonstrate good intemal 
consistency with a coefficient value of .81 for the total score and coefficients ranging 
in value from .82 to .90 for the six subscales. Similarly, excellent test-retest reliability 
has been found for the total and subscale scores of the OCI-R with spearman’s 
coefficient values ranging from .74 to .91 (Foa et al., 2002).
The OCI-R also shows good convergent validity with the original 42-item OCI (Foa, 
Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles & Amir, 1998% with a coefficient for total scores of .98, and 
moderate to high correlations with other measures of obsessional symptoms ranging 
from .53 with the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al., 1989) to 
. 85 with thé MOCI (Foa et al., 2002).
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7:5:4 Lucky Beliefs Questionnaire (Frost et al, 1993)
The Lucky Beliefs Questionnaire (LBQ) is a 30-item scale scored on a five point 
Likert scale that measures superstitious beliefs such as ‘fortune tellers can predict the 
future’ and ‘picking up a penny brings good luck’. Items were generated from an 
earlier measure of superstition (see below) developed by Leonard, Goldberger, 
Rapport, Cheslow and Swedo (1990) and from the Encyclopedia of Superstitions 
(Radford & Radford, 1969). The LBQ has strong intemal consistency (a = .95) (Frost 
et al, 1993). A copy of the LBQ can be found in appendix 9.
The companion Lucky Behaviours Questionnaire (LbehQ) (Frost et al, 1993) was not 
used in this study as Frost (ibid) suggested that the high intercorrelation between the 
LBQ and the LbehQ and an identical pattern of correlations with obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms indicated a lack of differentiation.
7:5:5 Superstition Questionnaire
(Leonard, Goldberger, Rapoport, Cheslow, Swedo, 1990).
The Superstition Questionnaire (SQ) was originally developed by Leonard et al (1990) 
and was modified by Zebb and Moore (2003), which is the version used in this study. 
They changed the original items from questions to statements so that for example ‘Do 
you believe that the number 13 is unlucky?’ becomes ‘I believe that the number 13 is 
unlucky’. This change facilitated the use of a six point scale from Strongly disagree 
(0) to Strongly agree (5).
The modified questionnaire has eighteen statements that reflect common superstitions 
such as ‘I believe that finding a four leaf clover brings good luck’ or ‘I believe that 
fortune tellers can predict the future’. Although there are no formal validity or 
reliability data available, the original use of the questionnaire by Leonard et al (1990) 
yielded an inter-rater reliability correlation of .94.
Both the LBQ and the SQ were used in this study as although they have items 
common to both scales they also differ in some of their content. The LBQ has some 
additional items not covered in the SQ such as ‘the seventh child in a family is 
unlucky’ whilst the SQ incorporates behaviours as well as beliefs on some of the items 
such as ‘I believe walking under ladders will bring bad luck’ and ‘I avoid walking
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under ladders’. A copy of the SQ can be found in appendix 10.
7:5:6 Multi-dimensional Locus of Control questionnaire (Levenson, 1972).
This locus of control (LOC) scale (see appendix 11) was derived from Rotter’s (1966) 
original conceptualisation of the internal-external control construct where a person 
believes events are either contingent upon one’s own agency or are attributable to 
forces extemal to the self that is, powerful others, fate or chance. Levenson developed 
the LOC scale to take account of a proposed differentiation between belief in powerful 
others and the random forces of fate and chance, both having been subsumed into one 
factor in Rotter’s original extemal constmct. Levenson constmcted three subscales 
scored on a 6-point Likert scale from strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree (+3): 
belief in personal control (Intemal scale), belief in chance (Chance scale) and belief in 
powerful others (Powerful Others Scale). Examples of respective items from these 
scales are ‘whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability’, ‘to a 
great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings’ and ‘getting what I want 
requires pleasing those people above me’.
Intemal consistency is relatively high. Levenson (1974) found Kuder-Richardson 
reliabilities of .64 (intemal scale), .78 (chance scale) and .77 (powerful others scale). 
Test-retest reliability ranges between .6 and .79 (Levenson, 1973 ) over one week and 
between .62 and .73 over a 7 week interval (Lee, 1976). Factor analyses evidenced the 
three distinct dimensions of personal, powerful others and chance control (Levenson, 
1974).
7:5:7State-Trait Anxiety Inventory -  Form Y (STAI-Y) (Spielberger, 1983)
The STAI-Y measures state and trait anxiety separately on two 20-item self-report 
scales. Only the trait anxiety scale was used in this study (see appendix 12). Trait 
anxiety refers to the enduring characteristics of a person’s anxiety-proneness and how 
threatening they perceive stressful situations to be (Spielberger, 1983). The scale asks 
how subjects generally feel and responses are rated on a four point scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 4 (very much so). The reader is referred to Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen and 
Marsh (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the theoretical and conceptual 
background of Trait anxiety.
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Eleven of the trait anxiety scale’s items are worded such that a higher score indicates 
greater anxiety and nine items are worded in the opposite direction so that a high score 
indicates low anxiety. These latter items are reverse scored when calculating the total 
score. Examples of such items are ‘some unimportant thought runs through my mind 
and bothers me’ and ‘I am calm, cool and collected’.
Test-retest coefficients for the trait anxiety scale are reported from .73 to .86 
(Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen, Marsh, 1999). Spielberger et al (1999) report high 
intemal consistency of the scale with independent samples of military recmits, adults 
and students achieving a median coefficient of .90 (Cronbach’s alpha). They also 
found good concurrent validity with correlations ranging from .73 to .85 between the 
trait anxiety scale and other measures of trait anxiety.
Higher mean scores for neuropsychiatrie patients and lower scores for personality 
disordered patients on the anxiety scale provide evidence of construct and 
discriminant validity (Spielberger, 1983).
7:5:8 Beck Depression Inventory -  II (BDI-II, Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996)
The BDI-II is a self-report measure of depressive symptoms in adolescents and adults 
that was specifically designed to reflect DSM-IV criteria for diagnosis of the 
depressive disorders (Beck, Steer, Ball & Ranieri, 1996). The BDI-II is a widely used 
established and reliable tool for use in clinical and normal populations. One-week test- 
retest reliability has been found as high as .93 in depressed outpatients (Beck et al., 
1996). Beck et al, (ibid) report convergent validity with the Hamilton Psychiatric 
Rating Scale (Riskind, Beck, Brown & Steer, 1987) as r =.71, n=87, and discriminant 
validity with the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety (Riskind et al., 1987) as r = 47, n 
= 87,(Beck et al, 1996).
The BDI-n has 21 items that reflect the cognitive, affective and psychomotor aspects 
of depression. Each item has four statements about one of those components that 
reflect differing degrees of severity. For example, item three is labelled Past Failure 
and has four possible responses: ‘I do not feel like a failure’ (0); ‘I have failed more 
than I should have’ (1); ‘As I look back I see a lot of failures’ (2); ‘I feel I am a total 
failure as a person’ (3). The total score on the BDI-II ranges between 0 and 63.
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A score of less than 10 on the BDI-II is classified as not depressed, whilst a score 
between 10 and 19 signals mild depression. Scores between 20-25 indicate moderate 
depression and a score of 26 or over indicates severe depression. A copy of the BDI-II 
can be found in appendix 13.
8:0 Results
Before testing the specific and exploratory hypotheses for the study, descriptive 
statistics for the whole sample data and for men and women separately are presented 
in section 8:1. The extent to which the sample is representative of the obsessional 
population is determined through a comparison with non-clinical sample data as there 
is unfortunately an absence of established clinical cut-off scores on the obsessional 
measures for a diagnosis of OCD (except for the OCI-R, see section 8:1 below). A 
preliminary exploration of the differences in men and women’s scores on measures of 
superstition, LOC, anxiety and depression is effected through the application of 
ANOVA’s to the data.
Throughout sections 8:2 to 8:5 each hypothesis is examined in the order presented in 
the introduction. Initially, in order to examine the validity of the data, scatterplots are 
conducted between the pairs of variables specified in the hypotheses for the study: 
superstition with trait anxiety; superstition with LOC and LOC with trait anxiety. 
Following Zebb and Moore (2003) a series of correlations and partial correlations are 
then applied to the data in order to facilitate comparison with their findings in regard 
to the relationship between superstition and anxiety, and also to examine the further 
hypotheses specific to this study together with any gender differences that may exist.
8:1 Descriptive statistics 
8:1:2 Testing data for normality
Before conducting the analysis, data were screened to check for normality. Taking the 
data as a whole, scores on measures of superstition, LOC, anxiety and depression were 
all normally distributed. Of the obsessional measures the Contamination and Control
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over Motor Behaviours subscales of the PI together with the Washing, Obsessing, 
Hoarding and Neutralising subscales of the OCI-R were not normally distributed, as 
measured by the Kolmogorov-Smimov test (K-S). However, when the sample was 
split into male and female groups only the Urges and Worries of Losing Control Over 
Motor Behaviours (UWLMC) subscale of the PI was positively skewed for males 
whilst for females only the four subscales of the OCI-R (washing, obsessing, hoarding 
and neutralising) were skewed. However, it was not attempted to statistically 
transform these skewed sub-scales scores as they were required only for descriptive 
purposes in determining whether levels of obsessionality in this sample were higher 
than that of non-clinical samples.
8:1:3 Descriptive statistics for obsessional measures
Table la shows descriptive statistics for obsessional measures for the whole sample 
and for males and females separately. The sample as a whole evidenced higher mean 
scores on obsessional measures than those obtained from non-clinical populations 
with the exception of the hoarding subscale of the OCI-R. This is consistent with Foa 
et al (2002) who found that the hoarding subscale did not differentiate OCD subjects 
from non-anxious controls. However, the OCI-R is one of the few measures that 
provides cut-off scores for a diagnosis of OCD. Foa et al (2002) recommend a total 
score of 21 or above on the OCI-R as an indication of the presence of OCD and an 
optimal cut-off score of 4 on the obsessing subscale (sensitivity: 74.4%; specificity: 
76.1%). Results in table 1 overleaf show that scores were in excess of those 
recommended by Foa et al (ibid) and therefore suggest that the sample was 
representative of an OCD population.
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Table la. Descriptive statistics for obsessional measures
Measure Total sample
Obsessive-compulsive Mean s.d 
Measures
PI
Males
Mean s.d
Females Scores from non- 
clinical samples*
Mean s.d Mean s.d
Impaired control of 
mental activity.
31.35 14.71 27.49 12.28 33.72 15.66 13.35 9.51
Becoming contaminated. 14.87 13.73 14.66 14.78 15.00 13.17 8.26 5.66
Checking behaviours. 13.75 8.78 13.00 8.03 14.21 9.24 6.59 5.61
Urges and worries of losing 
control over motor behaviours.
5.03 4.80 5.26 5.50 4.89 4.36 3.00 3.76
Total PI score 82.02 37.64 77.29 32.24 84.93 37.92 41.33 25.77
OBQ-44
Responsibility/ 
threat estimation.
73.55 24.26 65.41 22.26 78.40 24.29 34.2 13.00
Perfectionism/certainty. 79.33 21.80 72.74 22.95 83.26 20.28 41.4 18.10
Importance/ 
control of thoughts.
47.91 20.75 41.38 19.52 51.81 20.64 20.5 9.30
Total OBQ-44 score 200.91 56.52 179.91 52.74 213.44 55.38 96.0 35.1
OCI-R
Washing. 4.23 4.41 3.86 4.07 4.46 4.63 2.41 2.50
Obsessing. 7.82 3.69 7.06 3.46 8.28 3.79 2.86 2.72
Hoarding. 4.11 4.04 3.63 2.76 4.40 4.65 4.41 2.67
Ordering. 6.10 4.24 5.83 4.15 6.26 4.33 4.40 3.03
Checking. 5.85 4.04 5.83 3.73 5.86 4.25 2.91 2.56
Neutralising. 4.37 4.10 4.60 4.22 4.23 4.06 1.82 2.20
Total OCI-R score 32,37 15.23 30.83 13.55 33.32 16.23 18.82 11.10
source of non-clinical sample scores:
OBQ-44: Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (in Press) n= 86 
PI: Stemberger & Bums (1990) n= 678 
OCI-R: Foa et al (2002) n=477
8:1:4 Descriptive statistics for superstition, anxiety, LOC and depression 
Table lb shows the mean scores and standard deviations for the total sample and for 
men and women separately on measures of superstition, LOC, Trait Anxiety and 
depression. Results indicate that the participants were suffering from depression, with 
the mean score for men being in the Mildly Depressed range and for women in the 
Severely Depressed range.
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In order to test for gender differences a series of ANOVAs were applied to these 
measures. Levene’s test of equality of error variance was non-significant for each of 
the ANOVA’s. F values and probability levels are also given in table lb. Results 
show that women had significantly higher mean scores than men on the SQ, LBQ and 
the BDI-n.
Table lb. Descriptive statistics for measures of superstition. 
LOC, trait aniietv and depression
Superstitiousness
measures
LBQ
SQ
Total
Sample
Mean s.d.
66.48 (24.71) 
32.36 {22.02)
males
Mean s.d
58.97 (22.95) 
26.06 {21.30)
females
Mean s.d
F Probability
71.09 (24.82) 
36.23(27.74)
5.47
4.82
.022*
.031*
LOC
hitemality. 7.67 (6.57) 6.73 (6.64) 8.24 (6.53) 1.087 .300
Powerful others. -.15 (10.76) 1.94 (10.40) -1.43 (10.87) 2.028 .158
Chance. -.97 (9.30) -.61 (9.73) -1.19 (9.12) .078 .780
Trait Anxiety 59.18 (11.22) 56.37 (9.72) 60.91 (11.80) 3.65 .059
BDI-1 23.54 (14.48) 19.32 (13.20) 26.05 (14.74) 4.79 .031*
*P<0.05
Total possible scores on questionnaires; LBQ: 150; SQ: 90; LOC: plus or minus 24 for each scale;
Trait anxiety: 80; BDI-II: 63.
8:2 Bi-variate correlational analysis -  total sample
8:2:1 Preliminary scatterplots of superstition, Trait anxiety and LOC
Each of the pairs of variables specified in the hypotheses (p. 22) were entered into
scatterplots in order to check for any outlying scores that could effect the overall trend
of the data. Because there were two measures of superstition and two extemal LOC
constmcts (chance and powerful others) these are shown as overlay scatterplots with
anxiety and with each other. The scatterplots are shown in figures 1-4 and indicate
that there are no obvious outliers in the data. Owing to listwise deletion for missing
LOC data the sample size is reduced to 87 in the correlational analysis.
249
© Vanessa Bryant 2005
Figure 1. Overlay scatterplot of trait anxiety total scores with 
total scores on the SQ and LBQ for the total sample. 
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Figure 2. Overlay scatterplot of SQ total scores with LOC Chance/ 
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Figure 3. Overlay scatterplot of LBQ total scores
with LOC Chance/powerfuI others total scores 
for total sample. N= 87
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Bi-variate correlations between measures of superstition. Trait anxiety and LOC were 
carried out on the total sample data as shown in table 2a. In addition and in order to 
justify the inclusion of data from individuals without a formal diagnosis of CCD a 
separate analysis was carried out which excluded responses from non-diagnosed 
individuals (table 2b). A comparison of the results show that significant correlations 
attained between variables for diagnosed individuals are retained when the analysis 
includes the whole sample data with the exception of the correlations between the 
BDI-II/LBQ, Powerful Others/superstiousness and Trait anxiety/Chance. However, 
reductions in the strength of these relationships are so slight as to be negligible. 
These results indicate that associations between variables are not significantly altered 
when data from non-diagnosed individuals are included and justify the following 
analysis of results using data from the whole sample. This topic is addressed further 
in the discussion.
Table 2a. Bi-variate correlations between superstition. LOC. 
anxiety and depression for the total sample. n=87
Measure S/S LEO Trait anx. LOC
SUPERSTITION
Superstitiousness
LBQ
LOC
Intemality 
Powerful others 
Chance
Trait anxiety
BDI-n
.906** .026 
.906** .093
.022 .095 -.016
.207 .290* .316**
.410** .478** .159
Int P.other Chance 
-.022 .207 .410**
.095 .290* .478**
.029 .025
.029 .501**
-.025 .501**
.026 .093 -.016 .316** .159
.134 .223 .811** .055 .280** .219*
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 2b Bi-variate correlations between superstition,
LOC, anxiety and depression for varticipants who 
have been formally diasnosed with PCD, n= 73
Measure S/S LEG Trait anx. LOC
Int. P.other Chance
SUPERSTITION
Superstitiousness - .901** .113 -.043 .259* .488**
LBQ .901** - .220 .076 .296* .539**
LOC
Intemahty -.043 .076 -.014 - -.027 .003
Powerful Others .259* .296* .329** -.027 - .559**
Chance .488** .539** .251* .003 .559** -
Trait Anxiety .113 .220 - -.014 .329** .251*
BDI-II .152 .269* .803** .040 .301* .264*
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*Coirelation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
8:2:2 The relationship between superstition and Trait anxiety -  hypothesis 1.
Table 2a shows the results for bi-variate correlations carried out on the total sample 
data between measures of superstition. Trait anxiety, LOC and depression. Results 
show that contrary to the hypothesis for this study there was no association between 
measures of superstition and trait anxiety for the total sample data.
8:2:3 The relationship between superstition and an external LOC 
(Chance and Powerful Others) - hypothesis 2
Table 2 shows there were particularly significant positive correlations between both 
measures of superstition, (the SQ and the LBQ) with LOC Chance (Pearson’s r = .410 
and .478 respectively, p  < .01). There was also a significant positive correlation 
between the LBQ and LOC Powerful Others (r = .290p  < .01).
As might be expected results, show a significant positive correlation between LOC 
Powerful Others and LOC Chance ( Pearson’s r = .501, .01).
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8:2:4 The relationship between an external LOC
(Chance and Powerful Others) and Trait anxiety -  hypothesis 3.
Contrary to the proposed exploratory hypothesis there was a significant positive 
correlation between LOC Powerful Others and Trait anxiety ( r = .316, j!? < .01). 
There was no association at all between LOC Chance and Trait anxiety.
8:2:5 Effects of depression
Table 2 shows a significant positive correlation between Depression and Trait anxiety, 
indicating a very strong relationship (r = .811 p  < .01), and accounting for 65.8% of 
the variance in these two variables. The effects of depression on the relationships of 
the other variables is addressed further in section 8:4.
8:3 Further analyses
8:3:1 Bi-variate correlations by gender
Consistent with previous research (Wolfradt, 1997; Sica et al., 2002; Zebb & Moore,
2003) the preliminary analysis reported in section 8:1 indicated that women had 
significantly higher levels of superstitious belief than men. Consequently, bi-variate 
correlations between the LBQ, SQ, LOC and Trait anxiety were calculated separately 
by gender (see table 3).
8:3:2 Superstition and Trait anxiety — hypothesis 1
As expected from the total sample correlations, results in table 3 indicate there was no 
relationship between both the LBQ and the SQ with trait anxiety for men or women.
8:3:3 Superstition and an external LOC (Chance and Powerful Others) -  
hypothesis 2
The gender analysis showed that the relationship between superstition (LBQ) and 
LOC chance is even stronger for the split sample with a coefficient of .508 (p= .01) 
for females and .494 for males (p=,01). Scores on the LBQ and LOC Powerful 
Others were more significantly correlated for men ( .452 p< .01) than they were for 
women (.284 p<.05).
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Table 3. Bi-variate correlations between measures of superstition, 
LOC, Trait anxiety and depression bv gender.
Measure
SUPERSTITION
SQ
LBQ
LOC
Intemality 
Powerful others 
Chance
Trait anxiety 
BDI-II
S/S LBQ Trait anx. BDI-n
m f  tn f  rn f  m f
.924**.891** .066 -.058 .307 -.012 
.924**891** .008 .081 .288 .148
.095 -.137 .179 .005 -.314 .107 -.106 .110
.354*.190 .452**.284* .285 .382** .274 .345*
.473**.399** .494**.508** .149 .177 .235 .228
.066 -.058 .008 .081 .679**.849**
.307 -.012 .288 .148 .679** .849**
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) m= male; f=  female
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
8:3:4 External LOC (Chance and Powerful Others) 
and Trait anxiety -  hypothesis 3
As expected from the total sample correlations, there was no correlation between LOC 
Chance and Trait anxiety in the gender analysis. However, the gender analysis 
strengthened the significant positive correlation between LOC Powerful Others and 
Trait anxiety in that it increased from .316 for the total sample to .382 for women 
(Pearson’s r = .382 p< .01). There was no significant correlation between LOC 
Powerful Others and Trait anxiety for men.
8:3:5 Depression
The highly significant positive correlation between depression and Trait anxiety 
obtained for the total sample was changed by the gender analysis with the significant 
correlation slightly reduced for males( r=.679 p= .01) and slightly increased for 
females (r=.849,/>=.9i). Similarly, the strength of the significant positive correlation 
between depression and LOC Powerfiil Others that had been found in the total sample 
showed increased for women (r= .345 p= .05) and decreased for men (r = .274).
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8:4 Partial Correlations by gender
Controlling, for depression
The results of the partial correlations shown in table 3 on page 259 suggest a 
relationship between superstitiousness and LOC Chance, superstitiousness and LOC 
Powerful Others, LOC Powerful Others and Trait anxiety (for women only), 
depression and Trait anxiety and lastly depression and LOC Powerful Others. The 
results also suggest that there is no relationship of any substance between 
superstitiousness and anxiety.
It was clear from the size of the correlation between depression and Trait anxiety that 
they accounted for a large amount of the variance in each other. In addition it 
indicated that the impact of depression on Trait anxiety may have obscured the 
relationship that Trait anxiety had with superstition and LOC. To help clarify these 
relationships and the contribution of unique variance accounted for by each of these 
variables, a series of partial correlations, controlling for depression, were carried out 
on the data (see table 4). Partial correlations control for the effects of a third variable 
on both of the other two variables that are put into the analysis (Field, 2000).
Table 4. Partial correlations between trait anxiety, measures of superstition 
and locus of control with the effects of depression controlled for.
note: probability levels are given in parentheses
Trait Anx. SQ LBQ LOCchance
m f m f m f m f
Trait Anx. ------- -.209 -.090 -.275 -.086 -.021 -.031
(.244)  (.509) (.118)  (.530) (.910)  (.824)
SQ -.209 -.090 914** 902** .435**.412**
(.244)  ( 509) (.000)  (.000) (.013)  (.002)
LBQ -.277 -.086 914**902** .463 **.492**
(.118)  (.530) (.000)  (.000) (.008)  (.000)
LOCchance -.021 -.031 .435**.412** .463**.493**
(.910)  ( 824) (.013)  (.002) (.008)  (.000)
LOCp. Others .136 .179 .299 .207 .413** .250 .707**.314*
(.457)  (.199) (.097)  (.136) (.019)  (.070) (.000)  (.022)
* p < .  05 (2-tailed) ** p <  .07(2-tailed) m =male f=female
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8:4:1 Superstition and Trait anxiety -  controllins for depression 
Results in table 5 show that with depression controlled for the coefficient values for 
partial correlations between Trait anxiety and the SQ and LBQ all became negative 
(but did not reach significance) for both males and females.
8:4:2 Superstition and LOC Chance and Powerful 0/Agry- 
contollins for depression
The LBQ had shown highly significant correlations with LOC Chance and LOC 
Powerful Others for both men and women in the bi-variate analysis, as did the SQ 
(except for SQ/LOC Powerful others for women). The partial correlations retained 
significance for the LBQ on both LOC Chance and LOC Powerful Others for men but 
only on LOC chance for women. The SQ retained its significant correlation with LOC 
Chance for both men and women but not for Powerful Others.
8:4:3 External LOC (Powerful Others) and Trait anxiety- 
controllins for depression
The one significant relationship that Trait anxiety evidenced in the bivariate 
correlations (other than with depression) was with LOC powerful others in females. 
With the effects of depression controlled for on both these variables the correlation 
lost significance and fell from .382 to .179, the unique variance in Trait anxiety 
explained by Powerful Others (and vice versa) being reduced fi-om 14.6% to 3.2%.
8:4:4 External LOC ( Chance) and Trait anxiety -  
controllins for depression
In the bi-variate and gender analyses there had been no association between LOC 
Chance and Trait anxiety. Similarly, results in table 4 show that there was no 
association between LOC Chance and Trait anxiety after controlling for the effects of 
depression.
8:5 Summary of results
Participants in the study had higher mean scores on measures of obsessions than those 
obtained from non-clinical populations. This suggests participants were representative 
of an obsessional population. The sample as a whole had a mean score on the BDI-II 
of 23 suggesting they were moderately depressed. Women had significantly higher
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mean scores than men on the BDI-II. Results also show that women had significantly 
higher mean scores than men on measures of superstition.
Results did not support the first hypothesis of the study that superstition and Trait 
anxiety would be negatively correlated. Nevertheless, in the final analysis when 
controlling for depression, all of the correlation coefficients for these two variables 
had negative values although none reached significance.
However, results did support the second hypothesis. Initially, there was a significant 
positive correlation between superstition and an external LOC (chance and powerful 
others). The gender analysis showed that the association between superstition and 
LOC Chance was stronger for women than men, whereas the association between 
superstition and LOC Powerful Others was stronger for men than it was for women. 
After controlling for depression the LBQ retained its significant positive correlation 
with LOC Chance and LOC Powerful Others for men, but only with LOC Chance for 
women. The SQ also retained a significant positive correlation with LOC Chance but 
not with Powerful Others (for both men and women).
An additional exploratory hypothesis of the study was that an external LOC would be 
negatively associated with Trait anxiety but this was not supported by the initial total 
sample analysis that showed a strong significant positive correlation between LOC 
Powerful Others and Trait anxiety. The gender analysis confirmed this relationship for 
women but lost significance for men. However, removing the effects of depression 
from the analysis revealed that Trait anxiety and an external LOC (chance and 
powerful others) were not associated at all, either in men or women.
9:0 Discussion
In an extension of previous research, the aim of this study was to investigate the 
relatedness of superstition and trait anxiety and the relatedness of superstition and an 
external LOC in men and women with OCD. A third, exploratoiy, aim of the research 
was to assess the degree to which an external LOC may be associated with trait 
anxiety in an obsessional population. An over-arching aim of the study was to explore
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the findings in terms of any gender differences that presented.
The discussion will begin in section 9:1 with a brief overview of findings with regard 
to levels of superstition, obsessionality and depression in the participants. In sections 
9:2 to 9:5 a review and interpretation of the main findings for each of the specific 
hypotheses for the study are given together with a consideration of the relationship 
between anxiety and superstition in clinical and non-clinical populations. The 
possible effects on the findings of particular sub-types of OCD symptomatology are 
discussed in section 9:6. A critique of the study is offered in section 9:7 together with 
a discussion of cultural issues and a consideration of ethical difficulties pertinent to 
conducting research with a potentially vulnerable population. Suggestions for future 
research are given in section 9:7:4. Finally, clinical implications of the main findings 
of the study are discussed in section 9:8 before giving a concluding summary in 
section 9:9.
9:1 Participant levels of obsessionality, depression and superstitiousness
Results show that participants demonstrated higher levels of obsessionality than that 
of non-clinical populations suggesting that they were representative of an obsessional 
population. In addition, participants were suffering firom depression, with women 
being significantly more depressed than men. This is consistent with studies that have 
found depression to be co-morbid with OCD (Salkovskis et al., 2000; Millet et al.,
2004). ‘
Level of superstitious belief was not particularly high for the sample but above that 
obtained in a recent study using the LBQ with an obsessional population (Einstein, & 
Menzies, 2004). Women had significantly higher levels of superstitious beliefs than 
men and this is consistent with those studies that have researched levels of 
superstitious beliefs in non-clinical populations and report a gender bias in favour of 
women (Wolfradt, 1997; Sica, Novara & Sanavio, 2002 ;Zebb & Moore, 2003).
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9:2 Hypothesis 1
Building on previous theory and research (Keinan, 2002;
Freud, 1913/1966; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980;
Zebb & Moore, 2003) superstition may function in OCD 
as a global way of coping with uncertainty and reducing 
anxiety such that there will be an inverse association 
between superstitious beliefs and trait anxiety”
The first hypothesis was not supported. There was no negative association between 
superstition and trait anxiety. Although the final analysis (controlling for the effects 
of depression) showed there was a tendency towards a negative relationship between 
superstitious beliefs and trait anxiety, for both men and women, this relationship was 
not significant. Nevertheless, men did show a stronger inverse non-significant 
relationship between superstitious beliefs and trait anxiety, with correlation values 
over twice that of the values for women. Of course, an alternative interpretation could 
be that another factor, related to both but not measured here, could be mediating the 
effect.
One interpretation of the differences found between males and females in the 
relationship of anxiety and superstitiousness is that superstitious beliefs in men may 
function as a more salient and utilitarian force because they are more unusual in men. 
Thus, superstition may function to mediate anxiety in men with OCD but not in 
women with OCD. Vyse (1997) points out that although studies have been consistent 
in finding higher levels of superstitiousness in females, the men that are superstitious 
in the non-clinical population very often reflect the institutionalised beliefs that 
develop in response to culturally desired aims, such as winning a race or a football 
match. It may be that superstition in men and women is differentially perceived and 
experienced. In addition, the invoking of superstitious beliefs as a possible coping 
mechanism for anxiety may also be less efficacious in women if they feel less in 
control of circumstances. As Sica et al (2002) suggest, higher levels of superstitious 
belief may perpetuate an over-estimation of threat and lack of control. Future research 
into superstition in men and women in both clinical and non-clinical populations could 
include an analysis of the content of beliefs and their meaning and function.
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Superstition and trait anxiety are discussed in more detail in section 9:5.
9:3 Hypothesis 2
‘7« an obsessional population, and in accordance with
previous research (e.g. Tobacyk, Nagot & Miller, 1988;
Zebb & Moore, 2003) there will be a positive relationship
between superstition and an external LOC”
Previous research has suggested that superstitious individuals are characterised as 
having an external locus of control (Peterson, 1978; Vyse, 1997) and this was 
confirmed by the current study. Scores on the LBQ for both men and women showed 
strong positive relationships with belief in powerful others and chance factors. This 
suggests that belief in superstitious ideals is more likely in individuals who believe 
that events are largely outside of, or beyond, their control. Even after depression was 
taken into account these relationships retained their significance except for females 
and powerful others. This may indicate that depression is much more efficacious in 
women than it is in men in altering beliefs about the self and may lead to an increase 
in superstitious strategies in order to compensate for perceived threat and lack of 
control. However, as discussed above, this strategy may be ineffective in reducing 
distress in OCD and may even paradoxically strengthen the person’s belief that they 
have no control over their lives. Sica et al (2002) suggest that engaging in 
superstitious behaviours does in itself become a reinforcer of both a sense of threat 
and absence of personal control. These concerns may be even more significant for the 
women in the current study given that their higher levels of depression must signal 
increased isolation and reduced opportunity and motivation to break the cycle of 
emotional distress. Results suggest that for men, there are other factors influencing 
the positive relationship between superstition and a belief that one has little personal 
control over events. Levenson’s (1972) suggestion that men, more than women, may 
focus on the potential that powerful others have in mediating one’s success or failure 
may be significant in interpreting these findings. Expectancies of control may also be 
mediated by other factors not measured here that have the potential to be differentially 
experienced by men and women with OCD, such as employment and education. A 
future study could include these demographic variables in order to assess their
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covariance with expectancies of control.
Results for the other measure of superstition, the SQ (a less extensive questionnaire 
than the LBQ), were slightly different in that after controlling for depression it held 
onto its positive correlation with believing in Chance factors for both men and women 
but not to a belief in Powerful Others. Compared to belief in Powerful Others, belief 
in Chance factors was more strongly correlated with superstitious beliefs both for men 
and women. In contrast there was no relationship at all between superstition and an 
internal locus of control.
Using two measures of superstition in the study but treating them as one construct was 
problematic. These difficulties are discussed in more detail in the critique in section 
9:6.
9:4 Hypothesis 3
“An additional exploratory hypothesis to the study was that if the 
hypothesised relationships above (1 & 2) had validity, then an 
external LOC by virtue of its association with superstitious beliefs 
would show a negative association with trait anxiety”
Findings did not support the third, exploratory, hypothesis of this study. Results 
suggest that holding an externalised locus of control, in terms of belief in chance/fate 
factors and/or powerful others, is not associated in any systematic way with lower 
levels of trait anxiety. In part, this is consistent with the findings above that 
superstitious individuals tend to attribute outcomes in their lives to external causes but 
do not enjoy lower levels of anxiety.
However, it was interesting that before depression was controlled for there was 
actually a highly significant positive correlation between powerful others and trait 
anxiety in women. This relationship became non-significant once depression was 
taken into account. This result suggests that depression impacted substantially on the 
association between trait anxiety and a belief in powerful others in women but not for 
men. Without depression, there was no association at all between these two
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constructs. This may indicate, at least in women, that depression acts to increase both 
anxiety and a belief that events are outside of one’s own control. This is consistent 
with the findings in the study thus far that depression is a significant factor in the 
experience of perceived control for women. It may be that developmental factors are 
in the first instance driving those beliefs but they become more salient through being 
depressed, thereby leading to a sense of helplessness and increased anxiety.
9:5 Perceived threat and the function of superstition
This study has shown that trait anxiety is not inversely related to either superstitious 
beliefs or an externalised LOC. In retrospect it may have been too ambitious to expect 
such a relationship between superstition and trait anxiety in individuals already 
suffering from an extreme anxiety-related disorder. Given that superstition is widely 
accepted as a form of coping and control when all other means of control appear 
inadequate or beyond the perceived capability of the individual (Jahoda, 1969) it may 
be that superstitious beliefs only function to reduce the anxiety that is related to an 
immediate sense of perceived threat, but are not related to trait or general levels of 
anxiety, especially in women. To some extent this answers one of the questions raised 
by the study, that is, do superstition and trait or general anxiety function in clinical 
populations in the same way or differently as they do in non-clinical populations? 
Although this study suggests they do, there are some caveats. Zebb and Moore (2003) 
found no relationship in males between superstition and anxiety in their non-clinical 
population once perception of control had been controlled for and a reduced 
significant relationship for females. The results of the current study evidenced a 
similar position but only when depression, not an external LOC had been partialled 
out of the correlation. All relationships between superstition and anxiety became 
negative once depression was held constant. This could be a differential factor in 
terms of clinical and non-clinical populations in that depression may be much more 
central to the person’s experience once an anxiety disorder such as OCD and all its 
implications have developed and taken hold. In contrast, Zebb & Moore found 
relatively low levels of depression in their non-clinical sample compared to the very 
high levels in the current study. It may be that depression and perception of control 
are equally likely to impact on superstition and anxiety. It may also be important to 
consider whether depression presents as a primary or secondary comorbid condition in 
an obsessional population with regard to both its impact on other aspects of the
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disorder and treatment outcomes. Outcome studies have found that the presence of 
Major Depressive Disorder in OCD impedes progress on exposure and response 
treatment approaches (Abramowitz & Foa, 2000; Steketee, Chambless & Tran, 2001). 
Abramowitz (2004) recommends that both OCD and co-morbid depression should be 
addressed concurrently in any therapy programme.
In addition, if superstition per se is not related to trait anxiety in either a non-clinical 
or an OCD population, this may suggest that its relationship with obsessionality as a 
disorder is not exclusive either, even though they share common characteristics. This 
raises questions with regard to aetiology and whether superstition is more or less 
likely to predispose individuals to developing OCD. Whilst many writers presume an 
association between superstitiousness and OCD (e.g. Salzman, 1968; Amir et al., 
2001), Zebb and Moore (2003) found that superstitiousness was just as related to 
agoraphobic and panic disorder symptoms in their non-clinical sample as it was to 
obsessional symptoms. Similarly, Sica et al (2002) suggest that superstition may 
predispose the individual to developing ‘any form of psychological disorder that 
involves the generalized expectations of danger’.
9:6 Sub-types of OCD symptoms
It is possible that levels of particular OCD symptomatology among participants in the 
study could have impacted on the strength of the observed relationships between 
superstition, trait anxiety and LOC. For example, participants who held superstitious 
beliefs but may also have had higher levels of perfectionist tendencies could have 
experienced higher levels of trait anxiety. Many researchers have commented on the 
positive association between perfectionism and trait anxiety (Deffenbacher et al, 1986; 
Juster et al, 1996; Flett et al, 1989). The net effect of such characteristics in 
superstitious individuals could obscure a relationship between superstition and 
anxiety. Research suggests that although superstitious individuals tend towards 
rumination rather than active behaviours (Sica et al, 2002) some studies have found 
them to be characterised by perfectionism and responsibility (e.g. Frost et al, 1993). 
In order to add to the growing literature on the heterogeneity of beliefs and behaviours 
in OCD and the particular associations between sub-sets of symptoms a further study 
could assess the impact of perfectionism on anxiety in those individuals high and low 
in superstitious beliefs.
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9:7 Critique
9:7:1 Methodological problems
Measures of superstitious beliefs and behaviours
One of the major difficulties for this study was in sourcing a questionnaire that would 
capture superstitious beliefs and ideals as experienced in a clinical, obsessional 
population. In the absence of any research that would definitively conclude that the 
content of superstitious beliefs was the same or different within clinical populations as 
compared to non-clinical populations, or indeed presented on a unified continuum that 
tips over into pathology only when increasing conviction in those beliefs begins to 
seriously impede the everyday existence of the individual, established measures of 
everyday superstitious beliefs were used. The author decided to use two measures that 
differed slightly in content in order to maximise the information gathered. However, 
this proved problematic at the analysis stage as they yielded slightly different 
associations with the other constructs, making interpretation less clear. In addition the 
SQ and the LBQ both reflect culturally familiar (to a western european population) 
superstitious beliefs but do not tap into any of the idiosyncratic beliefs that the 
individual may hold. Further, some of the items on the LBQ such as ‘carrying silver 
dollars is good luck’ are perhaps relevant only to a fairly circumscribed set of 
individuals and do not maximise the power of the questionnaire in revealing the extent 
of people’s superstitious beliefs. As Zebb and Moore (2003) suggest the development 
of a valid and reliable questionnaire to measure superstitious beliefs is much needed.
In addition, there is some degree of confusion in the literature and indeed in the scales 
themselves about the classification of superstition and whether it is subsumed by or 
qualitatively distinct from magical ideation and/or paranormal beliefs making it 
difficult to systematically consider its relationship to other constructs. Some authors 
view them as one and the same construct whereas others say that distinctions may be 
made between superstition, magical thinking and fantastical thinking (Boyer, 1997; 
Johnson, 1997), Magical thinking is typically defined as ‘belief in forms of causation 
that by conventional standards are invalid’ (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). However, 
this description can be equally applied to superstitiousness and indeed some of the 
items on the LBQ such as ‘there is such a thing as the evil eye’ seem to straddle the 
boundary between magical thinking and superstition. One approach to superstition is
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that it may possibly be conceived of as a more benign form of magical ideation, at 
least in the sense that the consequences of belief and/or action are usually confined to 
the self, that is, the warding off of harm or threat is seen as a personal responsibility 
even though the potential effects of the belief and/or action may be widespread. 
Magical ideation on the other hand appears to represent a more global template for the 
way in which the world might be or is arranged. In western culture, magical ideation 
typically involves believing in astrology, telepathy, clairvoyance and the like 
(Chapman, Chapman & Miller, 1982) and appears to encapsulate a sense of ‘not 
knowingness’ on the part of the believer. Even more than superstition, magical 
ideation is defined by thought rather than action and is an indicator of schizotypy 
(Ecklad & Chapman, 1983). Taken to extremes, magical ideation has the capacity to 
escalate paranoid tendencies in the individual, in the form of, for example, developing 
beliefs about global conspiracies in public and corporate institutions. Likewise, 
superstitious beliefs in OCD can completely debilitate the individual and are often 
accompanied by behaviours and rituals that can consume the personal life of the 
individual both mentally and physically. These similarities and qualitative differences 
between superstition and magical ideation really do invite a thorough exposition in the 
literature so that some shared agreement about the degree to which they either reflect 
the same constructs or are theoretically distinct from each other can be reached. This 
should go some way towards developing questionnaires that operationalize and 
measure both superstition and magical ideation in a robust manner.
In addition, there may have been some highly superstitious individuals in this study 
who didn’t actually hold many of the culturally recognisable beliefs that make up the 
questionnaires. Some of the questions on both the LBQ and SQ are open ended such 
as ‘do you do anything special to ward off bad luck’ but the other questions may be 
irrelevant to some individuals thereby reducing the potential of the questionnaire to 
accurately measure their level of superstitious belief. In a quantitative design these 
difficulties could be reduced by incorporating a qualitative aspect of measurement that 
could take account of idiosyncratic beliefs and behaviours. This particular problem 
was not formulated in enough detail prior to the study and although it may not have 
any significance as far as anxiety is concerned it precluded the gathering of valuable 
information about the obsessional population.
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Defînins and measuring anxiety
Trait anxiety is defined as the enduring characteristics of a person’s anxiety-proneness 
(Spielberger, 1983) in that it remains fairly stable across different contexts. 
Conceptually, trait anxiety was thought to me more relevant to this study than state 
anxiety as both trait anxiety and superstitious ideals appear to be driven by 
developmental, rather than situational factors. However, in the light of the findings 
of this study, it may be that state/situational anxiety would be a better indicator of the 
fimction of superstitious beliefs as a strategy for coping with the distress associated 
with uncontrollable outcomes. Given the learning/conditioning context of a reduction 
in anxiety, it may be more likely to reduce immediately after superstitious beliefs and 
behaviours were invoked. Future research in this area could include measures of both 
state and trait anxiety.
9:7:2 Cultural considerations
Although the original advertisement for the study advised that potential participants 
should have English as their first language no further attempts were made to screen 
participants for cultural homogeneity given the time constraints of the study and the 
difficulties in sourcing a clinical population. However, from the email and letter 
contact the researcher had with participants it was clear that the sample was highly 
representative of the dominant White British culture. On the whole, levels of 
superstitious belief were not particularly high, perhaps for some of the reasons 
discussed above, but it should be considered that this may also represent cultural 
differences with regard to the meaning, acceptance and expression of superstitious 
beliefs. For example, Stemberger and Bums (1990) found a significantly lower mean 
score on the PI for a sample of American female college students (n=384) compared 
to Sanavio’s (1988) sample of Italian females (n=146) in the 16-20 and 21-25 year old 
age range. Stemberger and Bums (1990) do not give details about whether 
participants’ scores differed on superstitious items on the PI but it is possible that 
results reflect cultural variance in expressing superstitious beliefs. Where superstition 
has a cultural acceptance in its status as a coping strategy in responding to the 
unknowable or uncontrollable it may be more readily expressed by individuals in that 
culture and less pathologised (Sica et al., 2002).
267
© Vanessa Biyant 2005
9:7:3 Ethical considerations
Placing an advertisement for volunteers in a research study that is seeking to recruit a 
clinical population always has the potential to invite unrealistic expectations on the 
part of the participants as to what thé study is setting out to investigate and what it can 
hope to achieve in the short-term. This issue was thought about prior to carrying out 
the research and made explicit to participants through the information sheet included 
in the questionnaire pack Briefly, this stated that the research was of an investigative 
nature and that no obvious benefit could be gained through taking part. However, in 
reality OCD is a debilitating condition which renders many individuals feeling 
isolated and vulnerable, especially those who have become so disabled that they are 
no longer employed and may be hyper-vigilant to any research activity that they feel 
will be sensitive and interested in their difficulties in the hope that at some point in the 
future they are going to experience relief from their symptoms. For the most part, 
volunteers were very enthusiastic and sometimes philosophical about taking part in 
the research but it was notable that some individuals who were so overwhelmingly 
distressed by their symptoms contacted the researcher several times asking for help. In 
every case they were strongly advised by the researcher to consult with their GP and 
to seek specialist help. Anyone undertaking research with potentially vulnerable 
individuals should be mindful of the way in which they may be perceived by 
respondents and to take account of the power differential which inevitably exists.
9:7:4 Future research
This study used a correlational design in order to be able to make clear comparisons 
with previous research but as a consequence can only comment and hypothesise about 
relationships between the various constructs that were measured and as such leaves 
many questions unanswered with regard to causal factors. A further study could take 
account of these methodological difficulties and seek to clarify the findings of the 
current study by using an experimental design to investigate differences in anxiety 
levels between superstitious and non-superstitious individuals with OCD, and also 
differences in anxiety between those people having an external LOC compared to 
those with an internal LOC. However, the conflict between choosing an experimental 
or correlational design is really an indication of just how complex and broad a topic 
superstition is. On the one hand and in pursuit of a notional ‘truth’, is it best to seek a 
thorough delineation of any unique and ‘pure’ relationships that may or may not exist
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around superstition, or is it better to consider superstition and its effects as the result 
of a dynamic interaction of multiple factors? As discussed above, these philosophical 
difficulties are to some extent reflected in the literature in that superstition is clearly 
not understood or researched as either a distinct category or as a manifestation of 
some universal process which also takes in magical thinking and belief in the 
paranormal.
As mentioned in the introduction superstitious obsessional thoughts and behaviours 
have been linked to processes which are thought to underlie TAP. It was also argued 
briefly that superstitious beliefs may reflect the termination of logical attempts to 
deconstruct cause and effect early in development. In contrast ruminating at length on 
intrusive thoughts is a key feature of TAP that functions to increase anxiety. The use 
of covert or overt behaviours is reinforced due to a consequent reduction in anxiety. 
Both superstitious beliefs and TAP appear to have intrusive thought-rumination 
components about threat of harm but the latter appears to have more intermediary 
cognitions at least until one strategy or another is adopted to terminate the intrusive 
thought-rumination cycle. It seems apparent that TAP and superstition obviously share 
some universal underlying process and it would be interesting for further research to 
examine how beliefs in essentially the same magical processes (ie. both defy the laws 
of cause and effect) can, in some individuals, evidence a differential response. It may 
be that a differential response is linked to a myriad of complex developmental factors 
that drive an individual’s locus of control but this still leaves many interesting 
questions unanswered about the nature of the beliefs themselves, that is, beliefs that 
essentially defy scientific laws.
9:8 Clinical implications
One of the findings of this and previous studies is that superstitious beliefs show a 
strong association with belief in an externalised LOG such that the individual comes 
to be defined by and experiences life through an acceptance of events being beyond 
their control. This helplessness may be one of the factors implicated in the apparent 
resistance to treatment for some individuals with OCD and one that is not usually 
considered in cognitive and behavioural treatments for the disorder. Treatment for 
obsessional beliefs and behaviours typically focuses on challenging the content of 
thoughts and encourages the individual to engage in their own hypothesis testing by
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observing and noting the outcome of not engaging in thoughts/rituals designed to ward 
off harm or threat. Wells (1997) suggests that it is not clear how much the cognitive 
component adds to treatment success whereas other authors report that cognitive 
therapy for OCD is as beneficial as exposure and response prevention methods 
(Cottraux et al., 2001; Wilhelm, Steketee, Fama & Golan, 2003). Despite these 
inconsistencies in the literature, OCD is a heterogenous disorder in terms of clinical 
characteristics and comorbid symptoms and it seems sensible to favour an eclectic and 
pragmatic (in terms of the patient’s history) approach to treatment. Indeed recent 
developments in the literature favour a pluralism in treating OCD which embraces 
psychoeducational, cognitive, behavioural and pharmacological approaches (Wilhelm, 
Tolin & Steketee, 2004). However, these same authors state that ‘conspicuous by their 
absence are psychodynamic, humanistic and family systems treatments for OCD’ and 
attribute this absence to a lack of research on their efficacy and a consensus among 
workers in the field that OCD is best treated through the approaches cited above. 
Unfortunately such models do not take account of the wider experience of the client. 
It may be beneficial to take a developmental approach towards an exploration of 
factors impacting on a patient’s attributions in order to encapsulate and facilitate a 
broader understanding of their difficulties, especially in those cases resistant to change 
and in which frequent relapse has occurred. In support of a developmental perspective 
to treatment, superstitious beliefs have been found to be more prevalent in early onset 
OCD (Millet et al., 2004) and evidence suggests that early onset OCD is more 
resistant to successful treatment outcome (Campos, 2001). Future research could 
attempt to clarify if obsessions with superstitious content are more resistant than non- 
superstitious obsessions to successful treatment outcomes.
9:9 Summary and conclusion
Previous research by Zebb and Moore (2003) found that superstitious beliefs in a non- 
clinical population were not specifically related to levels of general (or trait) anxiety. 
The current study hypothesised that superstitious beliefs in a clinical population with 
OCD may be negatively associated with trait anxiety as they may have come to 
represent a global way of coping with threat and uncertainty such that threat was 
perceived as being generally less salient and present in the more superstitious 
individual’s environment. However this hypothesis was not supported by the data 
generated by this study. Although superstitious beliefs and trait anxiety were inversely
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related, this relationship was not significant. Nevertheless, this inverse relationship 
was stronger in men than in women. Results confirmed the findings of previous 
research in that women had significantly higher levels of superstitious beliefs than 
men. It was suggested that as superstition is less common in men it may be more 
salient and have more utility than it does for women. Women in the study were also 
significantly more depressed than men.
In line with previous research, a second hypothesis stated that belief in superstition 
would be strongly associated with an externalised LOC. Results confirmed this. There 
was a particularly strong relationship between superstitious beliefs and a belief in 
chance/fate factors for both men and women. Additionally, in men there was a strong 
positive association between superstitiousness and a belief that powerful others 
control events. Depression was considered to be associated with and a significant 
factor in control expectancies for women.
An additional and exploratory hypothesis to the study was that trait anxiety would be 
inversely related to an externalised LOC. However, results of the study did not 
support this hypothesis. There was no association between trait anxiety and an 
external LOC. However an additional finding was that depression was veiy strongly 
correlated with anxiety, (these two constructs evidenced the highest positive 
correlation of all the variables measured) and may have obscured the relationship 
between anxiety and an external LOC. In support of this, an initial positive 
relationship between anxiety and Powerful Others (externalised LOC) in women was 
reduced to a non-significant relationship once depression was controlled for, 
suggesting that depression was driving the initial association of these two constructs. 
Results suggest that depression was especially significant for women in their 
experience of distress and beliefs about personal control.
It was also considered that future research should take account of both developmental 
and situational constructs in defining and measuring anxiety as they may be 
differentially associated with superstitious beliefs and behaviours.
In conclusion, this study has shown that the area is under researched and as yet little 
understood but may yet yield interesting and useful therapeutic tools if extended and
271
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modified appropriately.
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Invitation to take part in OCD research
I am a third year student at the University o f Surrey studying for a doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. I am currently undertaking research with individuals suffering from Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder in which I will be investigating how levels of anxiety and control may 
differ in OCD sufferers according to the kinds of belief they may have, and whether there are 
any variations between men and women. Understanding this relationship may go some way 
towards helping patients and professionals alike in developing more effective methods of 
treatment for OCD. I would be most grateful if  anyone who is interested in takmg part in the 
study and would like further information on how to do so, could contact me via email or my 
university address, details of which are given below:-
Email address: psm2vb@suiTev.ac.uk
Postal address: Vanessa Bryant
Department of Clinical Psychology
University of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey
GU2 7XH
The study will involve completing postal questionnaires and returning to the researcher in the 
provided stamped addressed envelopes. The study is completely confidential and no 
identifying details will appear anywhere on the questionnaires.
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Appendix 3
Information pack, letter of introduction and consent forms sent to interested 
participants
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Unis
University 
of Surrey
OuMttd
Sgrr»yGJJ2 7XK IK  
TeksWns
♦44 p i t4 9 3 3 a :a o o  
*44 pt483 aoctoa
www,euif*ry8C,iK3"* December 2004
information Sheet
Study title:
The f ix ed n e ss  of superstitioi» beNefs to anxiety, per^rtloi of ccxitrcrf and 
gender in individuals suffering Rwn Obsessive CompWsive darder.
Invitation to take part in tiie study:
You are being invited to take part in a researdi study. Befixe yew decide it is 
im(x3rtant for you to vfxierstamd why the research is being d<me and what it vmII 
invoiv©. Please take time to read the toBowing inftxmation carefully and 
discuss It w^h ottw s if you wish, Please ask the researcher if there is 
anything that is not dear or if you would like more information. Take time to 
dedda whether or not you wish to take part.
Thank you for reading this.
School of
Human
Sciences
Psychology
Facwi'te
♦4«tC|l4B3eeSS53
7«» QMWM * AHRmkM** Fwm*
What is the purpose of the study?
The study is hoping to find out whether superstittous tœliefs in OCD sufferers 
are related to perception of (»ntrol and more w  less anwety than those 
sufferers who (ton't twW superstitious beltefe. For example, would an individual 
who engages in rituals (sudi as saying a rhyme a set number of times) in 
order to ward off any harm occurring to his/her family be likdy to apprai^ 
events in their life as being more or less outside of their control and 
experience more less anxiety compared to an individual who en g a g e  in 
continuous hand-washing to jKevent oontaminatiw»? The study will al«) 
assess if mate and female OCD sufferers differ in their level of superstitious 
beliefs and perception of control
The study is expwctKl to be completed by July 2005
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Why have I been approached to take part?
The researcher has advertised the research project to several recognised 
organisations that exist to support OCD sufferers. It is up to you to decide 
whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to 
take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.
What will taking part involve?
The research project is a questionnaire study. Participants will be given several 
questionnaires which they should complete and return to the researcher in a 
stamped addressed envelope that will be supplied. It will take approximately 
one hour to fill in the questionnaires.
What are the advantages of taking part in the study?
The research is seeking to contribute towards an improved understanding of 
the relationship between beliefs, anxiety and perception of control in OCD and 
may help sufferers and professionals to collaborate in developing more 
effective treatments for this distressing condition.
It is unlikely that individual participants will derive any personal benefit from 
taking part in the study.
What are the disadvantages of taking part in the study?
None except for the time it takes to fill in the questionnaires.
However, as a result of focussing on and completing the questionnaires it may 
be that some participants experience an increase in their anxiety. Should any 
participants become distressed they are urged to contact the researcher by post 
or email who will supply information on how to access psychological help for 
their difficulties. The address is at the end of this information sheet.
What happens after the research study finishes?
The information collected by the researcher will be used in her research thesis 
which will then be kept in the library at the University of Surrey. In addition it 
is hoped that the study will be published in a peer reviewed journal
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Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
Yes, taking part in the study is strictly confidential. You will not have to put 
your name on any of the questionnaires and cannot therefore be identified by 
any of the details you supply.
Should I inform my GP about my participation in the study?
Although the study is confidential you are encouraged to inform your GP 
about your participation in the study. However, it is your decision as to 
whether you wish to do this or not.
Who is organising and funding the research?
The University of Surrey and the researcher j ointly.
Who has reviewed the research?
The Central and South Bristol Research Ethics Committee and the University 
of Surrey Ethics Committee.
Contact for further information
If you require further information please contact:
By post: Vanessa Bryant
Department of Clinical Psychology
University of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey
GU2 7XH.
Email address: psm2vb@surrey.ac.uk
Thank you veiy much for agreeing to take part in this study. Please return one 
copy of the signed consent form with your completed questionnaires and keep 
the other copy for your own records.
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{on university headed paper)
17““ January 2005 
Dear Mr
Re: Research project investigating the relatedness 
of anxiety, locus of control and superstitious beliefs 
in individuals suffering with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.
Thank you very much for replying to my advertisement with regard to the above 
research project. I am sorry that it has taken so long to send out the questionnaires to 
you but setting up the project took much longer than I thought it would!
I enclose an information sheet, consent form and questionnaire pack for you to look at 
and decide whether or not you wish to take part in the study. If you would like to take 
part please sign both copies of the consent form and return one copy to me with the 
completed questionnaires in the enclosed stamped addressed envelope. Also, please 
don’t forget to fill in the form that asks about age etc. As there are rather a lot of 
questionnaires it may be a good idea to do half of them on one day and the other half 
another day. Hopefully, they shouldn’t take more than about one hour to complete. I 
would be most grateful if you could check carefully to make sure that all items on the 
questionnaires have been answered before you send them back to me.
With regard to confidentiality please do not write your name on the questionnaires.
Should you require any further information please don’t hesitate to contact me at the 
address given below.
Thank you again for your interest in the study.
Yours sincerely.
Vanessa Bryant
Department of Clinical Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
Surrey
GU2 7XH email: psm2vb@surrev.ac.uk
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{on university headed paper)
CONSENT FORM
Title of Project:
The relatedness of superstitious beliefs to anxiety, 
perception of control and gender in individuals 
suffering from O bsessive Compulsive disorder.
Name of Researcher; 
V anessa Bryant
Please initial box
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, without my legal rights being affected.
3. I agree to take part in the above study.
4. Please indicate whether you are currently taking part in any other research studies:
(please tick) Yes No
Name of Participant Date Signature
Researcher Date Signature
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Name of researcher; Vanessa Bryant
University address: Department of Clinical Psychology
University of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey.
GU2 7XH.
Proiect Title:
The relatedness of superstition to Locus of Control (LOG) gender and anxiety in 
individuals suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD).
Theoretical Rationale:
Research into the role of superstitious beliefs in either preventing disaster or inviting a 
positive outcome suggests a link with the individual’s perceived level of control over 
external events (Jahoda, 1969; Peterson, 1978). It is also suggested gender differences 
exist, with females having significantly more superstitious beliefs than males (Zebb & 
Moore, 2003). It is possible that both OCD and superstition represent an adaptive 
anxiety-reducing strategy whereby individuals engage in behaviours intended to ward 
off external events they perceive to be beyond their control. Historically, females may 
have perceived themselves to be less in control of the environment than males. There 
have been no studies to date that have examined the relationship between superstition, 
OCD, LOG, anxiety and gender.
Objectives:
To assess whether higher levels of superstitious beliefs in OCD sufferers are 
associated with more of an externalised LOG and less anxiety than those sufferers 
who show lower levels of superstitious beliefs. For example, would an individual who 
engages in a variety of rituals throughout the day (such as saying a rhyme a set 
number of times) in order to ward off any harm occurring to his/her family be more 
likely to hold an externalised locus of control and experience lower levels of anxiety 
compared to an individual who engages in continuous hand-washing to prevent 
contamination? The study will also assess if male and female OCD sufferers differ in 
their level of superstitious beliefs, LOG and anxiety.
Design and statistical analyses
The study will be a mixed design, between and within groups. All variables except 
gender will be continuous. A between groups analysis using ANOVA will test for 
differences between men and women on LOG, anxiety and level of superstitious 
belief. A correlational analysis (a series of bi-variate and partial correlations) will look 
at relationships within each of the two groups on all of the above variables.
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Participants:
Unfortunately there are no estimates of the frequency of superstitious beliefs in the 
OCD population and in effect, this is what the study is setting out to achieve. This is 
problematic when deciding on sample size, but a power analysis where alpha is set at 
.05 and power at .80 with an effect size of .25 yields a sample size of 128.
Participants will be recruited from OCD self-help groups.
Procedures
Participants will be recruited through advertisements placed in the newsletters and 
websites of the OCD self-help groups. Questionnaires will be posted to potential 
participants by the researcher.
Main hypotheses:
OCD sufferers who are characterised by high levels of superstitious belief will be 
more likely to have an externalised locus of control and lower levels of anxiety than 
OCD sufferers who have fewer superstitious beliefs.
Main outcome measure:
Participants will complete established measures of obsessive beliefs, superstitious 
beliefs, anxiety and Locus of Control.
Ethical considerations: Submission of proposal to University and NHS multi 
research ethics committee.
Confidentiality of and potential distress to participants are the main ethical issues of 
this study.
Confidentiality will be addressed through the use of unique identifying numbers on 
questionnaire packs. No personal details will appear anywhere on questionnaires.
Some participants may experience an increase in their anxiety when completing 
questionnaires that focus on their difficulties. The information sheet accompanying 
the questionnaires will advise participants on what they should do if this happens (see 
information sheet).
University supervisor: Dr. S. Thorpe
Name of ethics committee(s) to which project will be submitted: University of 
Surrey Ethics Committee and NHS multi research ethics committee.
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Background
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder is a severe and debilitating condition characterised by 
recurrent obsessions and compulsions that cause significant distress and impairment to 
sufferers. Obsessions may be thoughts, ideas, impulses or visual images that are 
persistent, unwanted and intrusive. The individual may view the content of their 
intrusions as strange and abnormal, being completely incongruent with his/her normal 
thought processes (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Compulsive behaviours 
may arise through attempts to neutralise obsessions, thereby reducing anxiety. For 
example, someone obsessed with contamination fears may engage in repetitive hand­
washing. Alternatively, compulsive behaviours may not be connected in a concrete 
way with the obsession they are seeking to neutralise and may tend towards 
superstition, such as placing items in a particular order in an attempt to prevent harm 
occurring to family members.
OCD sufferers are characterised by high levels of anxiety and feeling responsible for 
preventing some feared harm or events. They may also hold strong superstitious 
beliefs. However, although Zebb & Moore (2003) found a strong relationship 
between superstitiousness and obsessive-compulsive behaviour in a non-clinical 
sample, the relationship between superstition and anxiety was less well-defined. The 
study showed that in females, but not in males, superstitious beliefs were significantly 
correlated with measures of other anxiety disorders such as social phobia and 
agoraphobia. The authors point out that superstition is also related to depression and 
stress and as such may not be a specific pre-disposing factor for anxiety. In addition, 
the study found that in females superstitious beliefs are strongly related to compulsive 
behaviours such as checking but not to cleaning, doubting or slowness. It may be that 
the latter require more intermediary cognitions than checking and are prompted by 
continuous and high levels of anxiety and arousal. This may suggest that superstition 
to a certain extent acts as a container for the individual’s anxiety when compared to 
other OCD sufferers whose anxiety is demonstrated through more controlling
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behaviours such as obsessive slowness, doubting or cleaning. Interestingly, a study by 
Sica, Novara and Sanavio (2002) found a negative correlation between superstition 
and perfectionism whilst Frost et al (1993) found a strong link between superstition, 
checking, perfectionism and responsibility. These conflicting results with regard to the 
relationship between superstition and responsibility may reflect different methods of 
analysis and require clarification. Nevertheless, as perfectionism requires controlling 
behaviours and hence continuous arousal, it is unlikely that compulsive behaviours 
such as excessive cleaning would manifest in OCD sufferers who have strong 
superstitious beliefs and a hypothesised external locus of control. To a certain extent, 
belief in superstitious ideals may be seen as a relinquishing of responsibility and 
control.
Although individuals with superstitious beliefs may indeed be anxious, it is not clear 
from the Zebb and Moore (2003) study if anxiety varies with type of belief i.e. it may 
be that anxiety reduces somewhat through superstitious beliefs and ideals. Could OCD 
sufferers without superstitious beliefs be more anxious than those with superstitious 
beliefs? The profile of an OCD sufferer who holds superstitious beliefs may be one of 
an individual who surrenders their anxiety to an external force rather than the OCD 
sufferer who is continually ‘on guard’ and needs to keep track of his/her anxieties 
through pro-active and overt behaviours that exert a real and concrete effect on his/her 
environment.
The study predicts that OCD sufferers characterised by higher levels of superstitious 
belief will demonstrate lower levels of anxiety and more of an externalised LOC than 
those sufferers who have lower levels of superstitious belief.
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Additional information about participants and a diagnosis of OCD
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Additional Information 
Please supply the following information about yourself:
1. Age:
2. Sex : Male □  Female □  (please tick)
3. How old were you when you or others around you noticed your Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder symptoms?
4. Approximately how long have you been suffering from Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder symptoms?
5. Have you ever received a diagnosis of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
from a medical/psychological practitioner?
Yes □  No □  (please tick)
6. Please list below any medications that have been prescribed for you and 
that you are currently taking for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
symptoms:
Thank you very much.
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PADUA INVENTORY
Date:
Instructions: The following statements refer to thoughts and behaviours which may 
occur to everyone in everyday life. For each statement, choose the reply which best 
seems to fit you and the degree o f disturbance which such thoughts or behaviors may 
create.
0 - not at all
1 - a little
2 -quite a lot
3 - a lot
4 - very much
 1. I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money.
 2. I think even shght contact with bodily secretion (perspiration, saliva, urine, etc.) may
contaminate my clothes or somehow harm me.
 3. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or
by certain people.
 4. I find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things.
 5. I avoid using pubhc toilets because I am afraid of disease or contamination.
 6. I avoid using public phones, because I am afraid of contagion and disease.
 7. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary.
 8. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I think I may be dirty or
‘contaminated.’
 9. If I touch something I think is 'contaminated' I immediately have to wash or clean
myself.
 10. If an animal touches me, I feel dirty and immediately have to wash myself or change
my clothes.
 11. When doubts and worries come to my mind, I cannot rest until I have talked when
over with a reassuring person.
 12. When I talk I tend to repeat the same things and the same sentences several times.
 13.1 tend to ask people to repeat the same things to me several times consecutively, even
though I did understand what they had said the first time.
 14.1 feel obliged to follow a particular order in dressing, undressing, and washing myself
 15. Before going to sleep I have to do certain things in a certain order.
 16. Before going to bed I have to hang up or fold my clothes in a special way.
 17.1 feel I have to repeat certain numbers for no reason.
 18.1 have to do things several tunes before I think they are properly done.
 19.1 tend to keep on checking things more often than necessary.
 20.1 check and recheck gas and water taps and hght switches after turning them off.
21.1 return home to check doors, windows, drawers, etc., to make sure they are properly 
shut.
 22.1 keep on checking forms, documents, checks, etc. to make sure I have filled them in
correctly.
 23.1 keep on going back to see that matches, cigarettes, etc. are properly extinguished.
 24. When I handle money, I count and recount it several times.
 25.1 check letters carefully many times before posting them.
 26.1 find it difficult to make decisions, even about important matters.
 27. Sometimes I am not sure I have done things which in fact I know I have done.
 28. I have the impression that I will never be able to explain things clearly, especially
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when talking about important matters that involve me.
 29. After doing something carefully, I still have the impression I have either done it badly
or not finished it.
 30.1 am sometimes late because I keep on doing certain things more often than necessary.
 31.1 invent doubts and problans about most of the things I do.
 32. When I start thinking of certain things, I become obsessed with them.
 __33. Unpleasant thoughts come into my mind against my will and I cannot get rid o f them.
   34. Obscene or dirty words come into my mind and I cannot get rid of them.
 35. My brain constantly goes its own way and I find it difficult to attend to what is
happening round me.
 36.1 imagine catastrophic consequences as a result of absent-mindedness or minor errors
that I make.
 37.1 think or worry at length about having hurt someone without knowing it.
 38. When I hear about a disaster, I think it is somehow my fault.
 39.1 sometimes worry at length for no reason that I have hurt myself or have some
disease.
 40.1 sometimes start counting objects for no reason.
 41.1 feel I have to remember completely uiiimportant numbers.
 42. When I read I have the impression I have missed something important and must go
back and reread the passage at least two or three times.
 43.1 worry about remembering completely unimportant things and make an effort not to
forget them.
 44. When a thought or doubt comes into my mind, I have to examine it Jfrom all points of
view and cannot stop until I have done so.
 45. In certain situations I am afiraid of losing my self-control and doing embarrassing
things.
 46. When I look down from a bridge or a very high window, I feel an impulse to throw
myself into space.
 47. \^%en I see a train approaching I sometimes think I could throw myself under its
wheels.
 48. At certain moments I am tenq)ted to tear off my clothes in pubhc.
 49. While driving I sometimes feel an impulse to drive the car into someone or
something.
  50. Seeing weapons excites me and makes me think violent thoughts.
 51.1 get upset and worried at the sight o f knives, daggers, and other pointed objects.
 52.1 sometimes feel something inside me which makes me do things which are really
senseless and which I do not want to do.
 53.1 sometimes feel the need to break or damage things for no reason.
 54.1 sometimes have an impulse to steal other people's belongings' even if  they are of no
use to me.
 55.1 am sometimes almost irresistibly tempted to steal something fi*om the supermarket.
 56.1 sometimes have an impulse to hurt defenseless children or animals.
 57.1 feel I have to make special gestures or walk in a certain way.
 58. In certain situations I feel an impulse to eat too much, even if I am then ill.
 59. When I hear about a suicide or a crime, I am upset for a long time and find it difficult
to stop thinking about it.
 60.1 invent useless worries about germs and diseases.
 Total
Sanavio, E. (1988). Obsessions and compulsions: The Padua Inventory. Behavior 
Research and 
Theranv. 26,169-177.
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Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44)
This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs that people sometimes hold.
Read each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
For each of the statements, choose the number matching the answer that best describes 
how you think
Because people are different, there are no right or wrong answers.
To decide whether a given statement is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep 
in mind what you are like most o f  the time.
Use the following scale:
1________  2 3_____________ 4___________5 6___________ 7
disagree disagree disagree neither agree agree agree agree
very much moderately a little nor disagree a little moderately very much
In making your ratings, try to avoid using the middle point of the scale (4), but rather 
indicate whether you usually disagree or agree with the statements about your own 
beliefs and attitudes.
T. I often think things around me are unsafe. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. If Fm not absolutely sure of something, Tm bound to make a mistake 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Things should be perfect according to my own standards. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. In order to be a worthwhile person, I must be perfect at everything I do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. When I see any opportunity to do so, I must act to prevent bad things 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
happening.
6. Even if harm is very unlikely, I should try to prevent it at any cost. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. For me, having bad urges is as bad as actually carrying them out. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. If I don’t act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame for any 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
consequences.
9. If I can’t do something perfectly, I shouldn’t do it at all. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. I must work to my full potential at all times. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. It is essential for me to consider all possible outcomes of a situation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Even minor mistakes mean a job is not complete. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_13. If I have aggressive thoughts or impulses about my loved ones, this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I may secretly want to hurt them.
14. I must be certain of my decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. In all kinds of daily situations, failing to prevent harm is just as bad as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
deliberately causing harm.
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16. Avoiding serious problems (for example, illness or accidents) requires 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
constant effort on my part.
17. For me, not preventing harm is as bad as causing harm. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. I should be upset i f l  make a mistake. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. I should make sure others are protected from any negative consequences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
of my decisions or actions
20. For me, things are not right if they are not perfect. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Having nasty thoughts means I am a terrible person. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. I f l  do not take extra precautions, I am more likely than others to have 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
or cause a serious disaster.
23. In order to feel safe, I have to be as prepared as possible for anything 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
that could go wrong.
24. I should not have bizarre or disgusting thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. For me, making a mistake is as bad as failing completely. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. It is essential for everything to be clear cut, even in minor matters. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. Having a blasphemous thought is as sinful as committing a 1 2 3 4 5, 6 7
sacrilegious act.
28. I should be able to rid my mind of unwanted thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. I am more likely than other people to accidentally cause harm to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
myself or to others.
30. Having bad thoughts means I am weird or abnormal. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. I must be the best at things that are important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. Having an unwanted sexual thought or image means I really want to do it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. Ifmy actions could have even a small effect on a potential misfortune, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am responsible for the outcome.
34. Even when I am careful, I often think that bad things will happen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. Having intrusive thoughts means I'm out of control. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. Harmful events will happen unless I am very careful. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37. I must keep working at something until it's done exactly right. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38. Having violent thoughts means I will lose control and become 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
violent.
39. Tome, failing to prevent a disaster is as bad as causing it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40. I f l  don’t do a job perfectly, people won’t respect me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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41. Even ordinary experiences in my life are fiiU o f risk. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
42. Having a bad thought is morally no different than doing a bad deed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43. No matter what I do, it won’t be good enough. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. I f l  don't control my thoughts. I'll be punished. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
questionnaire developed by:
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group. (2001). Development
and initial validation of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and the Interpretations
of Intrusions Inventory. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39, 987-1006.
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Appendix 8
The OCI-R
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory -  Revised
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their everyday 
lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience has 
DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the past month. The numbers refer to 
the following verbal labels:
0 1 2 3 4
Not at all A little Moderately A lot Extremely
1. I have saved up so many things that they get in the way. 0 12 3 4
2. I check things more often than necessary. 0 12 3 4
3. I get upset if objects are not arranged properly. 0 12 3 4
4. I feel compelled to count while I am doing things. 0 12 3 4
5. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been
touched by strangers or certain people. 0 12 3 4
6. I find it difficult to control my own thoughts. 0 12 3 4
7. I collect things I don’t need. 0 12 3 4
8. I repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc. 0 12 3 4
9. I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things. 0 12 3 4
10. I feel I have to repeat certain numbers 0 12 3 4
11. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I
feel contaminated. 0 12 3 4
12. I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind
against my will. 0 12 3 4
13. I avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need
them later. 0 12 3 4
14. I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after
turning them off. 0 12 3 4
15. I need things to be arranged in a particular order. 0 1 2  3 4
16. I feel that there are good and bad numbers. 0 12 3 4
17. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary. 0 1 2  3 4
18. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting
rid of them. 0 12 3 4
Copyright 2002 by Edna. B. Foa.
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TheLBQ
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Lucky Beliefs Questionnaire (Frost et al., 1993)
Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with each of the following 
statements.
Strongly disagree Strongly agree
1. Some numbers are lucky. 1 2 3 4 5
2. Seeing a cat brings bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
3. Walking under ladders is bad luck 1 2 3 4 5
4. The number 13 is unlucky. 1 2 3 4 5
5. Opening an umbrella inside is
bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
6. Stepping on cracks in the pavement
brings bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
7. Finding a four leaf clover brings
good luck. 1 2 3 4 5
8. Picking up a penny brings good
luck. 1
9. Rabbits’ feet are lucky. 1
10. Some objects are lucky. 1
11. Wishes made at a well or while tossing
coins into a fountain will come true. 1 2  3 4
12. Knocking on wood will prevent the undoing
of something good you have just said. 1 2  3 4
13. There are such things as haunted houses
and ghosts. 1 2  3 4
14. Fortune tellers can predict the future. 1 2  3 4
15. Some sayings are lucky. 1 2 3 4
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Strongly disagree Strongly agree
16. It is bad luck for the groom to see the 
bride in her gown before the ceremony.
17. Wishes made on a star will come true.
18. Friday the 13^ is an unlucky day.
19. Breaking a mirror will bring seven years 
bad luck.
20. Hanging a horse-shoe ends up will bring 
good luck.
21. Killing a spider is bad luck.
22. The 7^ child in a family is lucky.
23. Astrology can predict the future.
24. Crystals have a special power.
25. There is such a thing as the evil eye.
26. Crossing your fingers can bring good 
luck.
27. Hanging gifts of money in new businesses 
will bring good luck.
28. Bad luck comes in threes.
29. Throwing change in the back seat of a 
new car will bring good luck.
30. Carrying silver dollars is good luck.
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
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Appendix 10
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Superstitiousness Questionnaire (Leonard et al., 1990)
Listed below are a number of statements. Please read each statement carefully and indicate, according 
to the scale given below, how much you think each statement applies to you.
Strongly disagree = 0 Slightly agree = 3
Moderately disagree = 1 Moderately agree = 4
Slightly disagree = 2  Strongly agree = 5
1 I have a lucky number__________________________________ _________
2 I believe that seemg a black cat brings bad luck .
3 I believe that walking under ladders will bring bad luck. _________
4 I avoid walking under ladders. _________
5 I believe that the number 13 is unlucky. _________
6 I believe that opening an umbrella indoors is bad luck _________
7 I avoid opening an umbrella indoors. _________
8 I avoid stepping on cracks in the pavement for fear of 
bringing bad luck.
9 I believe that finding a four leaf clover brings good luck
10 I believe that picking up a penny brings good luck.
11 I believe that wishes made in a well or while tossing coins 
in a fountain will come true
12 I believe that knocking on wood will prevent the undoing 
of something good I just said.
13 I knock on wood to prevent the undoing of something good 
I just said.
14 I believe that fortune tellers can predict the future.
15 I f l  went to a fortune teller and that person predicted 
something, it would come true for me.
16 I do something special to bring good luck.
17 I do something special to prevent bad luck
18 I have a superstition not listed here
324
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